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Contact Information 
This report has been published by: 
 
European Commission 
Directorate General for Trade.G.1 
170 Rue de la Loi 
1049 Brussels, Belgium 
Tel : +32-2-295-3034, Fax : +32-2-296-7393 
Email : TRADE-G1-MARKET-ACCESS@ec.europa.eu  
  Contacts: Mr. Jens Schaps, Mr. Graham Taylor and Mr. Andreas Guth 
 
where any further enquiries or comments concerning this report can be sent. 
 
 
 
For market access information, economic and regulatory information, applied tariff levels and analysis 
of trade issues, please consult the European Commission’s Market Access Database website: 
 
http://madb.europa.eu 
 
For an overview of all the U.S.-related fiches in the Market Access Database, please click here. 
 
Additional information and updates on EU-U.S. trade relations, as well as this report. can be found in 
the "Bilateral Trade Relations" section of the website of the European Commission's Directorate 
General for Trade:  
 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade 
 
Information from the Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry on notifications of technical 
regulations and conformity assessment procedures is available at: 
 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/tbt 
 
This report has been compiled by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Trade in co-
operation with the European Commission’s Delegation in Washington, D.C. and other services of the 
Commission on the basis of material available to them at the end of December 2007.  
 
This year's Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Barriers focuses on some key active, upcoming trade 
barriers and measures that prevent EU exporters from effectively drawing upon the full potential of 
EU-U.S. trade relations. Details on the trade barriers mentioned in the body of the report are attached 
in the annex.  
 
If you feel that a trade barrier has not been sufficiently covered in either this report or the MADB, you 
may now lodge an on-line complaint about the barrier you experience with the European 
Commission's Market Access Team via  
 
http://madb.europa.eu/madb_barriers/complaint_home.htm  
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1. EU-U.S.  TRADE  RELATIONS – A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
The European Union and the United States are each other's main trading partners and enjoy 
the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world. In 2006 their combined economies 
accounted for nearly 60 % of global GDP, approximately 33 % of world trade in goods and 42 
% of world trade in services. The total flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) between the 
EU and the U.S. was approximately Euro 147 billion. The EU FDI stock held in the U.S. 
amounts to roughly Euro 926 billion. Total FDI stocks held in each others countries reach 
approximately Euro 1.89 trillion. 
The size and importance of the bilateral trade relationship makes the EU and the U.S. the key 
trade players on the global scene. EU-U.S. economic cooperation defines standards around the 
world and sets the pace in the WTO. Europe and America support a “rules-based” trading 
system and are working towards a successful conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) round of trade talks. 
In 2007, the EU and the U.S. launched a new effort, the Transatlantic Economic Council 
(TEC), to integrate our economies even more fully by identifying key areas where greater 
convergence between economies and systems could reap rewards on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Bringing together government, industry, labour, and consumers, the TEC holds the 
promise of an ever deeper and more mutually productive transatlantic relationship. At the first 
TEC meeting in November 2007, important progress was achieved in areas such as the launch 
of the investment dialogue, the negotiations on mutual recognition of accounting standards 
and of U.S and EU trade partnership programmes, secure cargo and a number of more 
technical regulatory issues.  
In even this closest of partnerships, however, there still exist trade barriers and differences 
that hinder trade and investment. This annual report on U.S. trade barriers from the European 
Commission highlights some of the impediments that the European Union encounters when 
doing business with the U.S. The barriers described range from the small and relatively easily 
addressed to larger, more complicated problems, including challenging regulatory questions 
and some issues that have been or are being litigated at the World Trade Organisation. No 
matter the size or economic impact, all barriers need to be addressed, as far as possible, to 
help maintain and strengthen both transatlantic confidence and broader faith in the 
multilateral trading system.  
The year 2007, in fact, saw the successful resolution of one long-running trade dispute: the 
U.S. repealed countervailing duties, imposed on the basis of findings concerning 
"privatisation" of EC exporters, which were declared illegal by the WTO in December 2006. 
Other disputes remain before the WTO or await U.S. compliance with findings by World 
Trade Organisation dispute settlement bodies. 
While the overall economic impact of outstanding EU-U.S. trade disputes constitutes only a 
small proportion of the total EU-U.S. trade volume, our differences should be carefully 
managed to prevent unnecessary conflict, including costly and time-consuming litigation, and 
damage to the economies on both sides of the Atlantic. The European Commission remains 
firmly committed to addressing existing and future obstacles to trade and investment in the 
U.S. market in a constructive way, through bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral channels.  
Transatlantic trade and investment is very good for Europe, and also for America and 
Americans. It is thus the EU's hope that the U.S. will work diligently in 2008 to remove trade 
barriers facing European companies seeking to do more business in America.  
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2.  SECURITY RELATED TRADE BARRIERS 
2.1. Cargo  Trade 
The U.S. launched the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in 2002 to counter potential terrorist 
threats to the international maritime container trade system. The CSI consists of four 
elements: security criteria to identify high-risk containers; pre-screening containers before 
they arrive in U.S. ports; using technology to pre-screen high-risk containers; and developing 
and using smart and secure containers. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
launched the system to achieve a more secure maritime trade environment while attempting to 
accommodate the need for efficiency in global commerce. Ports participating in the CSI use 
technology to assist their officers in quickly inspecting high-risk containers before they are 
shipped to U.S. ports. So far, ten Member States have signed declarations of principle with the 
CBP to introduce CSI in their ports as well as an agreement on stationing U.S. Customs 
officials in their ports. 
In order to ensure a level playing field among European ports, the EU concluded an 
agreement that expands the EU-U.S. customs co-operation agreement to include transport 
security aspects and to prepare minimum standards for all EU ports to participate in the CSI. 
In August 2005, the U.S. agreed to the participation of more EU ports in the CSI where they 
comply with certain jointly agreed minimum standards and where no U.S. officials will be 
stationed. For this project, a pilot action has been performed in 2007 in the port of Szczecin 
(Poland). Similar actions are envisaged in Aarhus (Denmark) and Salerno (Italy) for the 
beginning of 2008. The EU-U.S. working group established by the expanded agreement is 
currently working on further measures which are intended to diminish the barriers caused by 
this initiative. 
According to EU industry, the CSI screening and related additional U.S. customs routines are 
causing significant additional costs and delays to shipments of EU machinery and electrical 
equipment to the U.S. This burden is so severe that a number of small European engineering 
companies have decided not to export to the U.S. any longer. There is also competitive 
distortion in this fiercely competitive engineering market between the EU and U.S. 
engineering companies since to date there is, de facto, no reciprocity between the EU and the 
U.S. in this regard. 
On 13 October 2006, U.S. President Bush signed into law the Safety and Accountability for 
Every Port Act, the so-called SAFE Port Act. The Act contains a number of provisions that 
impact upon port security as well as international supply chain security. Section 231 of the 
Act foresees the establishment of a pilot programme at some foreign ports to test integrated 
non-intrusive imaging and radiation detection scanning equipment for all U.S.-bound 
containers. This pilot programme goes against a modern customs approach of risk based 
controls through effective targeting followed by scanning and/or inspection when necessary 
and may slow down traffic in ports.  
The port of Southampton (UK) had been chosen to participate in this pilot project to study the 
feasibility of a 100% scanning approach. However, the U.S. did not await the results of this 
pilot action before pressing ahead with the “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007” (also known as the 9/11 Commission Recommendations bill), 
which were signed on 3 August 2007. 
As far as maritime cargo is concerned, the implementation of the 100 % scanning requirement 
is foreseen with a 5-year deadline by 1 July 2012. For the EU and other major partners, the 
envisaged scanning of all U.S.-bound containers in more than 600 ports from which ships  
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leave for the U.S. would lead to major trade disruptions and an additional administrative 
burden. It would require major re-structuring of EU ports and place a very heavy financial 
burden on EU business and ultimately its taxpayers. The bill does not include a spending 
authorisation/financial clause for equipping foreign ports. Therefore costs for the installation 
of the necessary equipment are expected to be borne by the port and shipping companies. An 
indication of the potentially devastating economic impact was provided by the pilot 
programme in the context of the U.S. Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) that was intended to 
evaluate the feasibility of 100% scanning and to install such full scanning equipment in seven 
international ports. It appropriated roughly $60 million to cover costs in some, although not in 
all of the ports. For the Southampton pilot alone the costs were estimated at $14.5 million.  
The new legislation also sets out other requirements (e.g. standards for container security 
devices and/or smart box technology), which have the potential to hamper the possibility for 
EU trade to compete fairly with their U.S. competitors and to excessively burden the EU 
export supply chain. 
For cargo carried on passenger aircraft the bill even requires a 3-year phase-in implementation 
with benchmarks of 100 % "screening", but at this stage, it's not yet clear whether and how 
the requirements for air cargo will affect international transport. 
The Commission, Member States, port operators and the entire trade community are seriously 
concerned about this new U.S. legislation, in particular with respect to the potential costs of 
the scanning requirement, its possible effects on competitiveness, and its negative impact on 
transatlantic trade flows. This measure is unilateral and would disrupt trade and cost 
legitimate EU and U.S. businesses a lot of time and money while no real benefit is proved 
when it comes to improving security. 
3. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND UNILATERALISM 
3.1. Extraterritoriality 
U.S. provisions having extraterritorial effect are a frequently used tool to implement U.S. 
policies across their own border. Today, the U.S. has a number of such provisions in place 
which hamper international trade and investment and may not as such conform to 
international trade law. These include for example the Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
Solidarity Act, known as the Helms Burton Act signed by Bill Clinton in 1996. The Act has 
been repeatedly condemned by the EU, which reserves the right to resume actions at the 
WTO. Other examples include the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). This Act was amended 
by President Bush in April 2004, terminating actions against Libya in light of its renunciation 
of international terrorism. In 2006 Congress passed the Iran Freedom Support Act, extending 
the provisions of ILSA in the case of Iran for another five years until 2011. 
These extraterritorial provisions continue to cause problems for EU companies. Subsequently 
the EU has expressed its opposition to this kind of legislation, or any secondary boycott or 
legislation having extraterritorial effects, through a number of representations and steps, such 
as the Council Regulation 2271/96 (the so-called "Blocking Statute") of 22 November 1996. 
Other trading partners of the U.S., such as Canada and Mexico, have strengthened or adopted 
similar blocking legislation. 
Another example of such legislation concerning Iran is the Iran Non-Proliferation Act (INPA) 
signed into law on 14 March 2000. It allows the U.S. Administration to apply its own 
sanctions to exports which are subject to EU Member State and EU export control regimes,  
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while also unilaterally expanding the scope of export controls on EU exports beyond those 
agreed multilaterally.  
Nevertheless, 2007 saw two welcome changes in the decisions by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to ease deregistration rules for non-U.S. companies and to drop 
the costly requirement for EU companies wanting a U.S. listing to reconcile their accounts 
(prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards) with U.S. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
Furthermore, Section 319 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, known as the PATRIOT 
Act, signed in 2001, deals with allegations of money laundering and the forfeiture of funds in 
the U.S. inter-bank accounts. Some European banks have alleged that it applies extraterritorial 
provisions to financial services. The European Commission is concerned about such 
allegations and their impact on the legal certainty and ability of European banks to conduct 
business in the U.S. The European Commission is still working with U.S. Treasury authorities 
to assess the nature of this problem and, if necessary, to remedy the situation in such a way as 
to give European banks sufficient legal clarity to conduct their business. 
3.2. Unilateralism   
'Unilateralism' may take the form of either unilateral sanctions or unilateral retaliatory 
measures against allegedly 'offending' countries or companies. Both types of measures are 
based on an exclusive U.S. assessment of the actions of a foreign country or its legislation and 
administrative practice irrespective of multilaterally agreed rules. This approach has in the 
past cast doubt on U.S. support for a multilateral rules-based system to address trade 
problems. Whilst the U.S. has in practice made extensive use of the WTO fora, including its 
dispute settlement system, it has not renounced the possibility of taking actions unilaterally. 
As a result, the EU has obtained important results in two WTO dispute settlement cases, one 
against the U.S. suspension of customs liquidation in the banana dispute, and one against 
Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974. The latter authorises the U.S. Government to take 
action to enforce U.S. rights under any trade agreement and to combat practices by foreign 
governments which the U.S. Government deems to be discriminatory, unjustifiable or 
restrictive to U.S. commerce. 
The EU also initiated dispute settlement proceedings against “carousel” legislation (Section 
407 of the Trade and Development Act of 2000), which the U.S. has so far not applied. A 
more recent example of unilateral action is the U.S. continued suspension of obligations in the 
EC – Hormones dispute in the form of persisting excessive import duties despite the EU's 
removal of inconsistent measures.  
4. TARIFF  BARRIERS 
Despite the substantial tariff reduction and elimination agreed in the Uruguay Round, the U.S. 
retains a number of significant duties and tariff peaks in various sectors including food 
products, textiles, footwear, leather goods, ceramics, glass, and railway cars.  
The EU hopes to achieve further reduction of U.S. tariffs within the context of the ongoing 
Doha Development Round. According to the current state of play, substantially all tariff peaks 
should be eliminated following the 'Swiss Formula'. Although little progress has been made, 
the EU continues to pursue this goal throughout the negotiations. 
A more recent example of tariff barriers is the issue concerning multilayer parquet. The U.S 
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection has reclassified multilayer parquet. It no longer  
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falls under the parquet panel category, imports of which are duty free. Instead it is categorized 
as plywood, which is charged with a duty rate of 8 %. EU Member States and producers 
continue to raise their discontent about this reclassification.  
5. NON-TARIFF  BARRIERS 
5.1. Regulatory Divergences 
In a global economy international standards are an indispensable tool to eliminate technical 
barriers to trade, to facilitate and increase market access, to improve the quality and safety of 
products and services, and to promote and disseminate know-how and technologies. For 
governments, the use of international standards in the context of their regulatory policy is also 
an important element for the implementation of the WTO-TBT Agreement. All parties to the 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee are committed to the wider use of international 
standards as the basis for their regulation. 
However, regulatory barriers have also long been recognised as significant impediments to 
trade and investment between the EU and the U.S. A particular problem in the U.S. is the 
relatively low level of implementation and use of international standards set by the 
international standardisation bodies.  
Furthermore, EU exporters to the U.S. market face steep regulatory barriers. In the U.S., 
products are increasingly being required to conform to multiple technical regulations 
regarding consumer protection (including health and safety) and environmental protection. 
Although in general not de jure discriminatory, the complexity of U.S. regulatory systems can 
represent an important structural impediment to market access. Obstacles for European 
exporters include for example a burdensome pharmaceutical approval system, the American 
Automobile Labelling Act, documentary and labelling requirements for textiles, as well as 
restrictions regarding the distribution of wines and spirits.  
It is not uncommon that equipment for use in the workplace is subject to a number of different 
standardising bodies. In the case of pressure equipment for instance: the U.S. Department of 
Labor certification, a county authority’s electrical equipment standards, specific regulations 
imposed by large municipalities, and other product safety requirements as determined by 
insurance companies.  
This situation is aggravated by the lack of a clear distinction between essential safety 
regulations and optional requirements for quality, which is due in part to the role of some 
private organisations as providers of assessment and certification in both areas. For instance, 
this is the case for product-safety requirements and other standards for electrical and 
electronic equipment as well as construction products. Moreover, for products where public 
standards do not exist, product safety requirements can change overnight when the product 
liability insurance market makes a new assessment of what will be required for insurance 
purposes. Differences in standards and food safety requirements between the U.S. and the EU 
are exemplified by the export conditions for Grade-A milk products as well as provisions for 
organic products under the National Organic Program of 2001. 
A more integrated and streamlined transatlantic regulatory environment would significantly 
reduce costs for producers and consumers on both sides of the Atlantic and improve the 
competitive situation of EU and U.S. companies in the global economy. As the world’s two 
most important trading partners there is much to gain from fewer barriers to bilateral trade and 
investment.  
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Reinforced regulatory cooperation is therefore important to help dismantle existing regulatory 
barriers and preventing new ones from emerging. At the EU-U.S. Summit on 30 April 2007, 
the two sides signed a “Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration 
between the United States of America and the European Union”. Key elements of this 
framework were the adoption of a work programme of cooperation and the establishment of 
the Transatlantic Economic Council to oversee, guide and accelerate the implementation of 
this work programme. Regulatory authorities on both sides aim at achieving greater 
convergence of technical rules through a number of sectoral and methodological regulatory 
dialogues. Since its inception in 2005, the High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum has met 
regularly to facilitate the exchange of best regulatory practice across sectors. Although 
progress is being made through EU-U.S. regulatory cooperation, EU exporters continue to 
face a number of post-import impediments. The proliferation of regulations at State level 
presents particular problems for companies without offices in the U.S. Moreover, the EU-U.S. 
Agreement on Mutual Recognition, in force since 1 December 1998, has not been fully 
implemented.  This is due to the absence of mandatory third party certification and 
operational difficulties which were not foreseen at the time of the agreement.   
5.2. Registration,  Documentation, Customs Procedures 
There is a lack of recognition of EU origin, while the EU is a customs union with a single 
customs territory; the direct consequence is non-acceptance of EC certificates of origin by 
U.S. Customs.  
The implementation of the food-related provisions of the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, known as the Bioterrorism Act, puts 
severe burdens on trade in food and feed products to the U.S. Additionally, in response to 
recent scandals and scares around imports of unsafe food, feed and drinks, the U.S. is 
currently considering a number of independent proposals on how to improve the safety of 
such imports. The outcome of this initiative is still widely unpredictable. However, it is 
apparent that a few elements are contained that may negatively impact on EU exporters. 
These include for example import inspection fees, country of origin labelling, and mandatory 
certification of 'high risk foods'. 
The U.S. Code, Title 46, Section 12108 and the American Fisheries Act of 1998 represent 
considerable shipping restrictions for fishermen as foreign-built vessels are not eligible to 
receive a fishing licence. U.S. rules of origin for textiles continue to affect European exports 
of fabrics, scarves, bed linen, table linen, bedspreads as well as quilts containing cotton and 
wool. Equally burdensome are the restrictions introduced through Section 8e of the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, stipulating that the importation of a number 
of agricultural commodities regulated under the Federal Marketing Orders (MO) shall be 
prohibited unless they are in compliance with grade, size, quality and maturity provisions set 
in the MO. 
5.3. Import  Prohibitions 
The right of sovereign nations to take measures to protect their essential national security 
interests has been widely recognised by multilateral and bilateral trade agreements and, of 
course, particularly since the events of 9/11. However, it is in the interest of all trade partners 
that such measures are prudently and sparingly applied. Restrictions to trade and investment 
cannot be justified on national security grounds if they are, in reality, essentially protectionist 
in nature and serve other purposes. Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 
U.S. industry can petition for the restriction of imports from third countries on the grounds of  
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national security. The application of Section 232 is however not dependent on proof from 
industry. Consequently, the law provides U.S. manufacturers with the opportunity to seek 
protection on the grounds of national security, when in reality the aim can be simply to curb 
foreign competition. In addition, the chemicals sector is affected by import restrictions for 
certain drug precursor chemicals. Similarly, the Jones Act uses national security reasons to 
prohibit the use of foreign vessels. 
In the area of fisheries, the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 establishes significant 
import prohibitions. While the EU wholeheartedly supports the protection of marine 
mammals, particularly dolphins; it rejects certain provisions – not directly related to animal 
protection –which may impede trade. Another example is the recently introduced restriction 
on the commercialisation and production of foie gras in a number of states. 
5.4.  Levies, Charges and Import Duties 
EU exports face a number of additional customs impediments, such as import user fees and 
excessive invoicing requirements on importers, which add to costs in a similar way to tariffs. 
The most significant user fee is the Merchandise Processing Fee, which is levied on all 
imported merchandise except for products from the least developed countries, from eligible 
countries under the Caribbean Basin Recovery Act, the Andean Trade Preference Act, U.S. 
FTA partners, or from U.S. Offshore possessions. Although the current MPF includes an 
upper limit on the custom user fee, it is still likely to exceed service costs as the charges are 
based on the value of the imported goods.  
Furthermore, the U.S. levies two taxes/charges on the sale of cars in the U.S. Both the 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) payment and the so-called Gas Guzzler Tax, place 
the tax primarily on imported cars and are therefore of concern to European exporters. 
Concerning the agricultural sector, in its 2007 Farm Bill proposals the USDA suggested 
applying a dairy assessment to imports, a levy of 15 cents per 100 pounds of milk equivalent, 
to finance dairy promotion and research activities. This could potentially prevent any increase 
of sales on the U.S. dairy market for European producers.  
European wine producers have to compete against another significant barrier. According to 
U.S. federal law, wine produced in or imported into the U.S. is subject to a "gallonage tax" 
with different tax bands according to the alcoholic content. However, while 'small' U.S. 
producers are eligible for a tax credit, their European counterparts are not entitled to the same 
rebate.  
5.5.  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
In the agricultural area, a number of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) issues remain a 
significant source of difficulty for EU producers. Most problematic in this respect is the 
trading of animal products. For example, since 1997 the U.S. has had special rules in place on 
the import of ruminant animals (bovine animals) and products thereof from all European 
countries based on concerns about Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, commonly termed 
BSE. Although the EU and U.S. collaborated closely towards the adoption of a global BSE 
standard in the Global Animal Health Organisation (OIE), and although the U.S. insist that 
their trading partners, notably in Asia, use this standard to assess the risk of U.S. beef, the 
U.S. remains unwilling to use these agreed rules for EU products.  
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Other long-standing trade barriers apply to exports of beef, pork and poultry products and are 
originally motivated by animal health protection. Imposing trade restrictions on products from 
a region which is affected by disease outbreaks is a quick, administrative process - and rightly 
so. However, the lifting of these trade restrictions should be equally fast and pragmatic once 
the disease has been eradicated. In many cases the U.S. administration has used complex and 
lengthy rulemaking procedures to restore trade, which can take several years longer than the 
re-acquaintance of an official disease-free status under the global rules of the OIE. 
The Veterinary Equivalence Agreement, signed on 20 July 1999, provides a framework for 
pragmatic regulatory cooperation between the EU and U.S. in these areas of animal health and 
food safety. But the pace of discussions is very slow and does not at all exploit the 
opportunities provided by the Agreement. An example of the slow progress in regulatory 
cooperation is the sanitary measure applied by the U.S. for imports of live bivalve molluscs. 
The EU and the U.S. apply different testing methods to determine the safety of molluscs. 
According to the EU both approaches yield the same result and are equally effective. The U.S. 
however does not currently recognise the EU approach as equivalent, which effectively 
prevents European producers from exporting to the U.S. 
Burdensome rules for the importation of dairy products make it extremely difficult for EU 
producers to be approved to export to the U.S., and as mentioned above this may be further 
exacerbated by potential measures in the Farm Bill which would apply a Mandatory Dairy 
Promotion Assessment to imported dairy products.  
The current U.S. import regime for Grade A milk products constitutes an effective block to 
any trade as there is currently no Federal State that would be willing to inspect establishments 
in the EU (or any other foreign country) under the Pasteurized Milk Ordinance. Discussions 
with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate Grade A milk imports under a 
federal regime are still at an initial stage. 
Furthermore, the U.S. requires that Pest Risk Analysis (PRA) be carried out for new non-
manufactured agricultural products before the import conditions are established.  This is done 
through a genus by genus approach.  The time between applying and inclusion on the list of 
approved products can take several years (or even decades), even when other products from 
the same area of production with the same phytosanitary risks are permitted.  Difficulties and 
delays have been noted for fruits, vegetables, and ornamental plants, although they are even 
more explicit for plants.  
Other SPS-related restrictive measures exist for plant health covering imports of fresh fruits, 
perennials and nursery stock, as well as standards and certification of ornamental plants 
established in growing media. 
5.6. Public  Procurement 
In the field of public procurement, the main U.S. trade barriers are contained in a wide array 
of clauses in federal, state and local legislation and regulation giving preference to domestic 
suppliers or products, or excluding foreign bidders or products altogether. In addition, there 
are federal restrictions on the use of federal grant money by State and local government. 
These restrictions are called 'Buy America' (Buy America Act or BAA). Taken together, these 
restrictions, such as the "Buy America" provisions of the Department of Transportation 
(DoT), cover a significant proportion of public purchasing in the U.S. Furthermore, as the 
U.S. International Trade Commission noted in its 2004 report: "The Economic Effects of 
Significant U.S. Import Restraints", the complexity and partially overlapping nature of 
existing restrictions makes it nearly impossible to determine the total value of government- 
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purchased imports subject to these restrictions. Regarding development aid, restrictive 
provisions for U.S. Food Aid purchases and transportation require that at least 75% of 
tonnage is transported on vessels carrying the U.S. flag. Moreover, on a significant number of 
sectoral issues, "Buy American" restrictions are imposed for ball and roller bearings, on 
electrical and electronic equipment, and are the legal basis of local content requirements for 
steel in public procurement cases. 
Another practical limitation lies in the lack of transparency related to sub-federal procurement 
opportunities. Unlike the EU - where all tender notices for central and sub-central 
procurements are published on a single electronic site free of charge (the TED data base) - 
only U.S. federal notices are published on a single electronic site (fedbizopps.gov). This 
situation effectively hinders foreign suppliers’ access to sub-federal procurement markets. 
Potential bidders do not know where to look for relevant procurement opportunities and/or 
information relating to sub-federal purchases.  
Despite the fact that the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) substantially 
increased tendering opportunities for both sides, the EU remains concerned about the wide 
variety of discriminatory "Buy America" provisions that persist. Small business set-aside 
schemes, exemplified by the Small Business Act of 1953, also limit bidding opportunities for 
EU contractors.  
The Department of Defense (DoD) also has significant procurement expenditures that exclude 
foreign suppliers of goods or services. The DoD is the largest public procurement agency 
within the U.S. government, spending billions of dollars annually on supplies and other 
requirements. Many procurements fall under “national security” exceptions to open 
procurement obligations. The concept of “national security” was originally used in the 1941 
Defense Appropriations Act to restrict DoD procurement to U.S. sourcing. Now known as the 
“Berry Amendment”, its scope has been extended to secure protection for a wide range of 
products only tangentially-related to national security concerns. There has been a trend 
towards making the DoD’s other domestic preferences, apart from the BAA, less restrictive 
by expanding them to qualifying countries which maintain reciprocal memoranda of 
understanding (MoU) with the U.S. In practice, all North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) countries (except Iceland), as well as all major non-NATO allies of the U.S. have 
signed MoUs with the U.S. allowing for a waiver of the corresponding restrictions. However, 
these MoUs are subject to U.S. laws and regulations, and consequently, other overriding ad 
hoc restrictions can be imposed annually by Congress through the 
authorisation/appropriations process.  
The Commercial Space Act of 1998 applies national security restrictions to space launching 
services. These restrictions, which initially applied to the launch of military satellites, are now 
also applied on national security grounds to satellites for civilian use. The measures are part 
of a set of co-ordinated actions to strengthen the U.S. launch industry and are clearly 
detrimental to European launch service providers. European operators remain effectively 
barred from competing for most U.S. government launch contracts which account for 
approximately 50% of the U.S. satellite market. 
5.7.  Trade Defence Instruments  
Several U.S. trade defence measures have been brought by the European Union to the WTO 
Dispute Settlement system. Many aspects of U.S. trade defence legislation and practices have 
already been ruled as inconsistent with WTO Agreements. Implementation by the U.S. of 
these WTO findings has, at best, also been slow.  
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The methodology and application of U.S. trade defence instruments has been challenged 
frequently and successfully - and not only by the EU - in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
system, such as the laws, regulations and methodology for calculating dumping margins 
(zeroing). As a result, the Department of Commerce (DoC) stopped the use of zeroing in 
original investigations when comparing export prices and normal value on an average-to-
average basis. However, the U.S. is yet to address the issue of zeroing in reviews of AD 
measures and in other comparison methods. Several other aspects of U.S. trade defence 
legislation and practices, including those relating to safeguards, have also been shown to be 
inconsistent with WTO Agreements. WTO rulings against U.S. trade remedies include the 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 ("Byrd Amendment").  Despite the 
welcomed news of its repeal in 2006, the Byrd Amendment's WTO-incompatible distribution 
of collected anti-dumping and countervailing duties to the U.S. complainants will continue for 
several more years as a result of a transition clause.  
The  Antidumping Agreement and the Subsidy and Countervailing Measures Agreement 
(SCM) contain a so-called "sunset review". Measures should not last longer than five years 
unless it is deemed that their termination would likely lead to the continuation or recurrence 
of dumping or subsidisation which are causing injury. For many years the U.S. kept in place 
countervailing duty measures on privatised steel firms dating back as far as 1985. However, 
the U.S. International Trade Commission decided on 14 December 2006 to revoke the 
measures. The U.S. had also enacted anti-dumping and countervailing duties on uranium 
imports from France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK in 2002, which were partially 
revoked in 2006 and were subject to a sunset review in 2007. Following the review, 
concluded on 29 November 2007, the remaining countervailing duties order against France 
has also been revoked. Nonetheless the anti-dumping measures on low-enriched uranium 
from France remain in force.  
5.8. Subsidies   
The EU continues to be concerned about the significant direct and indirect government 
support given to U.S. farmers and industry by means of direct subsidies, protective legislation 
and tax policies. The adoption by the U.S. Congress of the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002 ("Farm Bill") significantly increased the trade-distorting effect of 
U.S. farm subsidies. This Act is clearly inconsistent with the express commitments of WTO 
Members, reinforced at Doha in November 2001, that farm policies should be reformed in the 
direction of less trade distorting forms of support. Closely related to the Farm Bill are the 
commodity loan programmes with marketing loan provisions for crops like wheat, rice, corn, 
soybeans and other oilseeds. These programmes are administered by the Farm Service 
Agency (FSA) through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Additionally, several 
agricultural export programmes such as the Export Enhancement Program, the Dairy Export 
Incentive Program and Market Access Program, the Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-
102) as well as the Food Aid Programs provide considerable amounts of subsidies for U.S. 
farmers.  
On 6 October 2004, the EU initiated a WTO dispute settlement procedure against a number of 
U.S. federal, state and local subsidies to Boeing. This action followed the U.S. purported 
unilateral withdrawal from the 1992 EC-U.S. Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft on 
the same day and the initiation of WTO dispute settlement procedures against alleged 
European support for Airbus. U.S. subsidies challenged by the EU in the WTO include a USD 
4 billion package in the State of Washington (combining tax breaks, tax exemptions or tax 
credits), infrastructure projects for the exclusive benefit of Boeing, USD 16.6 billion funding  
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from NASA and DoD for aeronautics R&D and a USD 900 million package in the State of 
Kansas in the form of tax breaks and subsidised bonds. WTO panel proceedings in both cases 
are ongoing, and are expected to last well into 2008. The EU also remains concerned about 
the significant level of subsidies to the U.S. shipbuilding, aircraft engine manufacturers and 
steel industries. 
The EU recognises the severe financial consequences of 9/11 on U.S. airlines and the need to 
ensure that vital transport services in the U.S. are maintained. Nevertheless, the on-going 
large scale state aid for airlines represents a significant protection from commercial pressures 
also faced by foreign carriers and is an impediment to fair trade on transatlantic air routes. EU 
Regulation No 868/2004 allows for specific measures to be taken against third countries’ 
carriers in order to counteract subsidisation and unfair pricing practices resulting from such 
non-commercial advantages. 
U.S. subsidies also cause problems for the European biodiesel industry. The issue has 
emerged due to a surge in subsidised biodiesel exports to the EU, which has depressed prices 
and profits and caused several producers to shut down their operation. The problem is that the 
U.S. subsidises biodiesel producers by means of tax credits, which impacts not only on U.S. 
sales but also on exports to other countries, notably the EU. In contrast the EU provides 
subsidies to consumers, which only affect the EU market and imports are eligible for the same 
benefits as EU products. The subsidies are significant ($1 per gallon or Euro 200 per tonne) 
and they are enabling imports from the U.S. to enter at below the EU industry's raw material 
costs. In effect U.S. biodiesel exports to the EU have increased sharply, from less then 
100,000 tonnes in 2006 to 1 million tonnes in 2007, which already represents nearly 20% of 
the EU market share. 
6.  INVESTMENT RELATED MEASURES 
6.1.  Foreign Direct Investment Limitations 
The  Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA, formerly Exon-Florio 
Amendment) to the 1950 Defense Production Act (H.R. 556) and subsequent legislation is 
restraining foreign investment in (or ownership of) businesses relating to national security. 
FINSA is implemented by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
("CFIUS"), an inter-agency committee chaired by the Secretary of Treasury which is now a 
statutory body established by law. The law allows a foreign acquisition of a U.S. corporation 
to be blocked on national security grounds. The lack of a clear definition of “national 
security” may lead to an overly wide interpretation of the term by the U.S. The EU recognises 
that there are security issues to be resolved relating to trade and investment, particularly in the 
aftermath of 9/11, but has long expressed concern about excessive use which could be 
interpreted as a disguised form of protectionism. Import, procurement and investment 
restrictions, as well as the extraterritorial application of export restrictions are affected.  
U.S. restrictions on foreign investment are particularly evident in the shipping, energy and 
communications sectors. Apart from this matter, the EU would like the U.S. to resolve 
outstanding foreign ownership issues to allow the EU-U.S. agreement on aviation services to 
be brought to a rapid conclusion. 
Further investment constraints exist in the telecommunication sector (Section 310 of the 1934 
Communications Act), where U.S. law enforcement agencies have imposed strict corporate 
governance requirements on companies seeking Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
approval of the foreign takeover of a U.S. communications firm in the form of far-reaching 
Network Security Arrangements. (See also section 8.1)  
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Foreign investment is also restricted for coastal and domestic shipping under the Jones Act 
and the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which includes fishing, dredging, salvaging 
or supply transport from a point in the U.S. to an offshore drilling rig or platform on the 
Continental Shelf. Non-U.S. investors must form a U.S. subsidiary for exploitation of deep-
water ports and for fishing in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (Commercial Fishing 
Industry Vessel Anti-Reflagging Act of 1987). Under the 'American Fisheries Act of 1998', 
fishing vessel-owning entities must be at least 75% owned and controlled by U.S. citizens in 
order to receive a fishing permit. Licences for cable landings are only granted to applicants in 
partnership with U.S. entities (Submarine Cable Landing Licence Act of 1921). 
Under the Federal Power Act, any construction, operation or maintenance of facilities for the 
development, transmission and utilisation of power on land and water over which the Federal 
government has control, are to be licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
Such licenses can be granted only to U.S. citizens and to corporations organised under U.S. 
law. 
6.2.  Tax Discrimination  
Several aspects of U.S. taxation practices constitute additional difficulties to foreign 
investment in the U.S. market. These are mainly related to the nature of reporting 
requirements and conditions for deductibility of interest payments. Firstly, concerns about 
federal tax measures focus on the nature of reporting requirements and the fact that domestic 
and foreign companies are treated differently. Secondly, the so-called “earnings stripping” 
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code 163j and its limits on tax deductibility of interest 
payments applies relatively strict rules that do not necessarily always conform to 
internationally-accepted principles.  
7. INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY RIGHTS 
7.1.  Copyright and Related Areas 
Despite a number of positive changes in U.S. legislation following the Uruguay Round, 
copyright issues are still problematic due to Section 110(5) of the 1976 U.S. Copyright Act 
("Irish Music" case). Despite losing a WTO case on the issue, the U.S. has not yet brought its 
Copyright Act into compliance with the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). The EU has safeguarded its rights to suspend trade 
benefits granted to the U.S. if the Copyright Act is not amended. 
7.2.  Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications 
The continuing misuse of EU geographical indications on food and drinks produced in the 
U.S., especially in the wine sector, as well as other food products, is a source of considerable 
frustration for EU producers. Particularly problematic is the fact that the U.S. still considers a 
number of European wine names as 'semi-generics'. U.S. producers making use of 'semi-
generics' can take advantage of, or could damage, the reputation of the Community 
geographical indications in question.  
7.3.  Patents, Trademarks and Related Areas 
Under Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement, governments that use patents are required to 
promptly inform the patent right holders. Although patents are extensively used by the U.S 
authorities, it appears that U.S. government departments frequently fail to comply with that  
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obligation. This is problematic because right holders are consequently likely to miss the 
opportunity to initiate an administrative claim process.  
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides remedies for holders of U.S. intellectual 
property rights by keeping the imported goods which are infringing on such rights out of the 
U.S. (“exclusion order”), or to have them removed from the U.S. market once they have come 
into the country (“cease and desist order”).  
Section 211 of the U.S. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 ("Havana Club") prohibits, 
under certain conditions, the registration or renewal of a trademark that is identical or similar 
to a trademark previously owned by a confiscated Cuban entity. No U.S. Court can recognise 
or enforce any assertion of such rights. According to the Appellate Body report of 2002, 
Section 211 is in violation of both the national treatment and the most favoured nation 
obligations of the TRIPs. 
The co-existence of fundamentally different patent systems (the U.S. continuing with its 
“first-to-invent” system whilst the “first-to-file” system is followed by the rest of the world) 
continues to create considerable problems for EU companies, especially considering the high 
U.S. litigation costs in patent matters. The existence of different systems is a shared EU-U.S. 
problem and there is a need to harmonise the systems. However, there seems to be prospects 
for a solution in the near future as the U.S. no longer fundamentally opposes the first-to-file 
system. Although to date no agreement has been reached on the issue, negotiations seem to be 
going in a good direction. 
In a similar fashion, transatlantic differences regarding patents are exemplified by the 
application of the Hilmer Doctrine in patent interference cases, which has been clearly 
detrimental to European companies. Further complications emerge because American and 
European law take different approaches to the question of patentability of software and 
business methods. Last but not least, U.S. provisions concerning plant variety such as the 
Plant Patent Act seriously impede trade in breeding material for ornamental plants. 
8. SERVICES 
8.1. Communication  Services 
The GATS Basic Telecommunications Agreement, in force since February 1998, has a widely 
positive impact on communication services. Nonetheless, EU and foreign-owned firms are 
still faced with substantial barriers to access the U.S. market. These include for example 
restrictions to investment, lengthy proceedings, conditionality of market access and 
reciprocity-based procedures. Section 310 of the 1934 Communications Act established 
restrictions to foreign direct investment in U.S. companies holding a broadcast or common 
carrier radio licence (See also section 6.1). There are also limits to foreign indirect 
investment, although this is subject to a public interest waiver. The U.S. Administration and 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) consider that this waiver provision is 
sufficient for the FCC not to apply Section 310(b) (4) of the 1934 Communications Act to 
WTO Members. This situation, however, does not provide certainty to European operators. 
Market access barriers also exist for digital terrestrial television services. In 1996 the FCC 
mandated an exclusive transmission standard in the U.S., known as ATSC. This has since 
prevented the competing European technology (DVB-T) from accessing the U.S. market. 
Further difficulties accessing the U.S. market are encountered by EU based satellite 
communications operators.   
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The reduction in the number of competitors in the wire line sector and internet backbone 
market, notably as a result of mergers, coupled with a litigious environment raises some 
concerns and will require particular attention to ensure fair and non-discriminatory access. 
Particularly problematic is the question of how to guarantee last mile access to customers.  
8.2.  Business and Financial Services 
The implementation schedule of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) for 
professional services has brought about some improvement in market access. However, a 
number of problems remain to be tackled in order to secure more transparent and open access 
to the U.S. market. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, adopted as a reaction to U.S. corporate 
scandals, has had a significant impact on U.S.-listed EU companies, as well as on EU auditing 
firms, which could face conflicting laws on audit and corporate governance. Since the end of 
2006, the perceived loss of competitiveness of U.S. capital markets, and notably New York, 
as opposed to London, Hong Kong, Singapore and other "emerging" financial centres has 
prompted debate in the U.S. This debate has focused on Sarbanes-Oxley, under the threat of 
class action. U.S. authorities, and notably the SEC, have since embarked on a series of 
reforms. As a result of this new momentum and the commitment of EU institutions, 
significant progress is currently being made in the area of mutual recognition of accounting 
standards. On 15 November 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) agreed 
that foreign companies preparing their accounts in accordance with International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) would no longer have to reconcile them with U.S. GAAP. A two 
year transitional regime will be applicable to firms using the EU opt out from International 
Accounting Standard no. 39. Discussions have also started on the issue of mutual recognition 
of auditing oversight. Finally, EU firms wishing to leave U.S. capital markets used to be 
virtually prevented from doing so due to excessively restrictive SEC deregistration. These 
rules have now been relaxed since the adoption of a new SEC rule on deregistration, effective 
since June 2007, and several EU firms have already taken advantage of this new possibility. 
A new issue to emerge is the treatment of EU global custodians in the U.S. International 
banks must register in the U.S. as broker-dealers under Section 15 of the Securities and 
Exchange Act 1934 if they provide global custody and certain related services directly to U.S. 
investors from outside the U.S. This is not the case for U.S. banks doing the same business 
since they are covered by an exception pursuant to SEC "Regulation R" adopted in September 
2007. As it is now, U.S. banks enjoy an advantage as they are able to provide the same 
services to investors in the EU without registration in the EU and they are spared from SEC 
supervision in this respect. 
Much of the focus of EU-U.S. discussions in the field of financial regulation over the past 
three years has been to find pragmatic and mutually satisfactory solutions to ensure that 
provisions of the U.S. law do not have unintended consequences for activities of EU 
established entities and vice-versa. In general, recognition of equivalence of home-country 
standards for capital and banking markets would significantly reduce the regulatory burden of 
firms and financial institutions that are active on both sides of the Atlantic. Additionally, the 
current requirement for non-U.S. reinsurers to post 100% collateral for their U.S. acceptances 
is both discriminatory and technically unjustifiable in the modern age. In December 2006, the 
Reinsurance Task Force of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) 
endorsed the principle of a move away from the current discriminatory collateral requirements 
for non-U.S. reinsurers towards a system where collateral is charged for all reinsurers 
regardless of origin on the basis of a credit rating established by a ratings organisation. The 
Task Force agreed to carry out further work on the details of the move with a view to  
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adoption by the NAIC Executive Committee before the end of 2007. However the latest draft 
proposals published at the beginning of September 2007, whilst containing some good ideas, 
are much more discriminatory than the proposals agreed in December 2006. The Commission 
is fully engaged through the Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue to find a mutually 
acceptable solution to this issue. 
Concerns relating to access to U.S. financial markets frequently centre on the extent to which 
compliance with U.S. regulatory provisions is a proportionate or justified condition for 
providing financial services directly to U.S.-domiciled investors or counterparties. EU 
financial institutions are already subject to comparable and demanding authorisation and 
supervision in Europe. Several regulations of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
for foreign securities firms represent substantial barriers for the establishment of branches or 
subsidiaries. 
These concerns gain currency as remote trading and investment strategies are already being 
implemented on a transatlantic basis. In the context of the current debate on the 
competitiveness of U.S. capital markets mentioned above, the SEC has used a number of 
occasions since the beginning of 2007 to indicate its willingness to move away from its 
previous position to allow foreign brokers, dealers and exchanges to offer their services in the 
U.S. It is expected that further developments will occur in early 2008. 
Since 2002, the EU-U.S. Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue has been tackling existing 
issues of concern and acting to prevent new ones from emerging. Financial services 
negotiations in the framework of the GATS are also important. In this context, the EU is 
working to improve access for European financial institutions to U.S. markets in a number of 
key sectors. Unfortunately, the U.S. has not yet offered major new commitments in financial 
services. A permanent and MFN-based agreement entered into force in March 1999 and 
GATS negotiations on financial services were re-launched in Geneva in 2000. 
8.3. Transport  Services 
With regard to air transport, the EU and U.S. signed a first-stage Air Transport Agreement on 
30 April 2007, applicable from 30 March 2008.  The Agreement encompasses 60% of world 
traffic. The Agreement allows EU and U.S. air carriers to operate to and from any point in the 
U.S. from and to any point in the EU. It also provides possibilities to operate air transport 
services on international routes beyond the EU and U.S. Furthermore, the Agreement refers to 
further harnessing investment opportunities, thus addressing foreign ownership limitations, in 
second-stage negotiations. The first-stage agreement also creates new opportunities for EU air 
carriers to wet lease aircraft to U.S. air carriers for use on international routes between the 
U.S. and third countries. Measures adopted on aviation security since 9/11 as well as the large 
scale governmental financial assistance provided to U.S. airlines are issues that also need 
addressing. Section 1117 of the Federal Aviation Act requires that, in general, transportation 
funded by the U.S. Government (passengers and cargo, mail is covered by separate 
legislation) must be performed by U.S. carriers. By contrast, in the EU, any obligation for 
government officials to use “national flag” is considered to be anti-competitive. The EU-U.S. 
Air Transport Agreement creates new rights for EU airlines to carry certain categories of U.S. 
Government-financed traffic under the Fly America programme, with a commitment to 
pursue further access in the future. 
The 'Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act)' prohibits foreign-built vessels from engaging 
in (direct or indirect) coastal trade while they cannot be documented or registered for 
dredging, towing or salvaging. In addition, there has been no progress on the elimination of 
requirements that U.S. Government-owned or financed cargoes be shipped on U.S.-flagged  
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ships. U.S. maritime security legislation (such as the Container Security Initiative as well as 
the SAFE Port and 9/11 Commission Act – see chapter 2.1 Cargo Trade) is also of concern to 
the EU. In addition, the U.S. has not included any maritime services-related commitments 
within even its most recent Doha WTO Round services offer.   
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9. ANNEX 
Tariffs and Duties 
Tariff Levels 
Title  Textile Tariffs 
Sector  Textiles and Leather 
Description 
High tariffs make the U.S. one of the most difficult export markets for EU textiles and clothing 
industry. Industry considers that the U.S. tariff peaks constitute a very harmful barrier because 
they are focussed on very competitive products. Tariffs peaks range from 32% for some 
clothing, 25% for fabrics and 13.2 % for yarns. In addition, specific duties apply for a wide 
range of textile products. 
Many significant tariffs and tariff peaks will remain on products of export interest to the EU. 
These include (a) certain woollen fabrics and articles of apparel for which duty rates in 2002 
reached 27.6% plus a specific rate of 9.7 cents/Kg in certain fabrics and 32.5% for some 
apparel and (b) several footwear products for which the current duty rates are 48% or 37.50% 
plus a specific rate of 90 cents/pair. 
State of 
play 
In the context of the WTO negotiations on NAMA the EC in its second submission of 31 October 
2003 (TN/MA/W/11), proposed, inter alia, that Members agree, to deeper tariff cuts for textiles, 
clothing and footwear with a view to bringing these tariffs within a narrow common range as 
close to zero as possible. This proposal has to be put in the context of the recent end of the 
textile and footwear quota regimes. 
 
Title  Footwear and Leather Tariffs 
Sector  Textiles and Leather 
Description 
Tariffs levels on leather (3% or 5%) represent an important barrier for European exporters, 
considering the margins in the sector (from 1 to 5%) and the fact that EU leather is the most 
expensive of all U.S. imports, while other competitors are able to import into the U.S. at 
preferential regime (NAFTA and other preferential agreements). Furthermore, EU industry is 
denied access to footwear tenders for the U.S. Army. As Canada is allowed to participate in 
those tenders, the measure could be described as discriminatory against European companies.  
U.S. tariff peaks affect gaiters and other special footwear. Although gaiters are not a priority for 
the EU industry, it is interested in exporting hunting shoes. For the moment, such tariff peaks 
are a barrier to such exports. Tariffs for some footwear products are as high as 48% of the Free 
on Board (FOB) value (More information is available at DG Trades Applied Tariffs Database 
under Product Code 64). 
State of 
play 
In the context of the WTO negotiations on NAMA the EC in its second submission of 31 October 
2003 (TN/MA/W/11), proposed, inter alia, that Members agree, to deeper tariff cuts for textiles, 
clothing and footwear with a view to bringing these tariffs within a narrow common range as 
close to zero as possible. This proposal has to be put in the context of the recent end of the 
textile and footwear quota regimes. 
 
Title  Ceramics and Glass Tariffs 
Sector  Ceramics and Glass 
Description 
Tariff negotiations in the Uruguay Round still left a number of important tariff peaks, customs 
duties on ceramics and glass products remain relatively important and higher in the U.S. than 
in Europe. The U.S. has rejected the Community's offer to abolish tariffs in this sector even 
though Mexico, one of Europe's leading competitors in the U.S. market, should, after a 
transitional period, enjoy a zero duty rate by virtue of the NAFTA (North Atlantic Free Trade 
Area). In certain areas where EU producers have a traditionally strong position on the U.S. 
market, such as hotel ware, the most that the Americans were willing to concede was a simple 
reduction of the rates.  
•  For ceramic (not porcelain or china) hotel and restaurant ware, the rate is now 28%. 
•  For porcelain or china, the rate is currently 25%.  
•  For glassware, maximum rate remain the same (38%) even if it must be noticed that 
most of the glass products are between 10% and 20%. 
 
Title  Parquet Tariffs 
Sector  Wood, Paper and Pulp 
Description 
The European producers of multilayer parquet (or engineered/laminated wood flooring) are 
experiencing difficulties in exporting their products to the U.S. These difficulties have arisen over 
the decision by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to no longer accept the classification  
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of such products under heading 44.18.30 of the customs code as parquet panels, which is duty 
free. Instead, CBP considers such products as plywood, which falls under heading 44.12 with a 
duty rate of 8%. 
CBP has also reclassified another type of parquet previously also exported duty-free to the U.S. 
under code 44.18.30, into 44.18.90 with 3.2% duty. 
Internal Taxation 
Title  Merchandise Processing Fee 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
The most significant of the customs user fees is the Merchandise Processing Fee (MPF). The MPF 
is levied on all imported merchandise except for products from the least developed countries, 
from eligible countries under the Caribbean Basin Recovery Act and the Andean Trade 
Preference Act, and from U.S. offshore possessions. It is levied also on merchandise entered 
under Schedule 8, Special Classifications, of the Tariff Schedules of the U.S. Fixed previously at 
0.17% of the value of the imported goods, the MPF rose to 0.19% in 1992 and amounts to 
0.21% ad valorem on formal entries with a maximum of U.S.$485 as from 1 January 1995.  
At the request of Canada and the EU, the GATT Council instituted a Panel in November 1987 
that stated that the U.S. Customs user fees for merchandise processing were not in conformity 
with the General Agreement. The Panel ruled that customs user fees should reflect the 
approximate cost of customs processing for the individual entry in question. This principle was 
not met by an ad valorem system such as that used by the U.S. The GATT Council adopted the 
Panel report in February 1988.  
The present customs user fee structure is somewhat more equitable, since the fixing of a ceiling 
makes it less onerous for high-value consignments. However, the fee is still likely to exceed the 
cost of the service since it is still based on the value of the imported goods. 
State of 
play 
Whilst the MPF was to last until 30 September 1990 when established, it was recently extended 
(as part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004) until 30 September 2014. 
 
Title  Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Payment 
Sector  Automotive 
Description 
The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) payment is a civil penalty payment levied on a 
manufacturer or importer whose range of models has an average fuel efficiency below a certain 
level, currently 27.5 miles per gallon (approx. 10.3 litres per 100km).  
CAFE favours large integrated automakers or producers of small cars rather than those who 
concentrate on the top end of the car market, such as importers of European cars. According to 
the latest estimates available, European-based auto makers with a total market share in the 
U.S. of only 9%, bear almost 100% of the CAFE penalties. Since 1983, manufacturers have paid 
more than $675 million in CAFE civil penalties. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, most European manufacturers regularly pay CAFE civil penalties ranging from 
less than $1 million to more than $20 million annually.  
 
Title  Gas Guzzler Tax 
Sector  Automotive 
Description 
Manufacturers who sell cars that fail to meet certain fuel economy levels have to pay the so-
called Gas Guzzler Tax. The latter was introduced as part of the 1978 Energy Tax Act. 
Car manufacturers must follow U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) procedures to 
calculate the tax. This means that all cars (but not mini-vans, trucks or SUVs) failing to meet a 
fuel economy figure of 22.5 miles per gallon (approximately 10.5 litres per 100km) are subject 
to a tax of $1,000 per car for those just below the 22.5 miles per gallon threshold to $7,700 per 
car for models getting less than 12.5 miles per gallon. 
Fuel economy test results are calculated on the basis of a formula that weights city and highway 
driving cycles (55% city and 45% highway driving). Fuel economy values are calculated before 
sales begin for the model year; the tax has to be paid once the production has ended for the 
model year. The total amount of the tax, collected by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 
reflects the number of cars sold that fail to meet the EPA requirements. A particular fuel 
economy label (the window sticker on new cars) displays the amount of the tax paid. 
In general, the European Union wholeheartedly supports measures for environmental protection. 
However, in this particular case the tax has several flaws which in practice discriminate against 
European car manufacturers. First, the fuel economy cut-off point (i.e. less than 22.5 miles per 
gallon) is not founded on any reasonable or objective criterion.  
Second, the Gas Guzzler Tax is particularly unbalanced as it does not apply to minivans, sport 
utility vehicles (SUVs), and pick-up trucks. According to the EPA, Congress did not impose a tax 
on these vehicle types because in 1978, at the time the law was enacted, they represented a 
relatively small fraction of the overall fleet of passenger vehicles and were used more for  
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business purposes than personal transportation. Congress updated the law in 1990 (by doubling 
the tax penalties) but chose not to address the discrepancy in treatment between cars and light 
trucks. However, the light-truck category (including minivans, SUVs and pick-up trucks) has 
been the fastest growing segment of the new-vehicle market. 
Other Tariffs and Duties 
Title  Dairy Promotion and Research Assessment on Imports 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
Description 
In its 2007 Farm Bill proposals, USDA suggests to apply to imports the dairy assessment, a levy 
of 15 cents per 100 pounds of milk equivalent financing dairy promotion and research activities, 
paid by domestic producers since 1983.  
State of 
play 
Legislative language pertaining to the Dairy Import Assessment is present in the House version 
of the 2007 Farm Bill.  
 
Title  Hormones Dispute (Continued Suspension of Obligations) 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
In 1989 the EU banned imports of hormone treated meat. The U.S. and Canada responded by 
imposing retaliatory measures, suspending their obligations and imposing import duties in 
excess of bound rates on imports from the EU, and by initiating a WTO dispute settlement 
proceeding. 
In 1998, the EU lost the WTO dispute brought by the U.S. and Canada. The reason was that the 
legislation was not based on a full scientific risk assessment in relation to the risk arising from 
the ingestion of meat from animals treated with hormonal growth promoters. The Appellate 
Body overruled the earlier Panel but recommended that the EU bring its measures into 
conformity with obligations under the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS). 
The EU followed by eliminating the WTO inconsistencies and based its new Hormones Directive 
of 22 July 2003 on a full scientific risk assessment. Despite compliance with WTO rules and 
proceedings the U.S. (and Canada) up-to-date continue to apply their retaliatory measures. 
State of 
play 
The amendments to the Hormones Directive were adopted by the Council on 22 July 2003, and 
the new Directive 2003/74/EC, implementing the WTO ruling, entered into force on 14 October 
2003.  
On 27 October 2003, the EU notified to the WTO that it had implemented the WTO ruling of 
1998 and that, as a consequence, the U.S.' sanctions vis-à-vis the EU were no longer justified. 
However, the U.S. disagreed and since then has not lifted its sanctions. At the Dispute 
Settlement Body meeting of 7 November 2003, the EU proceeded to notify the new Directive as 
compliant in this case. The U.S. (and Canada) disagreed and kept their retaliatory measures. 
Furthermore the U.S. did not initiate a compliance dispute in the WTO, as is foreseen for such 
situations according to the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding.  
Informal attempts to persuade the U.S. to suspend its sanctions and to initiate a WTO review 
under Article 21.5 DSU have up-to-date failed. Consequently the EU requested on 8 November 
2004 formal consultations with the U.S. (and Canada) regarding the continued application of the 
countermeasures.  
The EU's challenge is directed against the U.S.' continued suspension of its obligations and its 
continued imposition of import duties in excess of bound rates on imports from the EU despite 
the EU's removal of the inconsistent measures. The WTO Agreement does not allow simply 
continuing to apply sanctions since this would amount to a prohibited unilateral determination of 
alleged non-compliance by the EU.  
Since the consultations held in December 2004 failed to resolve the dispute, the WTO dispute 
settlement panel was established on 17 February 2005. The panel proceedings are still ongoing 
but nearing their end, having comprised the first ever oral hearings open to the public based on 
a joint request by the parties. After a first hearing in September 2005, the second oral hearing 
and a meeting with the experts took place, also with public access, on 27-28 September and 2-
3 October 2006. The interim report has in the meantime been issued, but the public circulation 
of the final report will not happen before January 2008. 
Trade Defence Instruments 
Anti-Dumping 
Title  Zeroing in Determination of Dumping Margins (WTO DS 294) 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
Dumping is established when the price of a product on the domestic market (normal value) 
exceeds the price on the export market. To obtain a more meaningful comparison however, the 
calculation is usually performed in different stages; most commonly, the product is sub-divided 
into models having similar characteristics and for which prices should be similar. Normal values  
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and export prices are compared within these sub-groups and the dumping margin for the 
product is obtained by adding the results of these sub-comparisons. 
"Zeroing" consists in disregarding the results of the sub-comparisons yielding a negative result 
when adding them to calculate dumping at the level of the product. In other words, the absence 
of dumping on certain models (i.e. sub-divisions of a certain product) is not deemed to 
compensate for dumping that is taking place on others. This leads to an increase in the overall 
margin of dumping and, in certain cases, to a decision that dumping is taking place when an 
overall comparison would have resulted in the absence of dumping. 
This prompted the EC to initiate a first WTO dispute (DS 294) on the law, the implementing 
regulation, the DOC methodologies defining the zeroing practice and 31 specific cases (15 new 
investigations, i.e. leading to the imposition of the AD measure in the first place, and 16 annual 
administrative reviews of previously imposed AD measures) in which zeroing had been used. 
State of 
play 
As a result of the Panel and Appellate Body’s findings adopted by the DSB on 9 May 2006, the 
U.S. was condemned: 
•  for using zeroing in 15 specific original investigations, and for maintaining in such 
investigations a zeroing methodology which is WTO incompatible per se. 
•  for using zeroing in 16 specific reviews. As regards the EC challenge of the U.S. zeroing 
methodology in reviews, the Appellate Body considered that there were insufficient 
facts on the Panel's record to complete the Panel's analysis and decide whether that 
methodology was WTO inconsistent as such or not. However, the finding on the 16 
specific cases made clear that every calculation of a dumping margin with zeroing in a 
review will be WTO incompatible. 
The U.S. had until 9 April 2007 to implement the DSB ruling. But, to date, the implementation 
has been incomplete and unsatisfactory. On the one hand, the U.S. stopped using zeroing when 
calculating dumping margins on a weighted average to weighted average basis in original 
investigations initiated after, or ongoing on 22 February 2007 (Final modification of 
methodology published by USDOC on 27 December 2006 - 71 FR 77722). In the 15 specific 
original investigations, the U.S. re-calculated the dumping margins without zeroing and revoked 
the anti-dumping duty for those exporters now found not to have dumped or to dump below de 
minimis level. On the other hand, the U.S. has left a number of important issues open: 
•  The application of the new not-zeroed duty rate not only to imports entering the U.S. 
after 9 April, but also to collect duties after 9 April even if the import entered before 9 
April. Collecting duties on the basis of the condemned "zeroed" rate is maintaining the 
WTO incompatible measure after the implementation deadline. 
•  The non-elimination of zeroing in subsequent administrative reviews. In most cases, 
imports are currently subject to a duty rate established in a subsequent administrative 
review, which has replaced the rate of the original investigation. The WTO has already 
accepted that the measure taken in an administrative review concluded after the 
implementing measure and replacing it is also a measure taken to implement the ruling 
on the original measure, and may be condemned as an improper implementation to the 
extent that it is affected by the same WTO inconsistency (U.S. – Softwood Lumber IV, 
AB report (WT/DS257/AB/RW), paras 80-93). 
•  The proposed substantial increase of the "all others" rate in 3 cases (Stainless Steel 
Bar from France – from 3,9% to 35,92%, UK – from 4,48% to 83,85% and Italy – 
from 3,81% to 6,6%). This rate applies to imports from exporters which did not get 
their individual rates in the original investigation (notably new exporters). As a side 
effect of revoking the order on certain exporters, the "all others" rate was re-calculated 
and exclusively based on the higher rate calculated for non cooperating exporters. This 
is in effect determining retroactively that exporters subject to the "all others rate" were 
guilty of behaviour that would warrant the application of "adverse inferences" without 
demonstrating that such treatment is appropriate. 
•  The absence of revision of the injury determination in certain cases. Where non-zeroing 
resulted in finding the imports from certain exporters as non dumped, the U.S. did not 
analyse whether this modification in the volume of dumped imports affected the 
previous finding that dumped imports caused injury (Bed Linen, Panel report, paras 
6.138-6.140). 
•  The absence of correction of a basic mathematical error in the original 1999 
investigation on imports of Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from ThyssenKrupp 
Italy. This pushed the non-zeroed dumping margin just above de minimis level and 
allowed to maintain the AD measure, which would otherwise had been repealed. DOC 
admitted the error but refused to correct it on the ground that this was not required by 
the DSB recommendation. 
•  On the 16 specific administrative reviews, the United States has not taken any action. 
It alleges that it does not have to, as each of the 16 measures condemned have been 
superseded by later administrative reviews in the meantime. 
•  As a result, the EC is now challenging the U.S. implementing actions before the WTO in  
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a so called 21.5 compliance procedure. A panel was established on 25 September 2007 
and composed on 13 November. The Panel report should then be circulated within 90 
days and may be followed by an appeal. The panel's interim report is expected mid-
June.  
In parallel, the EC is pursuing another WTO dispute on the use of zeroing by the U.S. (DS 350) 
to address issues left open by the WTO ruling under DS 294. Thus, the United States has used 
zeroing in a number of anti-dumping measures, which were taken after the initiation of the DS 
294 dispute and therefore could not be covered by it. The new dispute covers all those 
measures, which apply to exports from 10 Member States (Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and UK) to the United States, and include such 
products as pasta, ball bearings, steel products, brass sheet and strip, and chemical products. 
The other issue left open by DS 294 was the existence of a zeroing methodology in reviews, on 
which the Appellate Body could not make a finding in the absence of sufficient factual findings in 
the Panel's report. The new DS 350 dispute initially covered the zeroing methodology in 
reviews. But, this was dropped at the later stage of the Panel as Japan, in the meantime, had 
been successful in its claim that the U.S. was maintaining a WTO incompatible zeroing 
methodology in reviews (DS 322 - decided by the Appellate Body on 23 January 2007).The 
panel in DS 350 was established at the DSB meeting of 4 June 2007 and its interim report is 
expected end of June 2008. 
 
Title  Byrd Amendment (Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act) 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA or the so-called Byrd Amendment) 
signed into law in October 2000, provides that proceeds from anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties shall be paid to the U.S. companies responsible for bringing the cases. This is clearly 
incompatible with several WTO provisions. The enactment of this legislation raised immediate 
and widespread concerns not only in the EU but in the whole WTO membership. The EU and 10 
other WTO members (Australia, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Thailand later 
joined by Canada and Mexico) brought a complaint to the WTO dispute settlement system and 
their claims were supported by 5 other WTO Members acting as third-parties. This 
unprecedented joint action was a clear indication of the important systemic concerns that the 
legislation raises.  
Since the enactment of the CDSOA, the U.S. authorities have distributed to domestic petitioners 
more than $1.6 billion. Further, a very limited number of recipients received a major part of the 
payments. Of the total disbursed so far, one third went to one company and its subsidiaries. 
Every year half of the payments went to a very limited number of companies (4 in 2001, 3 in 
2002, 2 in 2003, 9 in 2004, 4 in 2005 and 13 in 2006). 
Following the condemnation of the Byrd Amendment in the WTO in January 2003, the United 
States finally repealed the Byrd Amendment on 8 February 2006, but allowed for a transition 
period. The repeal will not affect the distribution of the anti- dumping and countervailing duties 
collected on imports made before 1 October 2007. Since in the U.S., these duties are usually 
collected several years after the import, this means, in turn, that distribution under the Byrd 
Amendment may continue for several years after 1 October 2007. The Congressional Budget 
Office foresees that the repeal of the Byrd Amendment will not produce effects before 1 October 
2009. 
State of 
play 
22 December 2000: The EC, together with eight other WTO partners (Australia, Brazil, Chile, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Thailand), requested formal WTO consultations with the 
U.S. This joint action was a clear indication of the important systemic concerns that the 
legislation raises among WTO Members. [2005-06-27]  
23 August 2001: Upon joint request from the nine co-complainants, a single panel was 
established by the DSB. [2005-06-28]  
10 September 2001: Canada and Mexico, which had requested formal WTO consultations with 
the U.S. on 21 May 2001, joined the panel proceeding initiated by the other nine co-
complainants at a special meeting of the DSB. 
16 September 2002: The Panel confirmed that the Act was an impermissible response to 
dumping and subsidisation and rendered meaningless the WTO provisions requiring Members to 
test the domestic industry's support for application before initiating an investigation, by making 
such support a condition to get access to funds. As a result of the WTO inconsistency of the Act 
itself, the Panel took the unusual step of recommending that the Act be repealed. [2005-06-28]  
16 January 2003: The Appellate Body confirmed that the Act was an impermissible response to 
dumping and subsidisation and, per se, WTO incompatible. [2005-06-28]  
13 June 2003: An arbitrator granted the U.S. until 27 December 2003 to comply with this 
ruling, which the U.S. failed to do. [2005-06-28]  
31 August 2004: The WTO arbitrators concluded that the EU could impose retaliatory measures 
on imports from the U.S. worth 72% of the payments made to the U.S. industry in the most 
recent year from duties collected on EC products. The level of retaliation will consequently vary  
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every year so as to reflect the fluctuations in the amount of payments made under the CDSOA. 
The award is the same for the other requesting parties as the 72% coefficient represents the 
average trade effect of each dollar disbursed under the CDSOA as measured by an econometric 
model. [2005-06-28]  
10 November 2004: The EU and six co-complainants (Brazil, Canada, India, Japan, Korea and 
Mexico) requested the authorisation to suspend the application of concessions or other 
obligations to the U.S. in accordance with the arbitration award. The requested authorisations 
were granted in the meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body on 24 November 2004. Chile 
requested and obtained the same authorisation in the following meeting on 6 December 2004 
[2005-06-28]  
25 April 2005: The Council adopted the Commission proposal to impose, from 1 May 2005, an 
additional import duty of 15% on paper, agricultural, textile and machinery products of the U.S. 
On the same day Canada also imposed additional import duties on certain U.S. products. [2005-
06-28]  
August/September 2005: Japan and Mexico started to apply retaliation. The House of 
Representatives requested public c o m m e n t s  o n  w h e t h e r  t o  i n c l u d e  a  r e p e a l  o f  t h e  B y r d  
Amendment into a miscellaneous trade bill. [2005-09-15]  
8 February 2006: the United States enacted the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which among 
other provisions, repeal the Byrd Amendment but allows for a 2+ year transition. The repeal will 
not affect distribution of the anti-dumping and countervailing duties collected on imports made 
before 1 October 2007. Under U.S. practice, collection of duties does not take place at the time 
of imports, but usually several years after the import, which means, in turn, that distribution 
under the Byrd Amendment may continue for several years after 1 October 2007. The 
Congressional Budget Office foresees that the repeal of the Byrd Amendment will not produce 
effects before 1 October 2009. 
24 April 2006: The European Commission adopted a regulation for the 1st annual revision of the 
level of retaliation applied in the dispute. Eight new products were added to the list of products 
subject to retaliation (different types of blankets, paper products, photocopying apparatus and 
drills). [2006-06-14] 
1 October 2006: the United States started the 6th distribution under the Byrd Amendment. The 
total amount paid in that distribution reached more than U.S. $ 380 million putting the total 
amount distributed so far at more than U.S. $ 1.6 billion. [2006-12-14] 
16 April 2007: The European Commission adopted a regulation for the 2nd annual revision of 
the level of retaliation applied in the dispute. 32 new products have been added to the list of 
products subject to retaliation to reflect the increase in the amount disbursed under the Byrd 
Amendment (different types of paper products, textile products, footwear, mobile homes, and 
pieces of furniture and ball-point pens). 
 
Title  Uranium Antidumping Duties 
Sector  Iron, Steel and Non-Ferrous Metals 
Description 
In March 2002, the U.S. imposed a countervailing duty on imports of low-enriched uranium from 
France, Germany, Netherlands and UK, and an anti-dumping duty on France. The countervailing 
duty for Urenco was only just over 2% (now de-minimis) but the combined duty for France was 
over 30% (since reduced substantially in the first two reviews). 
In a decision of 3 March 2005, further confirmed by a decision of 9 September 2005, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit ruled that enrichment was a service, not a good as the 
Department of Commerce (DoC) had found, and therefore could not be subject to anti-dumping 
or countervailing measures. In two remand orders dated 5 January 2006, the U.S. Court of 
International Trade directed the DoC to revise its final antidumping duty determination and 
order its final countervailing duty determination order, in accordance with the two decisions of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit. This finding was confirmed in September 2005. 
In July 2006, the CVD Orders on low-enriched uranium from Germany, Netherlands and the UK 
were revoked. 
The CVD order against France has also been revoked but the AD measures on low-enriched 
uranium from France continue to remain in force (following a sunset review concluded on 29 
November 2007) pending a possible appeal by the U.S. Government/Industry to the Supreme 
Court and possible legislative action to change the definition of goods and services in 2008. 
 
Title  Steel Sunset Reviews 
Sector  Iron, Steel and Non-Ferrous Metals 
Description 
The Uruguay Round negotiations introduced in the Antidumping and Subsidy and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM) agreements the obligation to terminate the measures after five years unless 
the authorities determine in a review ("sunset review") that termination of the measures would 
likely lead to the continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. The objective of introducing 
sunset review provisions was to avoid never-ending measures. It is the EU understanding that  
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the substantive disciplines governing the imposition of the duty should apply, albeit with some 
modifications, to the prolongation of the duty for another five years. The U.S. conduct of sunset 
reviews falls short of these requirements. For example, the U.S. imposes unwarranted 
conditions on the participation of exporters in sunset reviews, requiring respondents to cover 
50% of exports before it will conduct a full sunset review.  
The U.S., due to this minimalist interpretation of the SCM Agreement, has kept in place many 
CVD orders dating back as far as 1985, although the subsidies involved have usually expired, 
ceased to exist or confer only minimal benefits. The EU brought the U.S. sunset review practice 
to dispute settlement in 2001 in the DS213 Carbon Steel from Germany. Although the challenge 
was not immediately successful (the Appellate Body confirmed that DoC could self-initiate 
sunset reviews and use a 0.5% de-minimis), it did lead indirectly to the revocation of the 
measure in question, and some of the statements of the Appellate Body on the obligations of the 
U.S. in sunsets were helpful.  
Further to the 2006 revocations of AD and CVD orders on a number of products in sunset 
reviews (most notably cut-to-length steel plate from 8 EU Member States and carbon steel flat 
products from 4 EU Member States), this last year has also been mostly successful for EU steel 
exporters. In June 2007, the DoC revoked the AD order on Oil Country Tubular Goods from 
Italy, which followed the revocation of the CVD order on the same product in December 2006. 
Furthermore, the U.S. ITC revoked the AD order on Hot-rolled carbon steel flat products from 
the Netherlands (in April 2007) and from Romania (in October 2007). A number of additional 
revocations on steel products occurred as a result of the WTO 'zeroing' case (see barrier fiche 
Zeroing in Determination of Dumping Margins (WTO DS 294 and DS 350)). As regards stainless 
steel bars, a sunset review resulted in the revocation of the AD order against France, Germany, 
Italy, and the UK, and the CVD order against Italy, on 8 January 2008. 
These decisions mean that a large number of the U.S. steel measures imposed in 1993 have 
now been repealed. However, there remain a few other products subject to measures, especially 
stainless products. This, together with a successful outcome of the ongoing WTO disputes on 
zeroing (see also barrier fiche Zeroing in Determination of Dumping Margins (WTO DS 294 and 
DS 350)), would at last significantly reduce the number and scope of EU steel products subject 
to U.S. TDI. 
Other Trade Defence Instruments  
Title  Sections 301-310 of Trade Act 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988 (hereafter, 1988 Omnibus Act), authorises the U.S. Government to take action to 
enforce U.S. rights under any trade agreement and to combat practices by foreign governments 
w h i c h  t h e  U . S .  G o v e r n m e n t  d e e m s  t o  b e  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y ,  u n j u s t i f i a b l e  o r  r e s t r i c t i v e  t o  U . S .  
commerce.  
Title VII of the 1988 Omnibus Act relating to the removal of government procurement barriers 
was renewed. Furthermore, the 1988 Omnibus Act introduced a Special 301 procedure targeting 
intellectual property rights protection outside the U.S. Under Special 301, the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR) has created a priority watch list to identify foreign countries that are 
deemed to deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). 
Countries placed on the priority watch list are the focus of increased bilateral attention and the 
USTR officially initiates investigation procedures that may eventually result in unilateral trade 
measures. The watch list is reserved for those countries that do not protect U.S. intellectual 
property or that deny market access to IPR-related industries. 
Title III, chapter 1 (sections 301-310) of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, as amended, in particular 
sections 306 and 305, imposes strict time limits within which unilateral determinations must be 
made and trade sanctions must be taken. The legislation mandates USTR to take this type of 
unilateral action within time frames that in certain cases cannot possibly comply with WTO 
rules. This is particularly relevant in cases where the U.S. should follow the procedure of Article 
21.5 DSU to resolve disagreements over the WTO compatibility of measures taken by other 
Members to implement panel rulings. However, in the context of a Panel proceeding, the U.S. 
Administration indicated formally that the Act would always be applied in a manner consistent 
with the U.S. obligations under the WTO. 
The U.S. has resorted to unilateral action even since the WTO Uruguay Round Agreement 
entered into force on 1 January 1995. For instance, in the Bananas case, the U.S. sought to 
suspend trade concessions against the EU before the DSB could decide whether the EU was in 
conformity with WTO rules.  
The EU challenged Section 301 legislation, as it may result in some cases in unilateral 
determinations and retaliatory action even before the WTO bodies can make their own 
judgement on a given situation. A WTO Panel ruled on 8 November 1999 that the statutory 
language of Sections 301 to 310 of the 1974 Trade Act was as such inconsistent with the rules 
o f  t h e  W T O  D S U .  H o w e v e r ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  U . S .  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  f o r m a l l y  u n d e r t o o k  t o  a l w a y s  
refrain from taking action under Sections 301-310 in the absence of a previous WTO 
determination, the Panel concluded that no violation was taking place. The practical result of  
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this ruling has been to make Sections 301-310 ineffective against WTO members. 
Nevertheless, in cases where bilateral (as opposed to WTO) agreements are alleged to have 
been violated, Section 301 is still regularly used as a unilateral trade policy instrument. Under 
the various elements of Section 301 legislation, trading partners are given no choice but to 
negotiate on the basis of an agenda set by the U.S., on the basis of judgements, perceptions, 
timetables, and indeed, U.S. legislation. 
State of 
play 
Member states Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland and Romania remain on the 2007 Watch List. 
Bulgaria, Latvia and the EU were removed from the 2007 Section 301 Report. The Czech 
Republic was added to the Watch List in early 2008. 
The U.S. continues to stick by its formal Statement of Administrative Action in which it 
undertakes to always act in a manner consistent with the U.S. obligations under the WTO. 
Non Tariff Barriers 
Registration, Documentation, Custom Procedures 
Title  SAFE Port Act & Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007 
Sector  Services - Transport 
Description 
On 13 October 2006, U.S. President Bush signed into law the so-called SAFE Port Act (hereafter 
the Act). The Act contains a number of provisions that impact upon port security as well as 
international supply chain security. Section 231 of the Act foresees the establishment of a pilot 
programme at some foreign ports to test integrated non-intrusive imaging and radiation 
detection scanning equipment for all U.S.-bound containers. This pilot programme goes against 
a modern customs approach of risk based controls through effective targeting followed by 
scanning and/or inspection when necessary and may slow down traffic in ports.  
The port of Southampton (UK) had been chosen to participate in this pilot project to study the 
feasibility of a 100% scanning approach. The U.S. did not await the results of this pilot action, 
before pressing ahead with the “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007”. 
On 3 August 2007, the President signed into law the "Implementing Recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission Act of 2007". This legislation introduces the requirement of 100% scanning in 
foreign ports of all maritime cargo destined for the U.S. as from July 2012. 
The envisaged scanning of all U.S.-bound containers in more than 600 ports from which ships 
leave for the U.S. will be extremely expensive to implement at EU ports, could lead to major 
trade disruptions and add an additional administrative burden. Costs for the installation of the 
necessary equipment are expected to be borne by the port and shipping companies. In 
comparison, the costs of the pilot programme in the context of the U.S. Secure Freight Initiative 
(SFI) that was intended to evaluate the feasibility of 100% scanning and to install such full 
scanning equipment in seven international ports, appropriated $60 million to cover costs in 
some, although not in all of those ports. For the Southampton pilot project alone the costs were 
estimated at $14.5 million. 
The new legislation also sets out other requirements (e.g. standards for container security 
devices and/or smart box technology), which have the potential to hamper the possibility for EU 
trade to compete fairly with their U.S. competitors and to excessively burden the EU export 
supply chain. 
The Commission, Member States, port operators and the entire trade community are seriously 
concerned about this new U.S. legislation, in particular with respect to the potential costs of the 
scanning requirement, its possible effects on competitiveness and its negative impact on 
transatlantic trade flows. This measure is unilateral and would disrupt trade and cost legitimate 
EU and U.S. businesses a lot of time and money while no real benefit is proved when it comes 
to improving security. 
State of 
play 
The bill is to be implemented within a 5-year deadline (by 1 July 2012). 
For cargo carried on passenger aircraft the bill even requires a 3-year phase-in implementation 
with benchmarks of 100 % "screening", but at this stage, it's not yet clear whether and how the 
requirements for air cargo will affect international transport. 
The Act includes an option to extend the implementation date by two years. This however is 
deemed not to provide sufficient certainty. Ports would need to plan well in advance such 
important investments as those required by the implementation of the scanning provisions. 
The EU continues raising its objections at political level, including at the last meeting of the 
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) on 9 November 2007 and at DG level, especially through 
the promotion of mutual recognition of EU and U.S. security standards and the need for proper 
risk analysis, which in our view is the right approach to "secure trade". 
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Title  [Early warning] Tightening of U.S. import conditions for food and beverages 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
The U.S. response to recent scandals and scares around imports of unsafe food, feed and drinks 
is taking shape.  
Administration and legislators have introduced about a dozen independent proposals to improve 
the situation and the exact outcome of this debate is still unpredictable. However, a few 
elements emerge, which may have an impact on EU exports:  
•  Import inspection fees.  
•  Renewal of FDA registration of all establishments every two years.  
•  Mandatory certification for 'high risk foods' (on the basis of establishments or countries 
and under the conditions established in a Memorandum of Understanding).  
•  Voluntary certification programs, e.g. related to bio-preparedness, adherence to which 
will allow expedited border processing.  
•  Country of origin labelling.  
•  Increased civil penalties and bonding amounts for imports.  
•  Other, less predictable elements are the accreditation of private laboratories for 
conformity checks and possible adjustments in the Final Rule on Prior Notice for 
imported foods. 
 
Title  American Automobile Labelling Act 
Sector  Automotive 
Description 
The American Automobile Labelling Act provides that passenger cars and other vehicles must be 
labelled with, inter alia, the proportion of U.S. and Canadian-made parts and the final point of 
assembly. These requirements are intended to influence consumers to buy cars of U.S.-
Canadian origin. There is also an obligation to indicate the origin of engines and gearboxes that 
could discourage U.S. manufacturers from importing parts from Europe. Moreover conforming to 
the labelling requirement may involve the disclosure of confidential data from non-U.S. 
manufacturers. 
 
Title  Textile Rules of Origin 
Sector  Textiles and Leather 
Description 
Under the U.S. rules of origin of 1996, the origin of apparel products is generally determined by 
the country where they are assembled. These rules being quite similar to EU rules of origin, 
there were few complaints made by EU producers of apparel. However, for certain products 
(mainly fabrics, bed and table linen, silk accessories), the country of origin is where the fabric is 
made. As a consequence, the origin of the final product becomes the third country origin (e.g. 
India or Pakistan) and it was required to indicate the name of the country where the fabric was 
made (e.g. made in China). This legislation particularly affected EU products imported into the 
EU as grey fabric from third countries (such as Pakistan or India) and processed into dyed, 
printed fabrics or table linen before being re-exported to the U.S.  
In order to address this issue, in July 1997, the EU signed an Agreement with the U.S. for 
certain products (silk scarves and fabrics, printed cotton and printed man-made fabrics). The 
Agreement concerned specifically two aspects (1) U.S. authorities agreed to return to former 
rules of origin; (2) U.S. authorities exempted a limited number of products from existing 
marking rules (the requirement to indicate the country where the fabric is produced, i.e. made 
in) in order to allow the import into the U.S. of silk accessories with a different marking. For 
example, a silk scarf processed (dyed and printed) in Italy with imported silk fabric could be 
marked designed in Italy with Chinese fabric.  
The Congress adopted in May 2000, the Trade and Development Act reinstating the rules of 
origin that existed prior to 1996 for certain textile products. 
Nevertheless, European companies still face difficulties with the rules of origin, especially for 
products such as scarves, bed linen, table linen, bedspreads, quilts containing cotton and wool. 
For these products, according to the U.S. rules of origin, the country of origin is still the country 
of origin of the fabrics, even if the fabrics have been dyed and printed and have undergone two 
or more finishing operations in the EU.  
Therefore, the producers of these products have to label their products with the country of 
origin of the fabric. This, according to them, does not reflect the work of design and the 
production process, which have been made in Europe. 
Regarding marking of origin, customs allow some flexibility. The goods can be marked with, for 
example, designed in Italy, but in immediate proximity of this indication and at least in 
comparable size, there should be marked legibly and permanently the name of the country of  
U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2007 
 
 
30
origin preceded by Made in and Product of. 
State of 
play 
In the context of the WTO negotiations on NAMA-NTB, the EC and U.S. have made a joint 
specific negotiating proposal in relation to labelling for textiles, clothing, footwear and travel 
goods aimed at establishing disciplines on requirements for labels. 
 
Title  U.S. Customs Refusal of EU Origin 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
U.S. Customs does not recognise the EU as a country of origin, nor does it accept EU certificates 
of origin. In order to justify EU country of origin status, EU firms are required to furnish 
supplementary documentation and follow further procedures, which can be a source of 
additional costs. The European Commission and the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) 
have consistently urged the U.S. to recognise a simple EU origin. U.S. Customs noted this issue 
extends the scope of customs policy and that inter-agency consensus did not yet exist. Some 
U.S. industries and organised labour opposed the change whilst other business had cost 
concerns (i.e. marketing). For example, tyres imported into the U.S. are required by law to be 
labelled with their country of origin. If tyres marked "made in the EU" were accepted, market 
access would be improved and trade less onerous. 
 
Title  Textiles Documentary and Labelling Requirements 
Sector  Textiles and Leather 
Description 
Extensive product description requirements complicate EU textile exports to the U.S. and result 
in additional costs. Rules are burdensome for marking and labelling retail packages to clarify the 
country of origin, ultimate purchaser in the U.S. and the name of the country in which the 
article was manufactured or produced. Furthermore, there are requirements relating to the 
typology/physical characteristic of clothing labels (given size, font used, etc). These standards 
are different than those from the EU, meaning that special labels are needed for the U.S. 
market.  
In addition, customs formalities for imports of textiles, clothing and footwear to the U.S. require 
the provision of particularly detailed and voluminous information, which lead to additional costs 
and in some cases include confidential processing methods (type of finishing, of dyeing, etc). 
Much of this information seems to be relevant for customs or statistical purposes. 
The extensi on of t he l i qui dat i on peri od up t o 210  days al so functi ons as an i m port ant  t rade 
barrier. Apparel articles often have a short life span (e.g. fashion items must be sold within two 
to three months) and therefore have to be marketed immediately. Consequently, the retailer or 
the importer is often not in a position to re-deliver the goods upon Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) request, in which case CBP applies a high penalty (100% of the value of the 
goods). These delays are particularly damaging for seasonable products or for fashionable 
products. 
State of 
play 
In the context of the WTO negotiations on NAMA-NTBs, the EC and the U.S. have made a 
specific negotiating proposal in relation to labelling for textiles, clothing, footwear and travel 
goods aimed at establishing disciplines on requirements for labels. 
 
Title  Section 8e of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (Act)  
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
Description 
The following commodities are currently regulated under Federal Marketing Orders (MO): 
tomatoes, raisins, olives (other than Spanish-style green olives), avocados, mangoes, limes, 
grapefruit, green peppers, Irish potatoes, cucumbers, oranges, onions, walnuts, dates (other 
than dates for processing), hazelnuts (filberts), table grapes, eggplants, kiwifruit, nectarines, 
pistachios, apples, cherries, caneberries. 
These MOs provide requirements for the above mentioned commodities produced in one or more 
American States during a certain period of time.  It is possible that the Farm Bill currently being 
debated in the US will introduce additional marketing orders, notably for clementines. 
Section 8e of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (Act) provides that the 
importation into the United States of any such commodity, during the period of time such MO is 
in effect shall be prohibited unless it complies with grade, size, quality and maturity provisions 
set in the MO. In practice it means that any such commodities, imported from third countries, 
are checked against these requirements before release into free circulation in any American 
States. In the same time, such commodities produced and sold in an American State where the 
MO does not apply are not checked and do not need to meet these requirements. 
According to TBT, all technical requirements should equally apply both to imported and domestic 
products. 
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Title  Bioterrorism Act 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
Description 
The U.S. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act was signed 
into law on 12 June 2002. The measure is intended to address security risk surrounding the 
supply of foodstuffs. The implementation of the so-called Bioterrorism Act (BTA) necessitates 
the registration of all foreign facilities that supply food to the U.S., prior notification of all 
shipments to the U.S., record-keeping by foreign enterprises to allow traceability of foods, and 
procedures for the administrative detention of suspect foods. 
The measures cover all the main food exports to the U.S., beverages (including wines and 
spirits), processed foods, dairy products, and fruit and vegetables. Deliveries by international 
mail by private individuals are exempted, but foreign mail order companies are still subject to 
these burdens. The additional red-tape resulting from the implementation of the BTA does affect 
EU agri-food businesses in particular small and medium enterprises.  
Key elements of BTA include: 
Registration of facilities - requires every "food facility" from which foods are exported to the U.S. 
to be registered with the U.S. Food and Drugs Administration (FDA). Food facilities are also 
required to identify their U.S. agent, which implies that they must have a U.S. agent in order to 
be registered.  
The prior notice measure requires that every shipment to the U.S. must be preceded by advance 
notice of no more than 5 days and at latest by eight hours (if by sea) or by four hours (if by air) 
before arrival. Products imported from unregistered food facilities or for which inadequate notice 
is given cannot be imported and will be removed to secure storage.  
Also, EU member states expressed concerns related to U.S. lack of recognition of our plant-
passport system, applied for re-exports of plant products originated in other MS different of the 
exit one. EU's certification system for re-exports is fully in line with ISPM 12 (Guidelines for 
Phytosanitary Certificates) and this lack of recognition is adversely affecting EU exports. Other 
trade concerns are related to U.S. requirements for nursery products to be fumigated in a 
facility supervised by them before exporting.  
Record-keeping provisions set out the minimum rules for documentation related to imported 
foodstuffs and in principle cover all facilities that have to register. This provision may have far 
reaching extraterritorial effects.  
The Commission has repeatedly stressed the need for transatlantic consultation on these issues 
to increase the effectiveness of EU-U.S. coordination addressing potential terrorist threats to the 
food supply. 
 
Title  Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
The U.S. launched the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in 2002 so as to counter potential 
terrorist threats to the international maritime container trade system. The CSI consists of four 
elements: security criteria to identify high-risk containers; pre-screening containers before they 
arrive to U.S. ports; using technology to pre-screen high-risk containers and developing and 
using smart and secure containers. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) launched the 
system to achieve a more secure maritime trade environment while attempting to accommodate 
the need for efficiency in global commerce. Ports participating in the CSI use technology to 
assist their officers in inspecting quickly high-risk containers before they are shipped to U.S. 
ports. So far, ten Member States have signed declarations of principle with the CBP to introduce 
CSI in their ports as well as an agreement on stationing U.S. Customs officials in their ports.  
The CSI screening and related additional U.S. customs routines are allegedly causing significant 
additional costs and delays to shipments of EU machinery and electrical equipment to the U.S. 
This burden is so severe that a number of small European engineering companies have decided 
not to export to the U.S. any longer because of CSI. There is also competitive distortion in this 
fiercely competitive engineering market between EU and U.S. engineering companies since up 
to now there is, de facto, no reciprocity between the EU and the U.S. in this issue. 
State of 
play 
In order to ensure a level playing field among European ports, the EU concluded an agreement 
that expands the EU-U.S. customs co-operation agreement to include transport security aspects 
and to prepare minimum standards for all EU ports to participate in the CSI. In August 2005, 
the U.S. agreed to participation in the CSI of more EU ports, which comply with certain jointly 
agreed minimum standards and where no U.S. officials will be stationed. For this project, a pilot 
action has been performed in 2007 in the port of Szczecin (Poland). Similar actions are 
envisaged in Aarhus (Denmark) and Salerno (Italy) for the beginning of 2008. The EU-U.S. 
working group established by the expanded agreement is currently working on further measures 
which are intended to diminish the barriers caused by this initiative.  
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Quantitative Restrictions and Related Measures  
Title  Marine Mammal Protection Act 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
Description 
The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 aims at protecting marine mammals, particularly 
dolphins, by progressively reducing the acceptable level of dolphin mortality in U.S. tuna-fishing 
operations in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) Ocean and providing for sanctions to be taken 
against other countries which fail to apply similar standards for dolphin protection.  
The MMPA requires that countries that wish to import from the ETP must receive an "affirmative 
finding" from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). The criteria for receiving an 
"affirmative finding" relate to the membership (or launching and completing the accession 
within six months) to the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) and the need to 
have a "tuna tracking and verification system" that conforms to the Tuna Tracking and 
Verification System adopted under the Agreement for International Dolphin Conservation 
Programme (AIDCP). 
Spain was unable to join the IATTC within the 6 month time period. Therefore, it would appear 
that Spanish tuna products coming from the Eastern Tropical Pacific would not be allowed to 
enter the U.S. market. Additionally, canned tuna from Spain, not explicitly labelled as coming 
from outside the ETP would probably be prohibited from entering the U.S. market due to the 
difficulty to determine the origin of the canned tuna. 
State of 
play 
The Community, by Council Decision 1999/405/EC of 10 June 1999, authorised Spain to join the 
IATTC, on a provisional basis. This authorisation was granted pending the entry into force of the 
new Convention of IATTC (the so called Antigua Convention) which permits membership of the 
European Community. Spain formally acceded to the Convention in June 2003. The EU has 
recently become a full member of the AIDCP and has already introduced into Community Law 
the System for Tracking and Verification of Tuna through the Council Regulation (EC) N° 
882/2003 of 19 May 2003. 
On 7 June 2006 the EU notified its ratification of the Antigua Convention. The IATTC Antigua 
Convention will enter into force 15 months after the deposit of the seventh instrument of 
ratification or accession of the Parties to the IATTC Convention.  
 
Title  Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, U.S. industry can petition for the 
restriction of imports from third countries on the grounds of national security. Protective 
measures can be used for an unlimited period of time. The Department of Commerce (DoC) 
investigates the effects of imports that threaten to impair national security either by quantity or 
by circumstances. Section 232 is supposed to safeguard U.S. national security, not the economic 
welfare of any company, except when that company's future may affect U.S. national security. 
The application of Section 232 is not dependent on proof of injury to U.S. industry.  
In the past, the EU has voiced its concern that Section 232 gives U.S. manufacturers an 
opportunity to seek protection on grounds of national security, when in reality the aim is simply 
to curb foreign competition. On 1 February 2001, the DoC initiated an investigation to determine 
the effects on national security of imports of iron ore and semi-finished steel. The DoC released 
its report on 9 January 2002, which found that imports of iron ore and semi-finished steel do not 
threaten to impair U.S. national security. Therefore no action under Section 232 to adjust the 
level of imports was recommended to the President. 
 
Title  Food Aid Program 
Sector  Services - Transport 
Description 
Under U.S. regulations, only U.S. agricultural commodities may be used in food aid transactions. 
Legislation expressly includes among its food aid objectives opening up markets for U.S. exports 
(PL-480) and provision for overseas donations of surplus commodities acquired by the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (Section 416-b). The provision of such non-genuine food aid 
causes significant losses to commercial supplies of commodities. Several EU markets have been 
targeted by non-genuine U.S. food campaigns. 
Regarding transportation of U.S. food aid, the U.S. imposes cargo preferences on the World 
Food Program (WFP) requiring that at least 75% of tonnage granted is transported on vessels 
carrying the U.S. flag. It is, however, recognised that freight rates on ships carrying the U.S. 
flag are generally higher than those of other ships. The cost difference between the estimated 
amount of freight on a ship not carrying a U.S. flag and the actual freight on a U.S. vessel is 
called the Cargo Preference Premium. From 2002, income and expenditures are being recorded 
on the basis of the adjusted global freight estimates (net of cargo preference premiums). 
However, as a service to the U.S., the WFP continues to account for cash receipts and cash 
disbursements related to U.S. cargo preference premiums thus adding important operational 
costs. The EU considers this is a way of extending restrictive and discriminatory public  
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procurement practices beyond the U.S. public procurement market. In fact, this policy imposes 
Buy American requirements on a UN organisation. 
The propensity of the U.S. to use food aid to countries not suffering food shortages as a means 
of disposal of surplus farm products has the effect of disturbing local markets, cuts out 
traditional supplies and undermining local producers. Following EU complaints, the U.S. has 
partially reviewed its policy. However, the 2002 Farm Act has reinforced the role of U.S. food aid 
as an export enhancement tool and this has been further underlined by Congress in the debate 
over the budget for FY06, where the Congress has opposed a proposal by the administration to 
allocate 25% (i.e. $300 million) of the PL 480 Title II programme for local and regional 
purchases of food commodities (by USAID) outside the U.S. market. In addition, in the present 
WTO negotiations, the U.S. -both Administration and Congress- are resisting strongly any 
attempt to strictly regulate food aid operations. In particular they oppose the principle of 
providing food aid in cash insisting that also in future all U.S. food aid be procured on the U.S. 
market (including preference for transport / handling on U.S. logistics). The administration has 
again for FY 07 proposed to allocate 25% of the PL 480 Title II programme for local and regional 
purchases of food commodities (by USAID) outside the U.S. market, but the House version of 
the Farm Bill does not include such provision. Groups representing shipping companies and 
agribusiness interests have opposed using the budget of the main food aid program to buy food 
in developing countries instead of relying on American food shipped overseas. 
The new Farm Bill, which doesn't promise any significant increases in the food aid budget nor 
policy changes, is now under consideration in the Congress. 
Standards and other Technical Requirements  
Title  Organic Products 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
Description 
Under the 2001 U.S. National Organic Program (NOP), a provision exists for imported products 
to be recognised as organic. The EU and the U.S. have entered into bilateral negotiations with a 
view to mutually recognising the equivalency of the organic production systems applied by each 
Party. This should facilitate trade in products originating from organic production methods while 
ensuring the integrity of the organic production method. While substantial progress had been 
made in the negotiations for two years, the talks are at a standstill since May 2004 and no 
further road map has been laid out. 
 
Title  Electrical and Electronic Equipment Barriers 
Sector  Electronics 
Description 
The electrical safety field in the U.S. is ruled by workplace safety regulations developed by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the National Electric Code and safety 
standards for electrical equipment that are not always aligned with international standards. 
There is an imbalance in terms of market access as European exporters of electrical and 
electronic equipment and appliances have to comply with 3
rd party approval processes, whereas 
US manufacturers can market such products on the basis of a "Self-Declaration of Conformity".  
There is also an imbalance in market access for the certification industry.  Whilst US certifiers 
can freely offer their services to US industry to support their self-assessment of safety 
requirements for products to be marketed in the EU, EU certifiers need either recognition by 
OSHA to become an NRTL (Nationally Recognised Testing Laboratory) or recognition by one of 
the NRTLs in order to offer testing services. 
State of 
play 
Firstly it is important to note that there is not a single U.S. market for electrical and electronic 
products as partially divergent federal, regional, state, sectoral and even county and city 
technical regulations, procurement specifications and product standards split up the market. It 
is not sufficient to comply with federal regulations and obtain clearance from Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) to market electrical and electronic equipment in the U.S. 
As a result of this OSHA's approval system, which aims at ensuring that products used in the 
workplace are safe, has become the de facto rule for market access for most electrical and 
electronic products.  This system, designed in the 70's, presumes the necessity of 3
rd party 
approval for all electronic and electrical goods.  This approval is done by a variety of competing 
testing and certification agencies, some offering testing facilities in the EU.  Local safety 
regulations quite often require NRTL approval, whereas some regulations even seem to request 
approval from one specific NRTL, Underwriters Laboratories.  This NRTL used to have a 
monopoly and retains the largest market share in the certification market.  It recently acquired 
a number of EU certifiers. 
The information on import conditions received by European equipment exporters from U.S. 
Embassies, Chambers of Commerce abroad and the CBP often proves insufficient and 
inadequate. The de facto fragmentation of the U.S. market forces exporters to make expensive 
adaptations of their product models and type approvals to local and sectoral requirements. This 
undermines the economies of scale that a unified marketplace of the size of the U.S. market 
would otherwise make possible.  
Second, besides diverging among themselves, the standards on electrical and electronic  
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products used in the U.S. tend to diverge from International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
standards. These international standards are applied not only in Europe but in a great majority 
of third countries too. As a consequence, European exporters cannot export to the U.S. the 
electrical and electronic models that they sell to the rest of the world. Moreover, the U.S. does 
not have a policy to promote international standards as a basis for market access and seeks to 
extend the reach of its regime to those countries with which it has particularly intense trade in 
electrical and electronic equipment. This undermines the use of international standards in the 
global market place leaving scope for third countries to justify national deviations. The EU would 
like to see a more unambiguous commitment on the part of the U.S. for IEC standards. 
Third, despite the fact that technological development and consumer awareness in this sector 
favours self-certification by manufacturers, backed up by post-market surveillance and control, 
third party certification of electrical equipment and appliances is still mandatory (de jure and/or 
de facto), in the U.S. market. This is one of the most burdensome entry barriers for European 
electrical equipment and appliances. Technological development and consumer awareness have 
permitted public regulators in the EU and around the world to reduce the extent of pre-
marketing third party testing and certification of these products in favour of self-certification by 
manufacturers backed up by post-market surveillance. This disparity in conformity assessment 
creates an uneven playing field in the EU-U.S. trade of electrical goods, accruing 
disproportionately high costs to suppliers of the U.S. market.  Furthermore, it is a barrier in 
convincing some 3
rd countries to refrain from mounting similarly high market access barriers. 
Fourth, it must be noted that the EU was forced to suspend in January 2003 the Annex for 
Electrical Safety to the EU-U.S. Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA), since all attempts to 
develop practical solutions and confidence building measures to have EU certifiers accepted to 
operate in the NRTL scheme had been rejected by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA). Under the MRA, European designated laboratories would certify 
equipment according to U.S. regulations. The OSHA has continuously denied European 
authorities the right to designate European laboratories to operate under the Annex on Electrical 
Safety and this behaviour has nullified the benefits of the MRA in this sector.  This is in contrast 
with the situation for U.S certifiers who face no barriers to offer their services to the 
manufacturing industry for certifying that they meet the requirements in the EU. 
Fifth, since telecommunications equipment is subject to continuous testing and assessment in 
its development and production process, it should be unnecessary to repeat such tests by a 
third party. Industry stresses the advantages of an appropriate supplier declaration of 
conformity. U.S. regulatory agencies have begun a review of this approach, and are moving in 
certain instances towards manufacturers' declarations of conformity (PCs, VCRs, for example).  
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has deregulated its requirements for wired 
terminal equipment attachment (much in line with the regulatory approach used in the EU). 
However, the FCC continues to require third party certification of radio equipment that has been 
deregulated in the EU in terms of technical product requirements and approval procedures. The 
FCC is therefore encouraged to move toward a "manufacturers' declaration of conformity" for 
radio equipment. The current U.S. system has led to an unbalanced market access situation 
between the EU and U.S. and to various complex approval systems in the world. If the U.S. will 
adopt lighter conformity assessment procedures, it will be possible to call upon these regimes to 
deregulate.  
The FCC should be encouraged to ensure that U.S. operators only require certification of U.S. 
specific operations of mobile equipment or align its regime with the EU regime. 
 
Title  Pharmaceutical and Herbal Products (FDA Approval) 
Sector  Pharmaceuticals 
Description 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) must approve a new medicinal product before it can be 
commercialised. However, the delays for non-U.S. new medicinal products are longer than for 
U.S. developed medicinal products.  
By means of an over-the-counter (OTC) procedure, approved active substances for many 
medicinal products are put on a list (OTC-Monograph) by the FDA, so that different final 
products derived from these active substances can be marketed without any application or 
delay, as long as the active substance has a U.S. market history. This restricts market access 
for OTC products with lengthy marketing experience in countries with equally sophisticated 
medicines regulatory systems and particularly hampers access for plant-based (herbal) 
medicinal products with a long tradition in Europe. The issue has been explicitly discussed at the 
"Transatlantic Administrative Simplification Workshop" on 28 November 2007. 
State of 
play 
New provisions clarifying the criteria and procedure for classifying foreign OTC products 
generally recognised as safe and effective were adopted on 1 April 2002. Main criteria are five 
continuous years of marketing in at least one country outside the United States and a number 
of further requirements. While these  provisions were welcome in principle, administrative 
market access hurdles for herbal medicines from Europe exist since new herbal medicines still 
face difficulties in the authorisation process. 
The last meeting took place in March 2005, where new terms of reference to guide future  
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cooperation were developed and approved. In the framework of CHIC, the FDA , DG Enterprise 
and Industry have exchanged extensively information on respective regulatory systems, safety 
concerns, and alternative testing methods to animal testing, including discussing  the 
establishment of a rapid alert system to exchange data on adverse reactions.  
The exchange of information is, however, only a first step It is equally important that the U.S. 
and EU authorities take each other's findings into consideration when regulating cosmetic 
products (including certain over-the-counter drugs) and their ingredients. 
 
Title  Shipping on U.S.-flagged Vessels 
Sector  Services - Transport 
Description 
The U.S. has a number of statutes in place that require certain types of government-owned or 
financed cargoes to be carried on U.S.-flag commercial vessels. Whilst over 95% of all 
international maritime trade to and from the U.S. is carried by foreign shipping companies, the 
impact of these measures denies EU competitors access to this pool of U.S. cargo, while 
providing U.S. ship owners with guaranteed cargoes at protected, highly remunerative rates. 
The application of these measures to U.S. public procurement contracts introduces uncertainty 
for those businesses whose tenders include shipping goods to the U.S. Whether they are 
required to ship the goods on U.S.-flagged vessels, which charge significantly higher freight 
rates than other vessels, is not known until after the award of the contract. 
The relevant legislative provisions are: 
•  The Cargo Preference Act of 1904 requires that all items procured for or owned by the 
military departments be carried exclusively on U.S.-flag vessels. Waivers may be 
granted if the rates charged are excessive or otherwise unreasonable. 
•  Public Resolution N°17, enacted in 1934, requires that 100% of any cargoes generated 
by U.S. Government loans (i.e. commodities financed by Export-Import Bank loans) be 
shipped on U.S.-flag vessels. The U.S. Maritime Administration, MARAD, may grant 
waivers due to, for example, insufficient number of vessels or tonnage capacity 
available, unsuitable scheduling, unreasonable rates. 
•  The Cargo Preference Act of 1954 requires that at least 50% of all U.S. government-
generated cargoes covered be transported on U.S.-flagged vessels to the extent such 
vessels are available at fair and reasonable rates. Waivers may be granted in an 
emergency. 
•  The Food Security Act of 1985 amended the above U.S. Cargo Preference Act of 1954 
by introducing a provision to require that the percentage of shipments of agricultural 
cargo executed under foreign assistance programmes carried on U.S. flagged vessels 
be increased from 50% to 75%. 
•  U.S. Mineral Leasing Act, as amended, stipulates that exports of Alaskan North Slope 
oil must be transported on U.S.-flagged vessels (with some exceptions). 
 
Title  Pasteurised Milk Products (Grade A) 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
Description 
Certain dairy products, called "Grade A milk products" which include pasteurised milk and milk 
based products (fluid milk, cream, cottage cheese and yoghurt), are regulated under a 
Federal/State cooperative programme administered jointly by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and the National Conference on Interstate Milk Shipments (NCIMS) which is mainly 
comprised of state dairy regulatory officials. FDA and NCIMS jointly produce a Grade A dairy 
safety document, entitled the Pasteurized Milk Ordinance (PMO), which sets forth the rules and 
inspection requirements to be met by firms who would like to engage in the interstate 
commerce of Grade A products. 
According to an FDA notice published in January 2000 there are three options for firms 
interested in exporting Grade A dairy products to the U.S., the exporting company must sign a 
contract with a State, which must accept to treat it as if it were within its own jurisdiction 
(including the inspection and the control of the observance of the U.S. regulation by inspectors 
of the State several times per annum); or the region/country of the exporting firm must adopt 
and comply with the U.S. rules, in order to become a member of the Conference; or the 
programme and the regulations in the exporting country are recognised equivalent to the U.S. 
programme by the FDA. 
The first two options are closed, however, because (1) no Federal State is currently prepared to 
accept an application from a foreign company or country and (2) full compliance with the 
Pasteurized Milk Ordinance is almost impossible for a EU company.  
Only two EU firms have been able to make it onto the NCIMS list, considering the requirement 
to meet all PMO provisions and to finance the ongoing inspections by U.S. state officials. Upon 
the European Commission request, FDA has agreed to enter into equivalence discussions with 
the EU and a working plan for these discussions was agreed in October 2005. Several meetings  
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have been held since but progress is limited so far. 
It is the hope of the European Commission that these discussions can be advanced expeditiously 
in order to remedy the present situation in which it is extremely difficult to export Grade A milk 
products into the U.S. 
 
Title  Non-Use of International Standards 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
The U.S. standardisation system is different from the European model in respect to the 
development and use of international standards. Although a significant number of U.S. 
Standards Development Organisations (SDOs) standards often have a high standing 
internationally for their technical content in the industry sector and are claimed to be technically 
equivalent to international ones, their process do not require balanced representation, either in 
terms of nationality (U.S. dominated) or participation of all interested parties and consensus 
building (NGOs and SMEs interests are not ensured as in ISO and IEC). Hence they may not 
fully meet the requirements of the TBT. 
The essential characteristic of the European Standardisation system which comprises the three 
European Standardisation Organisations-CEN, CENELEC and ETSI is the pursuit of total 
harmonisation - one European Standard (EN) is adopted and implemented through out the EU. 
This access to a market of 490 million people through compliance with one European standard is 
available equally to European and non-European manufacturers and service providers. In 
addition the commitment of the European Standardisation system to the primacy of 
international standardisation through the existence of cooperative Agreements between ISO and 
CEN and IEC and CELELEC, ensures not just an open European market but also market access 
to those regions which have a similar commitment to the International Standardisation Bodies, 
ISO and IEC. 
The United States system is different from the European one. Although through its accreditation 
of about 250 Standards Development Organisations, ANSI-the American National Standards 
Institute-has made available more than 10.000 American National Standards, these alone rarely 
provide access to the U.S. market, as exporters to the U.S. must also meet prevailing state and 
federal laws. There are few unique national standards applied across the whole country and 
access to the U.S. market is not granted simply through compliance with standards. Even 
though ANSI is a member of ISO and IEC, both these two International Organisations are 
viewed as ‘little’ more than SDOs, competing with more than 800 SDOs in U.S. This fragmented 
and sectoral approach to U.S. standards development activities encourages the most prominent 
SDOs not to limit their activities to national boundaries. In addition the sectoral and competitive 
bases of the SDOs activities make it extremely difficult to develop unique standards, which are 
able to grant access to the total U.S. market. The EU has attempted to clarify some of these 
issues at the TBT Committee in Geneva but, as explained above due to the fundamental 
differences between the U.S. and EU systems no progress was made in this respect.  
State of 
play 
The metric or SI system is now the international standard. However, the U.S. does not accept it 
as such.  Although currently most U.S. states (with two exceptions) accept metric-only 
markings, this is not the case at the federal level where federal legislation requires markings in 
non-metric units. The U.S. federal obligation to dual mark products is a non-tariff barrier that 
considerably hampers exports to the U.S. by small and growing SMEs and notably constitutes a 
barrier to market entry. Consequently, these firms before being able to export products to the 
U.S. are required to re-label them with additional (U.S. inch-pound) markings that go beyond 
those required by the international standard, which is sufficient under EC law. 
 
Title  Digital Terrestrial Television 
Sector  Services - Communications & Audiovisual 
Description 
In 1996, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) mandated an exclusive transmission 
standard for digital terrestrial television in the U.S., known as ATSC. This decision has prevented 
the technology (DVB-T), developed in Europe and being adopted in several countries around the 
world, from entering the U.S. market. Several market players in the U.S. have called for a 
review of the FCC decision regarding, at least, the modulation system of the ATSC transmission 
standard so as to allow the market to choose the technology best suited for the innovative 
services and applications to be offered to consumers.  
Nevertheless, the FCC confirmed its decision in a January 2001 Order, following a period of 
comparative tests between ATSC and DVB-T modulation systems held in the U.S. whose 
procedure and results have been disputed by the DVB-T industry. This is in clear contradiction of 
U.S. Governments calls for technological neutrality and market driven approaches in other 
sectors, such as mobile communications.  
Moreover, as another example of regulatory intervention in this market, the EU notes that on 8 
August 2002, the FCC adopted an order requiring that almost all television receivers include 
digital television reception capability after 1 July 2007 (beginning on 1 July 2004, with receivers  
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with screen sizes 36 inches and above). This order, which aims to speed up the conversion to 
digital television, will further strengthen the position of the ATSC digital transmission standard in 
the U.S. market. In addition, on 9 June 2005 the FCC modified the schedule by which new 
broadcast television receivers are required to include the capability to receive over-the-air 
digital television broadcast signals to further speed up the conversion to digital television. In this 
respect, Congress has adopted legislation setting a firm date of 17 February 2009 to end the 
transition to digital TV and establish a $1.5 billion subsidy programme to help consumers 
dependent on over-the-air TV to purchase set-top boxes. The Department of Commerce's 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) appear to be on schedule 
to meet its obligations as they are defined in the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety 
Act of 2005. Beginning 1 January 2008, and continuing through 31 March 2009, consumers will 
be able to request up to two $40 coupons per household to purchase an approved DVT 
converter box. The FCC is also devoting significant resources to facilitate a smooth transition 
and is following a three-pronged approach including policymaking, enforcement and consumer 
outreach. 
Also noticeable is the adoption by the FCC, on 10 September 2003, of technical standards 
regarding the distribution of video programming on digital cable systems for devices marketed 
and labelled as digital cable ready and the establishment of some encoding rules. Finally, on 4 
November 2003, the FCC adopted an anti-piracy mechanism, known as the broadcast flag for 
digital over-the-air broadcast television to limit the indiscriminate redistribution of copyrighted 
content via the Internet.  
The European Commission submitted its views on this matter on 15 March 2004 to the U.S. 
State Department stressing that in the particular case of measures intended to guarantee the 
protection of intellectual property rights in the new digital world, regulators and policy makers 
must try to achieve a fair balance between the rights of content providers and the interests of 
other parties, such as consumers, broadcasters and manufacturers of equipment. On 12 August 
2004, the FCC released an Order approving 13 digital output protection technologies and 
recording methods that will give effect to the broadcast flag, including the digital recording 
technology developed jointly by Philips Electronics North America Corp. and Hewlett Packard. 
The FCC encouraged the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice to remain 
vigilant regarding possible anti-competitive behaviour by technology proponents.  
However, this Order, as well as a related order concerning the compatibility of TV receivers with 
cable systems (the so-called Plug and Play Order), have been challenged in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the DC Circuit. The FCC asked the Court to stay its proceedings while it reviewed the 
Orders following Petitions for Reconsideration by Parties on all sides of the issues in the Plug and 
Play Order case, the Court agreed but in the Broadcast Flag Order case, the Court did not and 
on 6 June 2005 the Court decreed that the FCC lacked jurisdiction to impose the broadcast flag 
anti-piracy mechanism on manufacturers of TV sets and other apparatus capable of receiving a 
digital signal. European Commission services will continue to monitor developments in this area 
and, in particular, any future initiative at Congressional level to re-instate the broadcast flag and 
impose a similar protection for digital radio services.  
Digital Audio Broadcasting  
On 11 October 2002, the FCC approved a technology developed by iBiquity Digital Corporation 
for the transmission of analogue and digital radio signals and allowed radio stations to begin 
interim, voluntary digital transmission, deferring consideration of licensing and service rules to a 
future proceeding. On 15 April 2004, the FCC initiated a proceeding to explore rules for digital 
audio broadcasting. FCC sought in particular comments on whether the advent of DAB requires 
the adoption of service rules addressing music piracy. 
Government Procurement 
Title  Berry Amendment to the 1941 Defence Appropriations Act 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
The concept of national security was originally used in the 1941 Defence Appropriation Act to 
restrict procurement by the DoD to U.S. sourcing. Now known as the Berry Amendment, its 
scope has been extended to secure protection for a wide range of products only tangentially-
related to national security concerns -- for example, the 1992 General Accounting Office ruling 
that the purchase of fuel cells for helicopters is subject to the Berry Amendment fabric 
provisions, and the withdrawal of a contract to supply oil containment booms to the U.S. Navy 
because of the same textile restrictions.  
An audit report by the Defence Department's Office of Inspector General concluded that for 
certain DoD procurements during fiscal years 1996 and 1997, about half of the solicitations and 
contracts examined had not incorporated or enforced the relevant domestic sourcing 
requirements. In response, DoD's procurement director has taken steps to ensure that contracts 
at or above the simplified acquisition threshold (presently U.S.$ 100,000) are domestically 
sourced. To comply with the Buy America provisions, contracting officers must generally add 
50% to the price when evaluating offers with non-qualifying country end products against offers 
with domestic end products.  
In September 1996, Congress adopted an amendment that extended the initial scope of the  
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Berry Amendment to cover also all textile fibres and yarns used in the production of fabrics. The 
r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  e x t e n s i o n  w a s  t h a t  E U  f i b r e s  a n d  y a r n s  c o u l d  n o  l o n g e r  b e  u s e d  b y  U . S .  
manufacturers for producing fabrics that they sell to the DoD. In 1998, a waiver allowing the 
procurement of para-aramid fibres and yarns under certain conditions was adopted through the 
National Defence Authorisation Act for fiscal year 1999 (Strom Thurmond Act).  
The FY2006 Defense Authorization Act (Section 833) contains changes to the Berry Amendment 
that expand the coverage of this amendment's Buy American provisions. The new language 
requires DoD to notify Congress within seven days if it awards a contract to a foreign 
manufacturer and place the contract on a General Services Administration Web site. The new 
provisions also expand the coverage of the Berry Amendment by requiring that components of 
textiles and apparel are also made in the U.S. In addition, the bill contains a provision (Section 
832) mandating training programmes for DoD personnel about the Berry Amendment. Taken 
together, these provisions will hamper DoD's flexibility in applying the Berry Amendment by 
opening DoD waiver decisions to continuous challenge by the U.S. textile industry.  
The FY2007 Defense Authorization Act contains some Buy American/Berry Amendment 
provisions, including the one establishing a Strategic Materials Protection Board that would 
identify items critical to U.S. national security and a related provision that instructs the Defense 
Department to work cooperatively toward complying with the "Berry Amendment" (specialty 
metals). In this context, working cooperatively means that the bill prohibits the purchase of 
non-domestically melted or produced specialty metals but allows for certain exceptions like 
exemption for electronic components containing small amounts of specialty metals. Exception is 
made also for procurement outside the U.S. and for cases when there is no domestically 
available specialty metal of satisfactory quality. Procurement of specialty metals from foreign 
sources is allowed also in furtherance of agreements with foreign governments or to offset sales 
made by the U.S. government or U.S. firms. One-time waiver authority of the specialty metals 
domestic source requirement is given by the Secretary of Defense for items manufactured 
before the date of enactment of this act. The FY2007 bill gives defence contractors four years to 
publicly disclose non-compliance or certify plans for future compliance and prevents the Board 
from adding or deleting items from the list of metals already protected by the Berry 
Amendment. 
Further DoD procurement restrictions are based on the National Security Act of 1947 and the 
Defence Production Act of 1950, which grant authority to impose restrictions on foreign supplies 
in order to preserve the domestic mobilisation base and the overall preparedness posture of the 
U.S. At the same time, defence procurement from foreign companies is sometimes also impeded 
by Buy America restrictions on federally-funded programmes. 
 
Title  Memoranda of Understanding (Defence Acquisitions) 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
There has been a trend towards making DoD's other domestic preferences, apart from the Buy 
American Act preferences, less restrictive by expanding the preference to qualifying countries. 
These are countries that maintain reciprocal memoranda of understanding (MoU) with the U.S.  
In practice, all North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries (except Iceland), all major 
non-NATO allies of the U.S. (e.g. Australia, New Zealand) as well as Sweden, Finland and 
Austria have signed MoUs with the U.S. allowing for a waiver of the corresponding restrictions. 
However, these MoUs are subject to U.S. laws and regulations, and consequently, other 
overriding ad hoc restrictions can be imposed annually by Congress through the 
authorisation/appropriations process. In 2005, the defence authorisation and appropriations 
process for FY2006 was no exception to this trend. A number of proposed provisions raised 
concerns those related to beneficiaries of alleged foreign subsidies and those contained in the 
House version of the bill that would establish a five-year ban on procurement from any person 
selling items on the U.S. Munitions List to China. These worrisome provisions were dropped from 
the final version of the bill. The White House issued Statements of Administrative Policy arguing 
in favour of keeping flexibility in applying the Buy American Act. 
For example, U.S. legislation allows the Administration (DoD and USTR) to rescind a waiver if it 
determines that a particular ally discriminates against U.S. products. Similarly, the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 requires the Secretary of Defense to make every 
effort to ensure that the policies and practices of the Department of Defense reflect the goal of 
establishing an equitable trading relationship between the United States and its foreign defence 
trade partners, including encouraging and ensuring that United States firms and United States 
employment in the defence sector are not disadvantaged by unilateral procurement practices by 
foreign governments, such as the imposition of offset agreements. To this effect, the Defense 
Secretary will also be required to develop a strategy as well as review and modify existing MoUs 
etc. with foreign defence trade partners. Furthermore, it is especially regrettable that Congress, 
after having adopted the Fastener Quality Act of 2000, continues to impose Buy American 
procurement restrictions on anchor and mooring chains.  
There are also indications that U.S. procurement officers disregard the exemption of Buy 
American restrictions for MoU countries (e.g. fuel-cells, ball and roller bearings, and steel  
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forging items). The barriers to defence trade with the U.S. result from a complex set of rules 
and practices aiming at imposing domestic source restrictions on U.S. defence acquisition. A 
partial identification of all these barriers is provided in a July 1998 report of the U.S. General 
Accounting Office that was established to justify these domestic source restrictions.  
The following examples illustrate the large variety of obstacles facing EU exporters to the U.S.  
•  Specific requirements to produce goods on U.S. soil. This can take many forms, for 
example as part of the DoD programme approval procedure, a requirement exists that 
any major defence item must be produced on U.S. soil, so that EU companies can only 
do business by selling the licences to manufacture (e.g. Harrier Vertical Take-Off and 
Landing Jet).  
•  There is no grant-back given for changes made to products by the licensee (a common 
element of licensing systems in the area of non-defence goods, as the original owner 
then benefits from changes made). 
•  Foreign comparative tests (FCT) are carried out to assess the best product for goods 
not produced in the U.S. Funds to carry out such tests were reduced in 1999, although 
the defence budget itself was increased. Also, experience shows that, where an FCT 
pinpoints a successful product, DoD seeks a licence to make that product in the U.S. 
rather than entering into a direct supply contract with the offshore producer. The effect 
of this practice is that EU suppliers look for a U.S. production partner early in the 
process. 
•  Barriers arising from the use of the Foreign Military Sales Regulation (FMSR). The FMSR 
introduces maximum foreign content threshold requirements for products exported with 
FMS support. This means that U.S. prime contractors willing to seek FMS support are 
reluctant to design foreign content into their products. Instead, they prefer replacing 
any foreign content by U.S. production under licence (e.g. armoured vehicles were 
obtained under licence from Austria and then sold on to Kuwait through the FMS 
system this took sales to third countries away from European companies).  
•  Technical data / Technology export control requirements. Non-nationals cannot take 
their own foreign companies' technical data out of the U.S. (even if only for showing 
around for sales purposes) unless the U.S. company is granted a licence to export that 
data and consequent rights over the data.  
•  U.S. subsidiaries. One way of circumventing the U.S.-soil production requirements is to 
set up a subsidiary in the U.S. However, such subsidiaries need to obtain both security 
clearance and authorisation to operate. A precondition for obtaining this is that the 
overseas parent company must relinquish management control of the subsidiary (U.S. 
Security Manual). These Chinese walls are quite systematically established.  
•  Lack of access to bidder conferences/security clearance considerations. Foreign 
nationals rarely have access to bidder conferences and other pre-contract award 
procedures, because they are not granted the required security clearances at that stage 
of the procurement process. 
 
Title  Space Launching Services 
Sector  Services - Transport 
Description 
Federal law and policy maintain high barriers to U.S. Government utilization of foreign launch 
services. The President's U.S. Space Transportation Policy authorized on December 21, 2004, 
requires the launch of U.S. government payloads (satellites) on space launch vehicles 
manufactured in the U.S. unless exempted by the Director of the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs. An exception is provided for use of foreign launch vehicles on a "no-exchange of funds" 
basis for limited scientific programmes. The NASA Authorization Act of 2005 enshrines the 
President's 2004 policy in law stating that NASA shall not launch a payload on a foreign launch 
vehicle except in accordance with the policy. 
The Commercial Space Act of 1998 also requires the Federal Government to acquire space 
transportation services from U.S. commercial providers whenever such services are required. 
The Act's definition of a U.S. commercial provider effectively excludes all foreign launch service 
providers by establishing domestic content in excess of 50 percent. 
Other restrictions on foreign launch services are now being considered by Congress. In 
December 2007, Members of the Florida Congressional Delegation introduced "Launch America" 
legislation that could prohibit NASA from the utilization of foreign launch vehicles for cargo 
missions to the International Space Station (ISS) and mandate the use of U.S. space launch 
services. The prohibition against foreign launch services could apply to NASA funded missions 
conducted with the Europe's ATV (Autonomous Transfer Vehicle), the Japanese Heavy Transfer 
Vehicle (HTV), or the Russian Progress supply vehicle. The legislation, if passed and signed into 
law, could have a serious impact on the utilization of the ISS during a five-year or even longer 
period, beginning in 2011, when the U.S. Space Shuttle is no longer in service and NASA's 
replacement systems, the Ares/Orion and U.S. commercial vehicles currently under  
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development, are not yet operational.  
In addition to these barriers, subsidies for U.S. launch services providers are at an all-time high. 
The 2004 Space Transportation Policy provides that the Secretary of Defence fund the annual 
fixed costs for both primary U.S. launch systems, the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles 
(EELV) now operated by the Lockheed Martin-Boeing joint venture, the United Launch Alliance 
(ULA). The President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2009 requests $358 million in funding for launch 
services but proposes fixed cost funding under "Assured Access" and "Launch Capabilities" 
categories of $40 million and $747 million respectively-twice the amount of the variable launch 
services costs. These high fixed cost subsidies translate to competitive advantages for Atlas V 
and Delta IV in the commercial satellite launch market. 
Taken together, these measures are part of a set of co-coordinated actions to strengthen the 
U.S. launch industry and are clearly detrimental to European launch service providers. European 
launch operators remain effectively barred from competing for most U.S. Government launch 
contracts, which account for more than 50 percent of the U.S. satellite market. Meanwhile, 
European Government support for fixed launch costs of 192 million Euros per year under the 
European Guaranteed Access to Space (EGAS) program are set to expire in 2010 as U.S. 
subsidies, set at three times the European level, continue to grow. 
The EU has no similar barriers to space launch services or a "Buy European" launch policy as 
demonstrated by the recent launches of the Sicral 1B and CosmoSkymed European government 
satellites on U.S. launchers. 
The same situation exists for the providers of remote sensing capabilities. The U.S. Commercial 
Remote Sensing Policy of 25 April 2003 directs the U.S. government to rely to the maximum 
practical extent on U.S. commercial remote sensing capabilities, not only for military and 
homeland security but also for civil uses. It is a stated goal of this policy to enable U.S. industry 
to compete successfully as a provider of remote sensing space capabilities for foreign 
governments and foreign commercial users. 
 
Title  Buy American Act 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
1. The Buy American Act (BAA), initially enacted in 1933, is the core domestic preference 
statute governing U.S. procurement. It covers a number of discriminatory measures, generally 
termed Buy American restrictions, which apply to government-funded purchases. The Executive 
Order 10582 of 1954, as amended, expands the scope of the BAA in order to allow procuring 
entities to set aside procurement for small businesses and firms in labour surplus areas, and to 
reject foreign bids either for national interest or national security reasons.  
The Buy American Act 
1) Restricts the purchase of supplies, which are not domestic end products, for use within the 
U.S. A foreign end product may be purchased if it is determined that the price of the lowest 
domestic offer is unreasonable or if another exception applies, and  
2) Requires, with some exceptions the use of only domestic construction materials in contracts 
for construction in the U.S. 
3) Buy American Act uses a two-part test to define a domestic end product a) the article must 
be manufactured in the U.S.; and 2) the cost of domestic component must exceed 50% of the 
cost of all the components. 
The Buy American Act applies to purchase of supplies valued from U.S. $3,000 to U.S. $193,000 
as well as construction purchases valued from U.S. $3,000 to U.S. $7,407,000 
Some of the Buy American provisions prohibit public sector bodies from purchasing goods and 
services from foreign sources; some establish local content requirements, while others still 
extend preferential price terms to domestic suppliers. For example, Federal agencies are 
required to procure only U.S. mined or produced unprocessed goods, and only manufactured 
goods with at least a 50% local content. In terms of price preferences, typically a 6% penalty 
would be added on the bid of a foreign firm for civilian projects; a 12% penalty for such projects 
when the local competitor is a small enterprise from an area with high unemployment; and a 
50% penalty in the case of defence contracts. 
Buy American restrictions not only directly reduce the opportunities for EU exports, but via 
content requirements also discourage U.S. bidders from using European products or services. 
The U.S. industry, through the court system and legislative lobbying, ensures that Buy American 
preferences are vigorously enforced and maintained. Suppliers based in countries that are 
parties of the GPA are generally not directly excluded from the scope of the BAA and other 
restrictive regulations. Instead, legislation generally foresees the granting of waivers as regards 
these suppliers (inter alia, through the 1979 Trade Agreements Act). However, the actual 
implementation of these waivers may lead to legal uncertainty and act as a barrier.  
2. In addition, significant barriers of access to the U.S. procurement market result from Buy 
America provisions which prescribe the products, State or local authorities can purchase for 
projects co-funded by Federal grants. The European Commission estimated Buy America to  
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affect about U.S.$ 35 billion of contracts in Fiscal Year 2005.  
One of the most obvious areas of Buy America is federal aid administered by the Department of 
Transportation (DoT) under several different acts, including the Highway Administration Act, the 
Urban Mass Transit Act, and the Airports Improvements Act. In accordance with these acts, the 
DoT provides aid to the State and local governments for various transportation-related 
procurements. The Federal government may fund 40% to 80% of the project (depending on the 
nature of the grant), while the State or local government must fund the remaining share. All 
purchases of goods and services related to these projects must meet various Buy America 
provisions, usually domestic content requirements of 60% and, failing that, a price penalty of up 
to 25%. Typically, these provisions also require that all iron, steel and other manufactured 
goods have to be assembled and originate in the U.S.  
3. Buy American or buy local legislation is also rife at State level. More than half of all U.S. 
States and a large number of localities do apply some "Buy Local" restrictions in one form or 
another. In some cases, the procurement of particular products (e.g. steel, coal, printing and 
cars) are subject to such restrictions. Affirmative action schemes favouring small business or 
particular types of business (e.g. minority-owned) are also applied extensively in a large number 
of States. 
Although 37 of the 50 States are covered by the GPA of 1994, the scope remains very limited, 
as procuring entities such as municipalities and utilities are not included. 
A m o n g  t h e  1 3  S t a t e s  t h a t  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  b o u n d  b y  t h e  U . S .  o f f e r ,  s o m e  m a i n t a i n  v e r y  
substantial local preferences, which have a very negative impact on EU and other foreign 
suppliers. This is the case of Alaska, New Mexico, South Carolina and, to a lesser extent, Ohio 
and Virginia. In the case of New Jersey, State legislation also provides that for the construction 
of public works projects financed by State funds, the material used (e.g. cement) must be of 
domestic origin. 
Even in the GPA-bound states, various exemptions (i.e. for purchases of cars, coal, printing and 
steel and for set-aside) seriously limit the procurement opportunities open to foreigners. 
Besides, all procurements by States and localities that benefit from particular types of federal 
funding (e.g. in mass transit and highway projects) are subject to the Buy America Act (BAA).  
4. Although the BAA applies in principle to the procurement of goods, it has also inspired similar 
provisions in the procurement of services. In March 2002, the State of New Jersey introduced 
new legislation for procurement of services specifying that only citizens of the United States and 
persons authorised to work in the United States pursuant to federal law may be employed in the 
performance of services under the contract or any subcontract awarded under the contract. This 
measure mainly affects computer services suppliers and suppliers with call centres outside the 
U.S. Although the State of New Jersey is not covered by the U.S. commitments under the GPA, 
the measure risks creating a contagious effect. In August 2003, the State of Michigan adopted a 
bill containing similar provisions. Other States such as Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri and 
Wisconsin have announced similar bills. 
 
Title  Steel Local Content Requirements 
Sector  Iron, Steel and Non-Ferrous Metals 
Description 
Steel is subject to the imposition of local content requirements or preferences given in works 
and other government procurement contracts for bids which include locally produced steel. This 
practice is notably common at the sub-federal level. Many States (such as Connecticut, 
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Illinois, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and West 
Virginia) have such requirements that also apply to private contractors and subcontractors. 
 
Title  Small Business Act 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
The Small Business Act of 1953 (SBA), as amended, requires executive agencies to place a fair 
proportion of their purchases with small businesses. This "set-aside" scheme is specifically 
exempted from application of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) under 
General Note 1 to the U.S. Appendix I. 
Under the SBA, any contract for the purchase of goods or services with an estimated award 
value greater than U.S.$ 3,000 but not exceeding U.S.$ 100,000 will be automatically set-aside 
for (U.S.) small business unless fewer than two small businesses submit competitive bids for 
that procurement. Small business set-asides can occur in procurements above U.S.$ 100,000 on 
a discretionary basis.  
In addition to meeting certain size criteria, a business is eligible for small business status, for 
procurement purposes, only if it maintains a place of business in the U.S. and makes a 
significant contribution to the U.S. economy through payment of taxes and/or use of U.S. 
products, materials, and/or labour. The size criteria vary depending on the product or service 
being procured. The standard size criteria for eligibility as a small business for goods producing 
industries are 500 employees or fewer. However, for some industries (i.e. pulp, paper boxes,  
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packaging; glass containers; transformers, switchgear and apparatus; relays and industrial 
controls; miscellaneous communications equipment; search, detection, navigation guidance 
systems and instruments) the employee limit is 750 and for some others (i.e. chemicals and 
allied products; tyres and inner tubes, flat glass, gypsum and generators; telephone and 
telegraph apparatus) it is 1000. For services industries, depending on the sector, firms with total 
annual revenues of less than U.S.$2.5 million to 17 million are considered to be small 
businesses. 
In 1999, the Small Business Administration launched another programme- HUBZone- that 
provides contracting benefits to small businesses located in "historically under-utilised business 
zones". The first goal of the programme is to channel at least 1% of overall federal procurement 
to HUBZone small businesses, which at current federal spending levels equates to about $2 
billion. By the year 2003, that goal rises to 3%, or about $6 billion. Until 30 September 2000, 
the procedures under the programme applied only to acquisitions made by certain departments 
and agencies; after that date, the procedures apply to all federal agencies. For acquisitions 
beyond thresholds and open to competition, price evaluation preferences may be granted, 
calculated by adding a factor of 10% to all offers.  
The notion of fair proportion means that the government-wide goal for participation by small 
businesses shall be established at no less than 20% of the total value of all prime contract 
awards for each fiscal year. Under normal bid procedures, there is a 12% preference for small 
businesses in bid evaluation for civilian agencies (instead of the standard 6%). 
An important number of States also operate particularly proactive small businesses and minority 
set-aside policies. The Small Disadvantaged Business Certification and Eligibility Program assists 
small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs) by certifying them as SDB-eligible firms. To be certified 
by the SBA as an SDB, a small business must be at least 51% owned and controlled by an 
individual determined as socially and economically disadvantaged. A price evaluation 
adjustment, as determined every year by the DoC., is applied for SDBs under the Programme in 
authorised competitive acquisitions meeting certain criteria. It is estimated that in States like 
Texas such policies effectively exclude foreign firms from around 20% of procurement 
opportunities. In Kentucky, as much as 70% is set aside for small businesses. 
The active promotion of small businesses is a common concern for the EU and the U.S. The EU 
is, however, concerned that the U.S. "set-aside" measures and their exemption from the GPA 
favour U.S. industry and have exclusionary effects to the detriment of foreign competitors 
 
Title  Transport-Related Buy America Provisions 
Sector  Services - Construction & Engineering 
Description 
One of the most obvious areas of Buy America is federal aid administered by the Department of 
Transportation (DoT) under several different acts, including the Highway Administration Act, the 
Urban Mass Transit Act, and the Airports Improvement Act. In accordance with these acts, the 
DoT provides aid to the State and local governments for various transportation related 
procurements. The State or local government at some level must match that money. 
Specifically, the Federal government may fund 40% to 80% of the project (depending on the 
nature of the grant), while the State or local government must fund the remaining share. All 
purchases of goods and services related to these projects must meet various Buy America 
provisions, usually domestic content requirements of 60% and, failing that, a price penalty of up 
to 25%.  
 
Title  Ball and Roller Bearings 
Sector  Iron, Steel and Non-Ferrous Metals 
Description 
Congress has imposed a Buy American requirement on the procurement of ball and roller 
bearings since 1988, which remain in effect in 2007. In May 1996, the Federation of European 
Bearings Manufacturers' Association (FEBMA) made a submission to the Department of Defense 
(DoD), in opposition to the restriction. The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 
1997 contains the McCain Amendment authorising the DoD to waive Buy America requirements 
that would impede the reciprocal procurement of defence items under the Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoU). In September 2005, the DoD issued a final rule amending the Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS) to authorise the Defence Logistics Agency 
Component Acquisition Executive to waive domestic source requirements on the acquisition of 
ball and roller bearings, when adequate domestic supplies are not available to meet DoD 
requirements on a timely basis, and provided that such acquisition is made in order to acquire 
capability for national security purposes. Sec. 8046 of the FY2007 Defense Appropriations Act 
reiterates this waiver provision. The EU will monitor the implementation of this waiver 
authorisation. 
Subsidies  
Title  Biodiesel Subsidies 
Sector  Other Industries  
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Description 
The Europe Union is the major market for Biodiesel and accounts for 77% of world production. 
The EU market is worth about €5 billion per year. The U.S. is the world's second largest 
producer and is by far the major source of EC imports. 
The issue has emerged due to a surge in U.S. subsidised Biodiesel exports to the EU, which has 
depressed prices and profits and caused several producers to shut down their operation. The 
problem is that the U.S. subsidizes Biodiesel producers by means of tax credits, which impacts 
not only on U.S. sales but also on exports to other countries, notably the EU. In contrast the EU 
provides subsidies to consumers, which only affects the EU market and imports are eligible for 
the same benefits as EU products. The subsidies are significant ($1 per gallon or 200 Euro per 
tonne) and they are enabling imports from the U.S. to enter at below the EU industry's raw 
material costs. In effect U.S. Biodiesel exports to the EU have increased sharply, from less then 
100,000 tonnes in 2006 to 1 million tonnes in 2007, which presents already nearly 20% of the 
EU market share. 
State of 
play 
EU industries have repeatedly complained about these subsidies, which are the so-called "B-99" 
tax credits to U.S. producers of Biodiesel, alleging that they are countervailable. The issue is 
becoming more urgent as the EU industry (EBB which has 52 member companies in 19 Member 
States) decided on 30 November 2007 to prepare anti-dumping and CVD complaints and the 
Commission expects to receive such complaints by March 2008. 
 
Title  Agriculture marketing loans 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
Description 
The Commodity loan programme allows U.S. producers of designated crops to receive loans 
from the U.S. government at a crop-specific loan rate per unit of production by pledging 
production as loan collateral. This programme has had significant budgetary outlays over the 
past few years, largely related to marketing loans.  
Marketing loan provisions allow farmers to repay commodity loans at less than the original loan 
rate (plus interest) when market prices are lower. Marketing loans provide farmers economic 
incentives to retain ownership of crops and sell them rather than forfeit ownership to the 
government to settle loans. Many U.S. farmers use a two-step marketing procedure in which 
they receive programme benefits when prices are seasonably low (and programme benefits 
high) and then sell their crop later in the marketing year when prices have risen. Producers can 
receive marketing loan benefits through two different channels the marketing loan gains (loan 
programme) and the loan deficiency payments. Under the loan programme, farmers place their 
crop under the commodity loan programme by pledging and storing all or part of their 
production as collateral for the loan, receiving a per-unit loan rate for the crop. But rather than 
repay the full loan (plus interest), farmers may repay the loan at a lower repayment rate at any 
time during the loan period that market prices are below the loan rate. Marketing loan 
repayment rates are normally based on either local, posted country prices or the prevailing 
world market price. The difference between the loan rate and the loan repayment rate 
represents a programme benefit to producers.  
Alternatively, farmers may choose to receive marketing loan benefits through direct loan 
deficiency payments (LDP). The LDP allows the producer to receive marketing loan benefits 
without having to take out and subsequently repay a commodity loan. The LDP rate is the 
amount by which the loan rate exceeds the posted county price or prevailing world market 
price. 
State of 
play 
10 January 2003 The European Oilseed Alliance (EOA) lodged a complaint under the Trade 
Barrier Regulation, claiming that loan rates, marketing loan subsidies, direct payments and 
counter-cyclical payments granted to U.S. oilseed producers under the 2002 Farm Act are 
causing serious prejudice to the EU.  
13 March 2003 Commission, after consultation of the Advisory Committee established by the 
TBR considered that the complaint contained sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an 
examination procedure in accordance with Article 8 of the TBR. 
20 October 2003 Investigation report was submitted to the Member States. Its findings were 
that some of the U.S. oilseed subsidies would be protected by Article 13 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, whilst for others the level of the U.S. support in the marketing year 2001 appear to 
have had significant price effects, but the Commission did not have sufficient evidence to reach 
a final conclusion on whether they cause or threaten to cause serious injury. The Commission is 
monitoring the evolution of the oilseed market and the U.S. subsidies in order to collect further 
evidence on the negative impact of the U.S. oilseed subsidies on prices and will present a 
report, whenever appropriate, on the basis of the information available and in any event no 
later than the end of 2005, which will review the situation in the light of the further evidence 
obtained and the applicable legal provisions. 
In 2005, the Commission reviewed the situation and reported to the TBR Committee on the 
evolution of the case. The monitoring continues. 
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Title  Farm Bill 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
Description 
Agriculture policy was overhauled in 2002 with the passing of the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002 (Farm Act). Despite a consensus among WTO Member States that farm 
policies should be reformed in the direction of less trade-distorting forms of support, the 2002 
Farm Act went in the opposite direction and increased the distorting effect of U.S. farm 
subsidies. The main elements of the U.S. 2002 legislation are 
•  introduction of new counter-cyclical payments for arable crops, designed to 
compensate for falls in market prices. These payments, together with the continued 
loan programme, shield farmers from low prices and thus perpetuate a cycle of over-
production and downward pressure on prices; 
•  updating of base areas on hitherto fixed arable crop payments, thus re-linking these 
subsidies to current production; 
•  payment of a new counter-cyclical subsidy to dairy farmers to counteract price 
movements; 
•  introduction of a promotional levy on dairy imports, which could be applied in a manner 
to act as a tariff increase  
•  new subsidies for producers of fruit and vegetables, wool, mohair, honey, and for 
grassland livestock farmers; 
•  substantial increases in export assistance measures, including a 120% increase in the 
Market Access Promotion programme to $200 million per year, and non-emergency 
food aid programmes explicitly designed to expand U.S. export opportunities and 
dispose of surplus production; 
•  subsidies for energy producers who utilise agricultural commodities, such as maize and 
soya. 
State of 
play 
The U.S. 2002 farm policy has been widely criticized, both within and outside the U.S. The main 
reasons for criticism are (a) the potential for the crop subsidies to depress world prices; (b) the 
counter- cyclical nature of both the loan programme and the new counter –cyclical support, 
which shields U.S. producers from the market and (c) the concern that the U.S. could exceed its 
WTO limit of $19.1 billion production-linked support (the AMS limit). 
The EU is monitoring the implementation of the 2002 Farm Act for compliance with trade rules 
and, as necessary, is defending its rights, notably in the framework of the WTO (notifications in 
accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on agriculture, trade policy review 
mechanism). 
The U.S. only notified the implementation of the 2002 Farm Bill to the WTO in November 2007, 
as the current Bill draws to a close, given that the commodity support provisions expire at the 
end of the 2007 crop year. The EU is scrutinizing the U.S. notification and is concerned that the 
counter-cyclical payment scheme is reported as "non-product specific" support and is therefore 
not counted against the AMS ceiling. Especially as the USDA data shows significant spending on 
counter-cyclical payments during the course of 2004 and 2005.  
 
Title  State Subsidies WTO Notification 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
Transparency in the area of subsidies is an obligation of the Agreement on Subsides and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM). However, the notification of subsidies is frequently delayed. 
State of 
play 
Up to 1998 the U.S. only notified the WTO of a limited number of Federal programmes, many of 
which were relatively small, and would not notify its many State-level subsidies. Following 
pressure from the EU, in the form of detailed questions and a counter-notification under Article 
25.10 of the SCM, the U.S. finally began to notify certain State-level subsidies in its new and full 
notification of 1998. The notification was reviewed in the WTO Subsidies Committee in May 
1999. The EU still remained concerned by the lack of information on U.S. State-level subsidies, 
particularly large, ad hoc investment incentives. 
The reporting of Federal subsidies was improved, although there were still gaps as regards 
certain sectors, notably aerospace. The U.S. undertook to include non-notified subsidies, 
including those identified by the EU, in the next update notification. This should have been 
provided in 1999. However, no update was provided until the Subsidies Committee on 2 July 
2002, where the U.S. provided an update on subsidies for 1999 and 2000 and a new and full 
notification for 2001.  
In October 2003 the U.S. presented a new and full notification for the 2002 fiscal year. 
The 2005 new and full subsidy notification covering the fiscal year 2003 and 2004 were 
submitted only after a 2 year delay by the end of 2007. 
 
Title  Aircraft Engine Manufacturers  
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Sector  Aircraft 
Description 
The EU is concerned by U.S. Government subsidies granted to U.S. engine manufacturers in the 
form of benefits from R and D funded by NASA, the DoD - dual use technology - and other 
mechanisms. GE and Pratt and Whitney are the dominant beneficiaries. These subsidies, which 
are non-repayable and can be directly traced to specific engine programmes, average around $2 
billion annually. 
 
Title  Airline State Aid 
Sector  Services - Transport 
Description 
Whilst recognising the severe financial consequences of 11 September 2001 on U.S. airlines and 
the need to ensure that vital transport services in the U.S. were maintained, the EU is 
concerned about the scale of financial assistance provided by the U.S. Government to U.S. air 
carriers, particularly since financial problems of many airlines predated 11 September. This 
assistance could place U.S. airlines at an unfair advantage compared to their European 
competitors who have received only tightly controlled compensation for the four-day closure of 
U.S. airspace. In the U.S. in the months after 11 September, $5 billion was made available to 
U.S. airlines according to their size and a further $10 billion was made available in loan 
guarantees to ailing companies. A second round of aviation related assistance totalling $2.4 
billion was also provided in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003. The 
government has supplied third party war risks insurance at virtually no cost to U.S. airlines and 
their suppliers. Although similar coverage was provided by several EU Member States, this was 
only done for a limited period and against payments of premiums. The overall assistance given 
by the U.S. Government to the U.S. industry represents significant protection from the 
commercial pressures facing foreign air carriers and is a potential impediment to fair trade on 
transatlantic air routes.  
Other areas of state aid include the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) awarded 
reimbursement grants totalling $100 million to 58 domestic air carriers for the direct cost of 
reinforcing cockpit doors. This grant money is in addition to $97 million for domestic carriers 
that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) awarded for the same purpose.  
In addition, in recent years four major U.S. carriers have sought bankruptcy protection under 
Chapter 11, and two have terminated and transferred their pension plans to a federal 
corporation, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Pension reform legislation 
pending before the Congress, if adopted, would provide specific relief to U.S. airlines, allowing 
them an additional 20 years to pay their pension liabilities.  
Provisions on government subsidies and support are included in the EU-U.S. Air Transport 
Agreement, which will be applied from 30 March 2008. It is recognised that government 
subsidies can adversely affect competition. If fair and equal opportunity to compete is adversely 
affected, the Joint Committee set up by the Agreement may develop appropriate responses. The 
Joint Committee will maintain an inventory of issues regarding government subsidies and 
support. 
 
Title  Agricultural Export Subsidies and Promotion 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
Description 
The U.S. operates a range of programmes designed to subsidise and/or promote exports of U.S. 
agricultural products.  
Under the Export Enhancement Program (EEP), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) pays 
cash bonuses to exporters, allowing them to sell agricultural products in targeted countries at 
prices below the exporters costs of acquiring them. The stated purpose of the programme is to 
enable U.S. exporters to meet prices that are being subsidised by other Governments into the 
world market. The EEP has not been used to any great extent in recent years, but potentially 
applies to products exported to over 70 countries. 
The Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP) is used for dairy market development purposes. 
Commodities eligible under the DEIP are milk powder, butterfat and Cheddar, Mozzarella, 
Gouda, Feta, cream and processed American Cheeses. 
The Market Access Program offers a share of costs for promotion campaigns for agricultural 
products (the majority being high value and value added) in selected export markets. The total 
budget for market development programmes for FY2005 was $254 million. 
 
Title  Jones Act and Shipbuilding Subsidies 
Sector  Shipbuilding 
Description 
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 "Jones Act", as amended in 1936, provides for various 
shipbuilding subsidies and tax deferments for projects meeting domestic built requirements. 
These are provided via the Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS), the Capital Constructions Fund 
(CCF) and the Construction Reserve Fund (CRF).  
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Pursuant to this act, the United States prohibits the use, sale or lease of foreign built or foreign 
reconstructed vessels in commercial application between points in national waters or the waters 
of an exclusive economic zone. Despite the discriminatory nature of this U.S. regulation, the 
United States is permitted to continue to apply the Jones Act under paragraph 3 of the GATT 
1994. Pursuant to this article, the United States may prohibit the use, sale or lease of foreign 
built or foreign reconstructed vessels in commercial application between points in national 
w a t e r s  o r  t h e  w a t e r s  o f  a n  e x c l u s i v e  e c o n o m i c  z o n e .  E v e n  i f  t h e r e  i s  s t r i c t l y  s p e a k i n g  n o  
prohibition of import, we can see that this prohibition of use is a de facto prohibition on imports. 
Moreover, the definition of vessels has been interpreted by the U.S. Administration to cover 
hovercraft and inflatable rafts. These limitations on rebuilding act as another discrimination 
against foreign materials the rebuilding of a vessel of over 500 gross tonnes (gt) must be 
carried out within the U.S. if it is to engage in coastwise trade. A smaller vessel (under 500 gt) 
may lose its existing coastwise rights if the rebuilding abroad or in the U.S. with foreign 
materials is extensive (46 U.S.C. 83, amendments of 1956 and 1960). 
The Merchant Marine Act also established under Title XI, the Guaranteed Loan Program to assist 
in the development of the U.S. merchant marine by guaranteeing construction loans and 
mortgages on U.S. flag vessels built in the U.S. In 1993, this was extended to cover vessels for 
export.  
In December 1994, the OECD Shipbuilding Agreement was signed. It aims at the elimination of 
all direct and indirect support in the shipbuilding sector and was expected to have an impact on 
the U.S. subsidy programme.  
The EU, South Korea and Norway deposited their instruments of ratification for the Agreement 
in December 1995 with Japan following in June 1996. Opposition in the Congress originating 
from the naval industry prevented the U.S. from ratifying the Agreement. Subsequent bills 
attempting to implement the ratification failed and the U.S. did not enter the Agreement in 
2001. During FY2000, the Maritime Administration (MARAD) approved U.S.$886 million worth of 
Title XI guaranteed loan applications for 15 vessels and barges and 2 cruise ships. From 
FY2001-2004 MARAD has approved over U.S.$1258 million in loan guarantees. For Fiscal Year 
2004, the Maritime Administration (MARAD) approved $152 million in loan guarantees. For 
Fiscal Year 2005, MARAD approved $140 million in loan guarantees. This measure is subject to a 
substantive review in the WTO according to Article III of the GATT. 
 
Title  Export Credit Guarantee Program 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
Description 
The Export Credit Guarantee Programme which is managed by USDA/FAS has a major impact on 
a number of key agricultural markets. Under this programme, the U.S. government guarantees 
credits up to 98 % of the export value on a short-term to long term basis varying from up to 
180 days under the Supplier Credit Guarantee Program SCGP, 3 years under the General Sales 
Manager (GSM) 102 and up to 10 years under GSM-103.  
The export credit programmes includes a specific list of commodities per country allocation. It is 
one of the main export policy tools of USDA, with annual allocations exceeding $5 billion and 
declared annual subsidy levels of over $400 million. The programme has a default rate of over 
10% historically, and it is characterised by uncertainty (and lack of transparency) with respect 
to the implicit subsidy component stemming from the terms and conditions which are more 
favourable than what the private sector is offering in this area, the rescheduling of payments or 
bilateral debt forgiveness. Both the GSM-102 and GSM-103 are distortive insofar as the credit 
terms exceed the average life of the product/commodity in question, and the risk premia are 
inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes. Furthermore, 
new commitments are not only demand driven but based on a selection of buyer country and 
product by the U.S. Administration.  
In U.S. - Upland cotton, the Panel, in September 2004, and the Appellate Body, in March 2005, 
found that, despite Article 10.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, export credit guarantees are 
not exempt from the export subsidy disciplines of that Agreement. The Panel and the Appellate 
Body condemned the export credit guarantee programmes at issue in this dispute (GSM 102, 
GSM 103 and SCGP) as prohibited under the illustrative list of the Subsidies Agreement because 
the premia paid by cotton exporters did not cover the expenses of the agency in charge of the 
programmes over the 1992-2002 period. Following the cotton ruling, the USDA announced some 
changes in the operation of GSM 103, GSM 102 and SCGP to bring them in conformity with WTO 
requirements. The U.S. administration has also proposed to repeal another export programme 
particular to cotton, the Step 2 program, which Congress ultimately passed into law, even 
though after the deadline imposed by the WTO rulings. The SCGP and GSM-103 programmes 
have been suspended and are not currently being operated and STEP2 users marketing 
payments have been repealed as of 1 August 2006. The GSM 102 (now the only operating 
programme) has been modified and increased fees have been introduced which vary with 
country risk, repayment term and frequency. The caps on 1% of fees that can be collected 
remain in place, although proposals to lift them have been put forward in the 2007 farm bill 
proposal. This is a significant subsidy element in the existing U.S. export credit guarantee  
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programmes. 
Despite these changes by the U.S., Brazil initiated a WTO "compliance" dispute against what it 
considers to be an insufficient U.S. attempt to bring about compliance with WTO rules. The 
Panel, whose report was circulated on 18 December 2007, found, inter alia, that the 
modifications of GSM 102 were not sufficient to remove the subsidy and that by acting 
inconsistently with Articles 10.1 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture as well as with Articles 
3.1a) and 3.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the U.S. failed to 
comply with the DSB recommendations. 
The European Commission is of the view that the changes (i.e. introduction of risk-based fees) 
to GSM 102, and the suspension of GSM 103 and SCGP introduced by the administration as a 
result of the Cotton ruling are a step in the right direction but are not sufficient either for 
purposes of implementation (as now confirmed by the compliance panel) or to eliminate all 
forms of subsidies flowing through the U.S. programmes. 
The Facilities Guarantee Agreement supports exports of equipment, goods and services related 
to the agricultural sector (up to eight years) with an annual budget of $250 million. State-level 
export promotions remain unnotified to the WTO. In 2001, Washington State paid an export 
subsidy to foreign purchasers of apples. This was contrary to U.S. WTO undertakings. Following 
representations by the EU, the USTR agreed to discontinue the measure and committed not to 
launch similar programmes in the future.  
Finally, the propensity of the U.S. to use food aid to countries not suffering food shortages as a 
means of disposal of surplus farm products has the effect of disturbing local markets, cuts out 
traditional supplies and undermines local producers. Following EU complaints, the U.S. has 
partially reviewed its policy. However, the 2002 Farm Act reinforced the role of U.S. food aid as 
an export enhancement tool and this has been further underlined by Congress which opposed a 
proposal by the administration to allocate 25% (i.e. $300 million) of the PL 480 Title II 
programme for local and regional purchases of food commodities (by USAID) outside the U.S. 
market. The U.S. administration has retained this proposal in the 2007 farm bill. In addition, in 
the present WTO negotiations, the U.S. -both Administration and Congress- are resisting 
strongly any attempt to strictly regulate food aid operations. In particular they oppose the 
principle of providing food aid in cash insisting that also in future all U.S. food aid be procured 
on the U.S. market (including preference for transport / handling on U.S. logistics).  
 
Title  Boeing Subsidies 
Sector  Aircraft 
Description 
Since 1992 direct and indirect government support to the aircraft industry in the United States 
and the European Union has been regulated by the bilateral EU-U.S. Agreement on Trade in 
Large Civil Aircraft. The U.S. purported to unilaterally withdraw from the 1992 bilateral EC-U.S. 
Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft in October 2004(a move that the EU continues to 
consider invalid as it did not respect the required conditions), and, on 6 October 2004, 
requested consultations regarding alleged support to Airbus by the EU and certain of its Member 
States (DS 316). The EU responded immediately by initiating WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings regarding a number of U.S. measures, including federal state and local subsidies 
(DS 317). 
For its part, the EU is challenging various U.S. State subsidies benefiting Boeing. These 
subsidies amount to billions of USD for Boeing. Illustrative examples include a USD 4 billion 
package in the State of Washington (combining tax breaks, tax exemptions or tax credits and 
infrastructure projects for the exclusive benefit of Boeing) and a USD 900 million package in the 
State of Kansas in the form of tax breaks and subsidised bonds. As regards U.S. federal 
measures, the EU has successfully challenged the tax breaks -- in theory repealed in 2006 by 
U.S. legislation -- offered to Boeing under the Foreign Sales Corporation successor legislation, 
the American Jobs Creation Act. These tax benefits, which the EU estimates at a value to Boeing 
of USD 2.1 billion over the period 1989-2006, were supposed to end on 1 January 2007. 
However, a recent official IRS Memorandum allows U.S. exporters, including Boeing, to continue 
to benefit from the illegal tax breaks even after the end of 2006 which should have marked the 
end of all benefits under the FSC and successor legislation. The EU is challenging these 
continued subsidies to Boeing, which could amount to USD tens/hundreds of millions. 
In addition to the federal tax breaks, the EU is challenging the U.S. system under which: 
  federal R&D contracts ultimately benefit Boeing's LCA division and Boeing's aircraft models; 
•  Boeing sees its own R&D expenses reimbursed; 
•  Boeing benefits from extensive cooperation with NASA and DOD engineers at no cost; 
•  Boeing is able to use testing facilities and equipment also at no cost. 
In addition, under this system, a large number of patents and other technologies are put at the 
disposal of Boeing free of charge, including through the transfer of patents held by U.S. federal 
agencies (and resulting from U.S. government funded research) to Boeing. The EU estimates 
the total benefits of federal research programs to Boeing at around USD 16.6 billion.  
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The EU considers that the above mentioned subsidies are in violation of Articles 3, 5, and 6 of 
the SCM Agreement and Article III of the GATT 1994. 
The EU intends to demonstrate before the WTO panel that the above subsidies benefiting Boeing 
have allowed the company to engage in aggressive pricing of its aircraft which has caused lost 
sales for and injury to Airbus. 
Consultations were held in Geneva on 5 November 2004. On 12 January 2005, the EU and the 
U.S. agreed to suspend WTO action for 3 months pending discussions towards the conclusion of 
a new bilateral agreement on subsidies for Large Civil Aircraft. However, both sides did not 
reach an agreement and in the following, the U.S. requested the establishment of a panel on 31 
May 2005; the EU submitted a similar request the same day. 
During the DSB meeting on 13 June 2005, the U.S. argued that a number of the measures 
referred to in the EU panel request of 31 May 2005 were not listed in the consultation request of 
October 2004. For reasons of absolute legal certainty, the EU on 27 June 2005 filed a second 
consultation request which explicitly lists all the measures in question. The U.S. has accepted 
the request for consultations, which were held in Geneva on 3 August 2005. 
The Panel was established on 20 July 2005 and composed on 17 October 2005. The first phase 
of the fact-gathering (Annex V) procedure was completed by 22 December 2005 with the 
submission of replies by the parties to follow-up questions posed on information submitted on 
18 November. The Facilitator submitted his report on the above procedure to the Panel on 24 
February 2006.  
During the Annex V procedure the U.S. refused to provide information, inter alia, on 13 
programmes not explicitly listed in the initial consultation request of the EU. Unlike the EU, 
which filed a request for preliminary rulings in DS316 on 26 October 2005 requesting the Panel 
to clarify the scope of the proceeding, the U.S. refused to do so in DS317. In view of this, on 23 
November 2005 the EU requested the Panel to invite the U.S. to make a preliminary ruling 
request before the completion of the Annex V process, or take any other decision with 
equivalent effect. The Panel did not issue such a decision. The final working procedures only 
require the U.S. to make a preliminary ruling request at the latest at the time of their first 
submission. 
This situation of procedural limbo needed to be resolved quickly, since the U.S. non-cooperation 
deprived the EU of access to documents falling within the scope of the dispute, in particular 
regarding NASA and Department of Defence subsidies. Consequently, the EU on 20 January 
2006 filed a request for the establishment of a (second) panel based on its second request for 
consultations of 27 June 2005. The (second) panel (for DS317) was established on 17 February 
2006. Subsequently, the U.S. submitted a second consultation request in DS316 on 31 January 
2006 (now DS 347), which has largely the same purpose as the EU request, i.e. to explicitly list 
measures which were contained in the U.S. panel request, but not in the consultation request.  
The U.S. repeatedly blocked the initiation of an Annex V process during DSB meetings. On 23 
May 2006 the EU transmitted Annex V questions for the U.S. to the Facilitator. The questions 
were substantially identical to the questions submitted in the previous Annex V procedure, but 
some new questions had been added. This was followed by a meeting between the parties, the 
Facilitator and the WTO Secretariat to resolve the blockage of the Annex V procedure, to no 
avail. The Facilitator then informed parties on 6 June 2006 that his views were that the initiation 
of an Annex V procedure requires positive consensus -- the EU objected, providing its own 
understanding of WTO law. 
The EU requested the WTO Director General to compose the panel in DS317 bis (second 
offensive EU case) on 17 November 2006. The Panel was composed on 23 November 2006, with 
Mr. Crawford Falconer as Chairman, and Mssrs. Franciso Orrego Vicuna and Varachai Plasai as 
Members. On 4 December 2006 the WTO Secretariat renamed DS317 bis, which became 
DS353.  
Pursuant to the composition of the Panel, the EU filed a request for preliminary ruling to the 
Panel on 24 November 2006, asking the Panel to:- either rule that the Annex V information-
gathering procedure had been initiated at the EU"s request in April/May 2006, and that the U.S. 
was under an obligation to answer the questions that have been put to them on 23 May 2006
- or, alternatively, to use its fact-seeking powers under Article 13 DSU to request the U.S. to 
provide relevant information that would be identified by the EU. 
The Panel rejected the EU's requests, and responded that it would not use its Article 13 DSU 
prerogatives before the parties have filed their first written submissions. Subsequently, 
following the first meeting of the Panel with the parties, the Panel posed questions to the 
Parties, including a number of questions to the U.S. that related to the EU's earlier request. 
The EU filed its first written submission on 22 March 2007. The U.S. for its part filed its first 
written submission on 6 July 2007. Third Parties filed their first written submissions on 1 
October 2007. 
The first meeting of the Panel with the parties took place on 26 and 27 September 2007. The 
Parties had also agreed that parts of the hearing should be open to the public. As a result, a 
public screening of the open parts of the hearings was scheduled to take place at the WTO on 
28 September 2007.  
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The Parties filed their rebuttal submissions on 19 November 2007 (instead of 6 November 2007 
as initially scheduled), and filed their responses to the Panel's questions, on 5 December 2007. 
The first meeting of the Panel with the Third Parties will take place on 15 January 2008, 
followed by the second meeting of the Panel with the Parties on 16-17 January 2008. According 
to the current timetable, the issuance of the final Panel report is due on 16 June 2008. 
In addition to the WTO case, the EU has also expressed its concern over legislation (Fiscal Year 
2002 Defense Appropriations Act) that would have allowed 100 tanker aircraft to be ordered by 
the U.S. Air Force (USAF) from Boeing (KC-767A tanker program) without allowing real 
competition from EADS/Airbus, which would have resulted in procurement at a price 
substantially above the market value of the aircraft. This legislation may also have contributed 
to a procurement scandal within the Air Force leading to several criminal, legislative, and 
administrative investigations of both government and Boeing officials, and to the cancellation of 
the contract awarded to Boeing under the KC-767A tanker program. In the wake of these 
investigations, the Fiscal Year 2005 Defense Authorization Act, which would seem to allow for 
competition, and the pledge by DoD (following a report of the DoD Inspector General on this 
matter) to seek such competition should the Air Force decide it needs new aircraft, chances for 
true competition appear much better. The Request for Information from USAF included language 
that would in effect have prevented EADS and its partner Northrop-Grumman to bid in the new 
competition. This language was subsequently removed from the Request for Proposal. The 
European Commission will continue to monitor the situation. 
State of 
play 
Some key dates in the WTO process in 2007/2008: 
•  22 March 2007: EU files confidential version of First Written Submission  
•  6 July 2007: U.S. files confidential First Written Submission  
•  26-27 September 2007: First panel hearing  
•  28 September 2007: EU puts non-confidential version of First Written Submission on 
its website  
•  16 and 17 January 2008: second panel hearing (rebuttals submitted on 6 November 
2007)  
•  7 April 2008: issuance of the confidential interim Panel report (to the Parties)  
•  16 June 2008: issuance of the final Panel report  
•  Publication of the final report: (after translation of the final report – approximately 2-4 
months) 
 
GATS Specific Measures 
Title  Wire Line and Wireless Telecommunications 
Sector  Services - Communications & Audiovisual 
Description 
The reduction in the number of competitors in the wireline sector, notably as a result of 
mergers, raises some concerns, in particular regarding the provision of local connectivity 
(namely special access lines for businesses requiring dedicated, non-switched connections to 
external networks), as well as Internet connectivity services.  
Special access lines are key inputs for the provision of global telecoms services and particular 
attention is required to ensure a fair and non-discriminatory special access offer. Several 
submissions to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the relevant proceedings have 
also expressed concerns about a reduction of competition in the internet backbone market 
leading to de-peering, dominance and packet-discrimination concerns.  
Meanwhile, the FCC has continued its work on several key proceedings concerning the provision 
of unbundled network elements by incumbent local exchange carriers, IP-enabled services, its 
ambitious Broadband Agenda and the allocation of spectrum for advanced wireless services. 
Unfortunately the U.S. regulatory framework remains unstable as a result of court proceedings, 
including at State level. 
Indeed, a number of court decisions have had a noticeable impact on some of the recent FCC 
rulings on the one hand, the FCC has had to revise several times its Triennial Review Order 
concerning unbundled network elements, notably with respect to local access in residential 
markets, as a result of a succession of court rulings vacating its decisions. According to the FCC 
the resulting Order favours facilities-based competition by phasing out the permitting wide 
unbundling of circuit switching for key elements such as loops and significantly curtailing 
unbundling of higher capacity transmission facilities transport, where there is clear and 
demonstrable impairment, and by removing the obligation of incumbents to provide competing 
carriers with unbundled access to mass market local circuit switching.  
As a result, services-based competition (where new entrants rely on the access to certain 
elements of the incumbents' network to enter and compete in the market) may prove more 
difficult in the future. The effects of the new regulatory framework emerging in the U.S. on the 
establishment of foreign operators will have to be properly examined, in particular, the FCCs 
new rules on the provision of unbundled network elements (UNEs) by incumbent local exchange  
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carriers, which became effective on 11 March 2005. 
In addition, in June 2005, the Supreme Court supported the FCC March 2002 Declaratory Ruling 
classifying cable modem broadband service as an information service, allowing the FCC to 
proceed with its deregulatory approach to broadband services. In general terms the FCC seems 
to favour the progressive establishment of a model based on competition between 
infrastructure-based operators (at least for advanced services). 
The Supreme Court decision allowed the FCC in August 2005 to classify high speed Internet 
access services over wireline facilities (and cable modem) as information services, rather than 
telecommunications services. As a result, after a one-year transition period, facilities-based wire 
line broadband Internet access service providers are no longer required to separate out and 
offer the wire line broadband transmission component of wire line broadband Internet access 
services as a stand-alone telecommunications service, separately from their Internet service. 
In the same line, the FCC declared in November 2006 Broadband over Power Line (BPL)-enabled 
Internet access service to be also an information service, as cable modem service and DSL 
Internet access service. 
It will have to be assessed whether such classifications may affect competition and the ability of 
new players to enter the U.S. market. This question is equally linked to the proposed change in 
the classification of certain services in the initial U.S. offer in the current GATS negotiations (e.g. 
the classification of packet switched data transmission services as information services and no 
longer as basic telecommunication services or the creation of a new category of "other 
communications services", which may result in the non-application of the provisions of the so-
called GATS Reference Paper on Pro-competitive Regulatory Principles to services that otherwise 
would be covered by it).  
Overall, the U.S. regulatory framework needs a comprehensive review to streamline it and make 
it less segmented along legacy technology lines. A more flexible approach based on a 
straightforward analysis of problematic market situations and identification of targeted adequate 
remedies rather than ad hoc legislative and/or regulatory solutions as new technologies and 
services develop would allow the regulator to focus on substantive competition issues where 
they arise and to apply targeted remedies. A more comprehensive and technology neutral 
approach to regulation of communications services would also address in a consistent manner 
public security or consumer protection issues that concern ultimately all communications 
services.  
Despite the commitments made at the WTO and especially those pursuant to the GATS Basic 
Telecommunications negotiations concluded in 1997 and which entered into force in February 
1998, European and other foreign-owned firms seeking access to the U.S. market have faced 
substantial barriers, particularly in the satellite sector (which has suffered from lengthy 
proceedings, conditionality of market access and de facto reciprocity-based procedures) and the 
mobile sector (e.g. investment restrictions, lengthy and burdensome proceedings and 
protectionist attitudes in certain congressional circles). A number of changes have been 
introduced, in particular in relation to the U.S. spectrum management policy and licensing 
procedures in the satellite sector. The EU notes these and other gradual improvements on a 
number of issues, but since some of the previously identified obstacles remain, must conclude 
that market access is still not fully ensured and this situation is not in line with the market 
access policy advocated by the U.S.  
Finally, U.S. law enforcement agencies, in implementing the so-called Exon-Florio statute, have 
imposed strict corporate governance requirements on companies seeking FCC approval of the 
foreign takeover of a U.S. communications firm in the form of network security arrangements to 
mitigate alleged national security concerns. 
 
Title  SEC Regulations for Securities Firms 
Sector  Services - Financial 
Description 
EU securities firms may register as broker-dealers or investment advisers, and may in principle 
establish both in the form of branches or subsidiaries. However, the establishment of a branch 
in the U.S. by foreign securities firms to engage in broker-dealer activities, although legally 
possible, is in fact not practicable since registration as a broker-dealer means that the foreign 
firm has to register thus becoming subject to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
regulation.  
Foreign mutual funds have not been able to make public offerings in the U.S. because the SEC's 
conditions make it impracticable for a foreign fund to register under the U.S. Investment 
Company Act of 1940.  
The SEC has not so far clarified the conditions under which EU exchanges can place trading 
screens terminals with U.S. professional or institutional investors (without having to register as 
a "national securities exchange"). The right to place trading screens with U.S. 
professional/institutional investors could attract increased liquidity for securities admitted to 
trading on EU exchanges, as well as reducing intermediation costs for U.S. market participants 
trading EU-listed securities. The efficient and transparent organisation of European exchanges  
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and the demanding regulatory framework in which they operate suggest that regulatory 
considerations should not be a bar to allowing sophisticated U.S. market participants to trade 
freely on those exchanges. The SEC has used a number of occasions since the beginning of 
2007 to indicate its willingness to move away from its previous position to allow foreign brokers, 
dealers and exchanges to offer their services in the U.S. It is anticipated that further 
developments should occur in this respect at the end of 2007/ beginning of 2008. 
 
Title  Air Transport Services (Foreign Ownership Restrictions) 
Sector  Services - Transport 
Description 
Air transport services, as far as the exercise of traffic rights is concerned, are not covered by the 
GATS (as detailed in a specific Annex to the Agreement) but rather through bilateral air services 
agreements. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 requires U.S. airlines to be under the actual 
control of U.S. citizens in order to be licensed for operation. For airline corporations, 75% of the 
voting interest must be held by U.S. citizens and two-thirds of its board of directors must be 
U.S. citizens. This latter limitation makes U.S. rules on foreign ownership considerably more 
restrictive than relevant EU rules. Cross border investment is an important driving force behind 
liberalisation. Reducing foreign ownership restrictions would give better access for carriers to 
international capital and facilitate cross-border restructuring, which in turn would contribute to 
growth, competitive effectiveness, and the promotion of competition and consumer benefits. 
The EU-U.S. Air Transport Agreement signed on 30 April 2007 refers to further investment 
opportunities as one of the objectives for second-stage negotiations. 
 
Title  Aircraft Leasing 
Sector  Services - Transport 
Description 
Rules pertaining to the leasing of aircraft are determined by the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) regulations which distinguish between dry leasing (without crew) and wet leasing (with 
crew). In general, for dry leasing, the lessee is granted operational control of the aircraft, whilst 
for wet leasing, the leaser retains operational control of the aircraft. The U.S. rules on wet lease 
prevent any lease of non-U.S. registered aircraft by U.S. carriers. No Community-registered 
aircraft with Community crew can thus be leased to U.S. companies.  
The EU-U.S. Air Transport Agreement includes the opportunity for EU carriers to lease to U.S. 
carriers aircraft with crew for international air transportation. The Agreement will be applied 
provisionally from 30 March 2008. Before the end of 2007, the U.S. Department of 
Transportation will issue guidance for the economic and technical requirements for the provision 
of aircraft with crew by foreign carriers. 
 
Title  Satellite Services 
Sector  Services - Communications & Audiovisual 
Description 
European satellite operators have encountered serious difficulties in serving the U.S. market as 
a result of the FCC application of its DISCO II public interest framework that considers the effect 
on competition in the U.S., spectrum availability, eligibility and operating (e.g. technical) 
requirements, and national security, law enforcement, foreign policy and trade concerns. These 
difficulties were compounded by the ORBIT Act of 2000 which required, Intelsat, Inmarsat 
Ventures plc and New Skies N.V. to conduct Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) by a set deadline, and 
the FCC to apply the Act's privatisation criteria in order to determine whether to grant market 
access to these entities. There were serious concerns on the part of the EU that these criteria 
applied to no other competitor, foreign or domestic, and could lead the FCC to limit these 
entities' access to the U.S. market, thereby reducing competition. In the past, a number of 
cases were brought to the attention of the European Commission by satellites operators such as 
Inmarsat Ventures plc, New Satellites N.V, Eutelsat, and SES Global. UK based Inmarsat 
Ventures plc, for instance, was granted access to the U.S. market but this grant was subject to 
further review after Inmarsat conducted an IPO, or revocation of its authorisation to provide 
non-core services to the U.S. if it failed to conduct the IPO.  
In the case of Eutelsat, the FCC, upon a competing claim by Loral Skynet to use a specific 
orbital location to provide FSS, would not allow U.S. earth station operators to link up with 
Eutelsat's satellite at the disputed orbital location in the absence of a settlement with Loral 
Skynet in spite of the priority rights that Eutelsat had acquired by the ITU. Eutelsat's customers 
eventually received FCC authorisation to link up with its satellite. HISPASAT received 
authorisations by the FCC, according to DISCO II provisions, to operate its satellites in the USA 
but earth stations were not authorized to use these satellites to provide any Direct-to-Home 
(DTH) service, Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) service, or Digital Audio Radio Service (DARS) 
to, from, or within the United States. 
On the other hand, the 2003 ITU-R World Radio Conference (WRC-03) modified the conditions 
for use of the Ku extended band (13.75-14 GHz) to allow the implementation of FSS earth 
stations as small as 1.2 m whereas today only 4.5 m earth stations are generally permitted  
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under the rules. The U.S., even though it recognized this modification to the international Radio 
Regulations as a signatory to the Final Acts of the WRC-03, and these Acts became international 
law as of 1st July 2003 (Article 59 of the ITU Radio Regulations), has not yet incorporated into 
its national radio regulations the results of the WRC-03 related to the FSS (Earth-to-space) in 
the band 13.75-14.00 GHz. This restriction implies that U.S. earth stations are not allowed to 
use HISPASAT satellites operating in this band and provokes an imbalance between other 
companies that are using Ku standard band and HISPASAT, noting that there is considerable 
demand for such stations, and consequently there are many locations in the United States 
where such terminals can in fact be used to deliver a variety of services. The adoption of rules 
such as those requested would permit the needed and long overdue expansion of such services.  
These cases show that proceedings by the FCC on spectrum allocation and licensing have been 
rather difficult raising in certain cases questions on their objectivity, transparency and their 
applicability on a timely, consistent and non-discriminatory manner.  
It must be noted that, between April and June 2003, the FCC introduced several reforms in its 
satellite licensing procedures to accelerate them and introduce more predictability. In particular, 
in an order issued in May 2003, the FCC attempted to expedite the satellite licensing process, 
creating a single queue for all new satellite applications and two different licensing frameworks 
and removing restrictions on sales of satellite licenses so as to facilitate transfers of licenses in 
the secondary market. Nevertheless, the DISCO II public interest framework is maintained in 
addition to those rules applying for U.S. market access. An ITU priority date is not considered 
sufficient to show that a non-U.S. licensed satellite operator will meet all the public interest 
factors weighed by the FCC and does not preclude the FCC from licensing the operator of a U.S.-
licensed GSO satellite on a temporary basis pending launch and operation of a satellite with 
higher priority in cases where the non-U.S.-licensed satellite has not been launched yet.  
Finally, the U.S. still maintains a MFN exemption on the provision of one-way satellite 
transmission of Direct to Home (DTH), Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) and digital audio 
services, taken by the U.S. at the very end of the GATS negotiations on basic telecom services.  
 
Title  Section 310 of the 1934 Communications Act 
Sector  Services - Communications & Audiovisual 
Description 
Foreign Ownership / Investment Regulations 
 
Section 310 of the 1934 Communications Act establishes restrictions to foreign investment in 
U.S. companies holding a broadcast or common carrier radio license (the latter include also 
aeronautical en route or aeronautical fixed radio station). Such licenses shall not be granted to, 
or held by, foreign governments or their representatives, aliens, foreign corporations, or 
corporations of which more than 20% of the capital stock is owned or voted by a foreign entity. 
Foreign indirect investment is limited to 25% subject to a public interest waiver. In addition, to 
provide telecommunications services, operators typically need to integrate radio transmission 
stations, satellite earth stations and in some cases, microwave towers into their networks. 
Foreign-owned U.S. operators face additional obstacles in obtaining the licensing of these 
various elements relative to U.S.-owned firms. As a result, the U.S. broadcasting market today 
is hardly accessible to foreign media companies.  
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 only eliminated the restriction on foreign directors and 
officers. It significantly relaxed many of the existing broadcast ownership rules (leading to 
substantial consolidation in the commercial broadcast radio industry) and mandated the FCC to 
review them every two years to determine "whether any of such rules are necessary in the 
public interest as a result of competition. At the time, the U.S. undertook market access and 
regulatory commitments on most telecommunications services (voice telephone, data, telex, 
telegraph, private leased circuit services; local, domestic, long-distance and international, etc.). 
Regulatory commitments in particular impose that the U.S. regulation be in line with a number 
of principles to have inter alia adequate licensing procedures, to promote competition, and to 
ensure proper interconnection.  
The Basic Telecom negotiations in the WTO did not change the situation with respect to foreign 
direct investment, as limitations on direct foreign ownership of common carrier radio licences 
have been explicitly retained in the U.S. schedule of commitments. However, the U.S. took 
commitments on foreign indirect ownership but did not modify its domestic legislation. In 
November 1995, in the run-up to the WTO negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted a rule on entry of foreign-affiliated carriers 
into the U.S. market, adding a new factor to the FCC's public interest review, notably for the 
purpose of granting waivers to those restrictions on foreign indirect investment imposed by 
Section 310 of the 1934 Communications Act. Specifically, the FCC introduced an Effective 
Competitive Opportunity Test (ECO-test). The FCC also issued in May 1996 a notice of proposed 
rulemaking applying the ECO-test to foreign-licensed satellites. The EU submitted objections in 
both proceedings. On 25 November 1997, the FCC adopted two rulings (a general ruling on 
foreign participation in the U.S. market, and a specific one on the satellite services market 
entitled DISCO-II) to implement the commitments of the U.S. in the Basic Telecom Agreement.  
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In these rulings the FCC replaced the ECO-test with a rebuttable presumption that entry by 
carriers from WTO countries and by satellites licensed by WTO countries is pro-competitive, but 
the FCC retained the unclear "public interest" criteria which can still be invoked to deny a licence 
to a foreign operator for various motives, such as trade concerns, foreign policy concerns and 
very high risk to competition. Although the FCC expressed its intention to only deny market 
access on this basis in exceptional circumstances (which are not well defined) the discretion 
retained by the FCC remains of concern to the EU and raises questions as to the compatibility of 
the FCC rules with U.S. WTO commitments.  
In March 2004, the FCC amended its International Communications Policy in recognition that 
markets have become more competitive but it re-affirmed the relevance of its benchmarks 
policy applicable to international settlement rates since 1997. This policy, which seeks 
unilaterally and arbitrarily to move these rates towards costs, may violate WTO rules. Concerns 
were heightened in 2004 as some parties sought to apply the Benchmarks' policy to the mobile 
communications sector. The FCC decided instead to initiate in October 2004 a Notice of Inquiry 
to evaluate the effects of high foreign mobile termination rates on U.S. consumers and 
competition.  
 
General Ownership Regulations 
 
Within this context, the FCC conducted a comprehensive review of its media ownership 
regulations. In June 2003, it adopted an Order relaxing previous restrictions (e.g. elimination of 
the local TV broadcast duopoly rule, increase from 35 to 45% of the cap on a TV broadcast 
network's reach of the national audience and elimination of the existing ban on broadcast 
newspaper and radio-television cross-ownership in large markets and replacement of this ban by 
a set of cross-media limits in small and medium size markets). The Order was immediately 
challenged in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit.  
In June 2004, the 3rd Circuit U.S. Court re-affirmed the FCC decision to eliminate the ban on 
media cross-ownership but called in question the FCC methodology in setting specific limits on 
media combinations and remanded the Order to the FCC. In January 2005, the FCC decided not 
to appeal to the Supreme Court. Although a number of broadcasters and publishers took the 
issue to the Supreme Court, the Court decided not to review the Third Circuit Court decision. 
The 3rd Circuit did not address the FCC broadcast TV network ownership rules because Congress 
in the meantime rolled back the cap from 45% to 39%.  
In December 2007 the FCC concluded its quadrennial review of broadcast ownership rules.  The 
Commission amended the 32-year-old absolute ban on newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership 
by crafting an approach that would allow a newspaper to own one television station or one radio 
station in the 20 largest markets, subject to certain criteria and limitations – see below for more 
detail, although please note it is still possible that the new rule could be challenged in the Courts 
/ Congress over the coming months. 
 
The rule adopted by the FCC would permit cross ownership only in the largest markets where 
there exists competition and numerous voices. The revised rule balances the need to support 
the availability and sustainability of local news while not significantly increasing local 
concentration or harming diversity. Under the new approach, the Commission presumes a 
proposed newspaper/broadcast transaction is in the public interest if it meets the following test: 
 
(1) the market at issue is one of the 20 largest Nielsen Designated Market Areas (“DMAs”); 
(2) the transaction involves the combination of only one major daily newspaper and only one 
television or radio station; 
(3) if the transaction involves a television station, at least eight independently owned and 
operating major media voices (defined to include major newspapers and full-power TV stations) 
would remain in the DMA following the transaction; and 
(4) if the transaction involves a television station, that station is not among the top four ranked 
stations in the DMA. 
 
All other proposed newspaper/broadcast transactions would continue to be presumed not in the 
public interest, subject to certain exceptions.  
 
Thus major U.S. players may now consider consolidating or swapping their assets. Non-U.S. 
companies will however not be able to participate in this development because of the existing 
foreign ownership restrictions.  
The U.S. Administration holds the view that it is not necessary to adopt specific legislation to 
abolish foreign indirect investment restrictions in the telecoms sector (namely Section 310(b) 
(4) of the 1934 Communications Act), since the FCC may waive these restrictions under the 
current law by invoking the public interest. However this waiver provision, which entails lengthy 
and costly proceedings, does not provide certainty to European operators. The EU will continue 
to monitor the situation carefully and will oppose any action, through legislation or otherwise,  
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that would conflict with the U.S. WTO commitments. 
Other Non-Tariff Measures 
Title  Treatment of EU Global custodians 
Sector  Services - Financial 
Description 
International banks must register in the U.S. as broker-dealers under Section 15 of the 
Securities and Exchange Act 1934 if they provide global custody and certain related services 
directly to U.S. investors from outside the U.S. This is not the case for U.S. banks doing the 
same business since they are covered by an exception pursuant to SEC "Regulation R" adopted 
in September 2007. The reasoning for exempting U.S. banks is that they are already subject to 
Fed supervision which should not be replicated by SEC (however, this also applies to foreign 
banks doing business in the U.S.). 
 
Title  Sub-federal ban on the commercialisation and production of foie gras 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
Description 
A number of U.S. states have introduced potentially excessive restrictions on the 
commercialisation of foie gras, effectively banning it from their markets. 
On 26 April 2007 the municipal council of Chicago introduced  legislation banning the 
commercialisation of foie gras in restaurants as of June 2007. California has introduced a ban on 
the commercialisation and production of foie gras, effective as of 2012. Other U.S. states are 
also considering the adoption of similar legislation, notably New York, Oregon, Massachusetts 
and Washington. 
EU industry fears that this trend will continue, leading to an eventual closure of the U.S. market. 
 
Title  PATRIOT Act 
Sector  Services - Financial 
Description 
Section 319 of the PATRIOT Act, adopted in 2001, deals with the forfeiture of funds in United 
States inter-bank accounts by those accused of money laundering. It requires U.S. 
correspondent banks to maintain certain records concerning a foreign bank that has a U.S. 
correspondent account. Furthermore it provides authority for the Treasury Secretary and the 
Attorney General to subpoena the foreign bank's offshore records concerning the account and 
authorises forfeiture of deposits in the foreign bank. 
State of 
play 
Both the subpoena authority and the forfeiture clause have potential extraterritorial impact. The 
European Commission and others have complained vigorously both at the time of the adoption 
of the Act and during the comment period on proposed Treasury implementing regulations. In 
response, U.S. authorities said that they had no intention of using this seizure authority 
i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y  o r  i n  d e r o g a t i o n  o f  e x i s t i n g  a n d  e f f i c i e n t  m e c h a n i s m s ,  s u c h  a s  M u t u a l  L e g a l  
Assistance Treaties, for the seizure of funds located outside of the U.S.  
Despite this reassurance, there have been some allegations from European banks and from 
individual Member States that there is still a lack of clarity about the circumstances under which 
the U.S. would make use of Section 319 and when it would refrain from doing so. The European 
Commission will continue to work with U.S. Treasury to ensure that these concerns and others 
are duly addressed. 
 
Title  Section 407 of the Trade and Development Act (Carousel Law) 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
Section 407 of the Trade and Development Act , enacted on 18 May 2000, enables the U.S. 
Trade Representative (USTR) to periodically revise the list of products subject to retaliation 
when, according to the U.S., another country fails to implement a WTO dispute decision. The 
periodic revision of the law has become known as "carousel retaliation." The law provides for a 
mandatory and unilateral revision of the list of products subject to suspension of GATT 
concessions 120 days after the application of the first suspension and then every 180 days 
thereafter, in order to affect imports from Members which have been determined by the U.S. 
not to have implemented WTO recommendations. 
State of 
play 
The EU believes that the "carousel" legislation is fundamentally at odds with the basic principles 
of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, being a unilateral act and affecting the 
predictability of the trading system. The cumulative effect of application of the "carousel" 
system goes well beyond what  is authorised by the WTO. It therefore, requested WTO 
consultations, which were held on 5 July 2000, making it clear that it was not acceptable to 
apply this legislation. The U.S. has for the time being refrained from applying it and, therefore, 
the EU has not requested the establishment of a panel.  
 
Title  Insurance Market Fragmentation and Collateral Requirement  
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Sector  Services - Financial 
Description 
A remaining impediment for EU insurance companies seeking to operate in the U.S. market is 
the fragmentation of the market into 56 different jurisdictions, with different licensing, solvency 
and operating requirements. Each state has its own insurance regulatory structure and, by 
contrast to banking, federal law does not provide for the establishment of federally licensed or 
regulated insurance companies. However, interest in establishing an optional federal statutory 
structure for licensing and regulation of insurance is growing.  
The decentralised U.S. regulatory/supervisory structure entails heavy compliance costs for EU 
companies in each of the 56 jurisdictions. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
( N AIC)  is m aki ng an att em pt  t o harm onise some basic regul at ory requi rem ents between the 
states, but this will be a long process. The NAICs recommendations are not binding, so even if 
state insurance commissioners agree to some further harmonisation, implementation at state 
level cannot be guaranteed.  
A major issue of concern however has been the requirement for non-U.S. reinsurers to post 
100% collateral for their U.S. acceptances (i.e. their U.S. reinsurance business). The collateral 
requirement is not technically justified and leads to important costs not only for European 
reinsurers, but also for the U.S. insurance industry and their policyholders. Discussions between 
the European Commission Services and U.S. insurance commissioners on the collateral issue 
continue as part of the more general EU-U.S. Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue and the 
NAIC-CEIOPS-European Commission Dialogue on Insurance. In December 2006, the 
Reinsurance Task Force of the NAIC endorsed the principle of a move away from the current 
discriminatory collateral requirements for non-U.S. reinsurers towards a system where collateral 
is charged for all reinsurers regardless of origin on the basis of a credit rating established by a 
ratings organisation. The Task Force agreed to carry out further work on the details of the move 
with a view to adoption by the NAIC Executive Committee before the end of 2007. However the 
latest draft proposals, whilst containing some good ideas, (i.e. a single port of entry and 
equivalence concept) are much more discriminatory than the proposals agreed in December 
2006.The Commission is fully engaged through the Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue to find 
a mutually acceptable solution to this issue. 
 
Title  Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
Sector  Services - Financial 
Description 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, adopted as a reaction to U.S. corporate scandals, has a 
significant impact on U.S.-listed EU companies as well as on EU auditing firms, which could face 
conflicting laws on audits and corporate governance. On the implementation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley-Act, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) launched two public consultations in December 2006 with 
a view to reforming corporate governance aspects thus responding to strong market concerns 
on costs.  
The new SEC deregistration rules for foreign companies have entered into force in 2007. The 
continuing development of technical co-operation between the PCAOB in the U.S. and the 
European Commission and Member States on audit regulation, in particular the independent 
public oversight of the audit profession on either side, will be a major (political) challenge in 
2008. 
State of 
play 
Requirement to use U.S. GAAP: EU companies admitted to trading on the New York Stock 
Exchange (or other U.S. exchanges) must reconcile financial statements with U.S. accounting 
standards (U.S. GAAP). This means a significant cost for EU companies raising capital in the 
U.S. Following the regulation adopted by the Council on 7 June 2002, all listed EU companies 
are required to prepare consolidated accounts under International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) (formerly international accounting standards) by 2005 thereby complying with 
international best practice set by independent accounting standard-setters. The EU believes that 
EU firms whose financial accounts are published in accordance with IFRS should not be required 
to publish reconciliations to U.S.-GAAP when being listed on U.S. exchanges.  
In April 2005, the SEC adopted a roadmap towards the recognition of IFRS by 2009 at the 
latest. With a view to convergence, the IASB (International Accounting Standards Board) and 
the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) published on 27 February 2006 a 
Memorandum of Understanding. It describes the projects they intend to undertake jointly and 
includes an estimated timeline. The Commission welcomed the MoU. However we have also 
pointed out that the IASB must focus firmly on business need before making any further 
changes to the accounting standards as companies need a period of relative stability in order to 
implement IFRS.  
On 3 July 2007, the SEC published for public comment a proposal to eliminate the current 
reconciliation requirement for foreign private issuers filing their financial statements using IFRS 
as published by IASB. On 15 November 2007, SEC voted on the final rule, which provides that 
foreign issuers publishing their accounts in accordance with IFRS will not have to reconcile them 
with U.S. GAAP for their financial statements covering years ended after 15 November 2007. EU 
companies using the EU opt out on IAS 39 will be also able to benefit from the exemption for  
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the next two years provided they reconcile their accounts with full IFRS. Following the end of 
this two years period, only accounts published in accordance with IFRS as published by the IASB 
will be accepted by SEC. 
It is important to ensure that the IASB’s standards can be fully endorsed in the EU and that the 
existing carve-out concerning hedging rules can be removed. Consistent with this, the European 
Commission recently issued a joint statement with the U.S. SEC, the Japanese Financial 
Services Agency and IOSCO announcing reforms of the overall governance of the IASB and its 
parent entity, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) Foundation. The 
statement foresees, among other requirements, measures to enhance the transparency and due 
process of the IASB’s standard-setting process. 
Deregistration: The regulatory requirements for firms listed on a U.S. exchange have increased 
significantly over the last few years, especially due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
European firms listed on U.S. exchanges may consider delisting. SEC rules made it virtually 
impossible for foreign firms to delist from NYSE or NASDAQ, and even if they were, SEC 
registration requirements still applied if the registrant had more than 300 U.S. shareholders, 
which was often the case.  
In December 2006, the SEC issued a revised proposal to reform the current requirements and 
to ease the conditions for deregistration of foreign companies. With the support of the Member 
States via the European Securities Committee, securities regulators and EU issuers, the 
Commission sent detailed comments on the proposal issued by the SEC in order for the new 
rules to be workable for EU industry. The U.S. SEC took these concerns on board and adopted a 
final rule in March 2007, which entered into force in June 2007.Under the final rule, it becomes 
possible for companies to terminate SEC registration if the percentage of their average daily 
trading volume in the U.S. is less than 5% of their average daily trading volume worldwide. 
Many EU companies listed in the U.S. have since chosen to take advantage of this possibility. 
 
Title  Shipping Code Restrictions for EU Fishermen 
Sector  Services - Transport 
Description 
The U.S. Code, Title 46, Shipping, Section 12108, prevents EU fishermen from fishing in U.S. 
waters under the U.S. flag as foreign-built vessels are not eligible to receive a fisheries licence. 
This situation also precludes the possibility of joint ventures and joint enterprises. In addition, 
the American Fisheries Act of 1998 included a provision that increased the percentage of shares 
in a vessel that must be held by U.S. citizens in order for the vessel to be considered a U.S. 
vessel from 50% to 75%. 
 
Title  Wine Distribution 
Sector  Wines & Spirits 
Description 
Some state legislation prevents cross-state retail sales of wines and spirits; prohibit EU 
exporters from distributing, rebottling, or retailing their own wine; require duplicate label 
approvals; levy fees and charges; and other procedures. 
Direct distribution is becoming an increasingly important issue .Certain states allow in-state 
wineries to ship directly to retailers and restaurants, bypassing the traditional three-tier system. 
As a result of the "Costco" ruling, states that allow such direct-distribution will be forced to open 
direct-distribution to out-of state producers or to eliminate direct-distribution rights altogether. 
However, foreign wines are not allowed to be distributed directly to retailers. 
A number of states, termed the "reciprocal states", have agreed among themselves to facilitate 
the distribution of wines among themselves, whilst requiring imported wines to continue to be 
channelled via the more -burdensome procedures and trade-restrictive concessionary networks. 
In addition some state regulations on direct to consumer shipment are changing due to the U.S. 
Supreme Court's Granholm ruling. As a result certain states are now allowing shipments of wine 
directly to consumers if the winery obtains a permit from the state they wish to ship to. 
However, in most of the cases only domestic wineries are eligible to obtain the permit. 
In both cases, direct to consumers' shipment and direct distribution, state legislators do not 
take imported products into account when establishing regulations and appear to discriminate 
against foreign wines. 
State of 
play 
The issue is being discussed in the framework of the EU/U.S. wine talks. (i.e. meetings of 
December 2006, October 2007, and January 2008) 
 
Title  Pressure Equipment Regulation 
Sector  Other Industries 
Description 
Pressure equipment in the U.S. is regulated on a local level, e.g. by local jurisdictions. For some 
specific pressure equipment used at the work place, this local regulation is complemented by 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) rules, which is part of the federal U.S.  
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Department of Labor.  
The regulation on pressure equipment in the U.S. relies on the national standards of the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code. Although the ASME code is the basis, 
most of the local jurisdictions'' regulations complement it by additional and locally slightly 
different provisions mainly on administrative procedures resulting in what can be perceived as 
excessive red tape. Moreover, the prescriptive approach of the U.S. legislation impedes 
innovative approaches to technical problems and grants a de facto regulatory monopoly to a 
private organisation. 
At the meeting in Washington on May 3, 2004, the U.S. claimed that pressure equipment 
legislation on the state/jurisdiction level is considered to have no trade impact and is therefore 
not notified to the WTO.  
In order to have their products accepted in the U.S. market, European manufacturers need to 
have their welders and non-destructive testing (NDT) personnel certified according to ASME 
requirements, which incurs extra costs.  
Another problem concerns ASME list of approved materials. European pressure equipment 
manufacturers envisaging to use a particular material for the U.S. market, which is not listed in 
the ASME code, are faced with significant problems. The only possibility is the so called code 
c a s e  p r o c e d u r e  t h a t  i t  i s  v e r y  t i m e - c o n s u m i n g ,  costly and requires a lot of test series and 
corresponding data. Many U.S. jurisdictions provide for state specials, which are items of 
pressure equipment that have been granted a (partial) exemption from the ASME code. "State 
specials are very rare and in practice not economic for new pressure equipment (i.e. only to be 
considered if already-existing pressure equipment designed according to a foreign code should 
be brought to the U.S.). Since state specials are implemented by State law, any improvement in 
this respect would require the modification of 50 State laws a process which is not feasible, 
moreover since no coordinated action can be expected. This prescriptive approach of the U.S. 
legislation impedes any alternative solution to enter the market. No international or European 
standards are accepted.  
The ASME code requires a mandatory initial (and then frequently repeated) inspection of 
manufacturers - and independent of the amount of pressure equipment manufactured - by an 
Authorised Inspection Agency (AIA). For foreign manufacturers the AIA has to be an insurance 
company authorised to write pressure equipment insurance in at least one U.S. jurisdiction, 
while third-party inspection of U.S. manufacturers may also be performed by local jurisdictions. 
According to information from the National Board, the future nomination of non-U.S. foreign 
government agencies as AIAs, which would have to be accredited to ASME criteria, is about to 
be approved. Although such a change would certainly be a positive development, the mandatory 
AIA inspection still creates high entry costs to the U.S. market for European manufacturers and 
there is no analogy imposed by European legislation on U.S. manufacturers. High entry costs 
particularly penalise small manufacturers producing only limited quantities of pressure 
equipment for the U.S. market with respect to their U.S. peers. 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
Title  Ornamental Plants Established in Growing Media 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
SPS 
measure 
Risk analyses 
Description  
The provisions on standards and certification of plants established in growing media (CFR 1996, 
Title 7, Subtitle B, Ch. III, §319-37-8) were last revised and effective on 3 November 1999 to 
permit the import into the U.S. of certain plant genera in sterile growing media. This has only 
moderately reduced the obstacles encountered by EU exports of potted plants to the U.S.  The 
fundamental problem remains that USDA-APHIS only considers authorisations including risk 
assessments on the basis of applications genus by genus.  The USDA phytosanitary approach to 
risk assessment has been very slow (in some instances 10+ years) and appears 
disproportionate to the low risk involved (demonstrated by the recent PRA performed by the 
USDA).  
Furthermore, the new rule contains some requirements that are difficult for exporters to fulfil; 
e.g. it is impossible to satisfy certain obligations because some of the species or genera have a 
growth cycle that is shorter than the waiting period required by USDA before export can take 
place. 
Almost all sorts of plants and growing media (except soil) are permitted for import. However, 
when the permitted plants are in permitted growth media the import is not permitted, unless a 
special Pest Risk Assessment (PRA) has been performed by USDA´s Animal Plant and Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS). The process of obtaining PRA has proved to be extremely slow. 
State of 
Play 
This is a longstanding issue which has been ongoing for the last 25 years. 
As of 1 May 2006, the U.S. approved the entry of Xmas cactus (Schlumbergera spp.) and Easter 
Cactus (Rhipsalidopsis spp.) from the Netherlands and Denmark in approved growing media, 
subject to specific growing, inspection and certification requirements.   
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New applications for approval of additional genus have been submitted.  We have asked that 
they next consider Bromeliaceae genera (which seem to be in the pest risk analysis stage), 
Campanula plants, and other ornamental plants. 
The U.S. should continue efforts to revise and accelerate the process of approval of new 
applications of plants in growing media allowing their entry into the U.S.  
 
Title  Sanitary measures applied by USA for imports of live bivalve molluscs 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
SPS 
Measure 
Disease causing organisms 
Description 
U.S. tests the water in which oysters are reared for coliforms, whereas the EU requires testing 
of the flesh of the oyster. The EU claims that the two different approaches achieve the same 
level of protection, and therefore should be regarded as equivalent, within the framework of 
Article 4 of the WTO Agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures. The Community 
Reference Laboratory for this issue has studied the two approaches and has confirmed that the 
same level of protection is achieved. 
 
Title  Rules for import of dairy products into USA 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
SPS 
Measure 
Legislation 
Description 
Certain milk products must come from establishments on a list of Inter State Milk Shipments 
(IMS). To be imported, three options are available: 
•  the exporting establishment must enter into a contract with a State, which must treat 
the exporting establishment as though it falls under its jurisdiction, and meet relevant 
U.S. rules. 
•  the exporting country must adopt and apply U.S. rules 
•  the exporting countries rules must be recognised as equivalent to those of USA 
To date only Greece and Spain have been approved to export to Florida. 
 
Title  Hardy Nursery Stock 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
SPS 
measure 
Quarantine 
Description  
The U.S. requires a two year post-entry quarantine on an importers premises for hardy nursery 
stock. Its main purpose is believed to be the detection of latent infections by organisms of 
quarantine concern. 
 
Title  United States- Bovine animals and products 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
SPS 
measure 
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
Description  
In 1997, the U.S. introduced rules on the import of ruminant animals and products thereof from 
all European countries based on concerns about Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE).  
These rules are still in place. 
State of 
Play 
General statement on BSE to all Third Countries on 17/03/2004 in reaction on the statement of 
the USA 
In response to the confirmation of the first case of BSE in the U.S. in December 2003, the U.S. 
has voiced strong support for the respect of OIE rules by importing countries. However, 
hypercritically, the U.S. does not respect these rules for imports from the EU.  
 
Title  Maturate Meat Products 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
SPS 
measure 
Import licence 
Description  
Imports into the U.S. of uncooked meat products (sausage, ham and bacon) have been subject 
to a long-standing prohibition. Following repeated approaches by the EU, U.S. import 
regulations were modified to permit the import of Parma ham, Serrano hams, Iberian hams, 
Iberian pork shoulders and Iberian pork loins. However, U.S. still applies a prohibition on other  
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types of uncooked meat products (e.g. San Daniele ham, German sausage, Ardennes ham) 
despite the fact that meat products may come from disease free regions and that the 
processing involved should render any risk negligible. 
 
Title  Fresh fruit and vegetables 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
SPS 
measure 
Risk analyses 
Description 
R e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  t h e  i m p o r t  of fresh fruit due to a stringent inspection programme,
cold treatment, lack of progress on Pest Risk Analysis for new varieties and fruits. 
In 2002, Spain requested APHIS the authorization of certain stone fruits (peaches, nectarines, 
apricots, plumbs and cherries) along with avocados and ripe tomatoes (the latter from the 
Canary Islands). All the applications were accompanied by the respective Pest Risk Analyses. 
In April 2005, Spain received a letter from APHIS requesting a number of comments on the 
apricot's Pest Risk Analysis. The letter was duly replied and information provided. As of now no 
official reply has been received by Spain, nor on any of the applications. 
Since 2002, Spain has been unsuccessfully trying to get some information from APHIS on the 
status of these applications without getting any response. 
Investment Related Barriers 
Trade Related Investment Measures 
Title  Helms-Burton Act 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
On 12 March 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (referred to as the Helms-Burton Act). This was the latest in a 
series of legislative initiatives since the U.S. proclaimed a trade embargo against Cuba in 1962 
(Section 620 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; further reinforced by the Food Security 
Act of 1985 and the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992).  
The Helms-Burton Act among others (a) allows U.S. citizens to file lawsuits for damages against 
foreign companies investing in confiscated U.S. (including Cuban-American) property in Cuba 
(Title III of the Act) and (b) requires the U.S. Administration to refuse entry to the U.S. of the 
key executives and shareholders of such companies (Title IV of the Act). The EU is of the view 
that these measures are contrary to U.S. obligations under the WTO Agreements, in particular 
the GATT and GATS. In that respect, the EC initiated a WTO dispute settlement procedure on 3 
May 1996. 
State of 
play 
On 11 April 1997, an Understanding was reached with the U.S. concerning the Helms-Burton 
Act. The Understanding charted a path towards a longer-term solution through the negotiation 
of international disciplines and principles for greater protection of foreign investment, combined 
with the amendment of the Helms-Burton Act. The EC agreed to suspend its WTO case, but 
reserved the right to restart or to re-launch the WTO dispute settlement procedure, if action 
was taken against EU companies or individuals under the Helms-Burton Act, or waivers as 
described in the Understanding were not granted, or were withdrawn. 
At the 18 May 1998 EU-U.S. Summit in London, building upon the April 1997 Understanding, 
the EU and the U.S. reached an Understanding on a package of measures to resolve the 
dispute. The Understanding offers the real prospect for a permanent solution, but still depends 
on acceptance by the U.S. Congress before full implementation may take place. The 
Understanding contains three main elements. 
The first element is the Understanding on investment disciplines. It contains a clear 
commitment on the part of the U.S. Administration to seek from Congress the authority to grant 
a waiver from Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act (visa restrictions) without delay. With respect to 
Title III (submission of lawsuits against trafficking in expropriated property), the Understanding 
provides for a U.S. commitment to continue to waive the right of U.S. citizens to file lawsuits. 
Contrary to the Understanding, neither the waiver under Title IV nor a permanent waiver under 
Title III was granted. However, the Understanding waivers under Title III have been 
continuously granted on a six-monthly basis (the last waiver having been granted on 16 
January 2008 with effect as of 1 February 2008) and no action has been taken, so far, against 
EU citizens or companies under Title IV, although the U.S. Administration continues to 
investigate certain EU companies' investments in Cuba. The existence of the Helms Burton Act 
and the lack of permanent waivers under Titles III and IV continue to constitute an on-going 
threat to EU companies doing or intending to do legitimate business in Cuba. 
The second element is the Transatlantic Partnership on Political Co-operation (TPPC), which 
should be seen in conjunction with the EU's efforts vis-à-vis U.S. Administration to restrain its 
use of unilateral sanctions with extraterritorial effects, so-called 'secondary boycotts'. The TPPC 
states that the U.S. Administration will not seek or propose, and will resist, the passage of such  
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sanctions legislation. 
The last element of the Understanding relates to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). At the 
London Summit in 1998, the U.S. Administration did not grant the EU a multilateral regime 
waiver as foreseen by the Understanding of 11 April 1997. However, the U.S. determined, under 
Section 9(c) of ILSA, to waive the imposition of sanctions against a major EU investment project 
in gas exploration in the South Pars field in Iran and committed that similar cases could be 
expected to be granted similar waivers.  
The Understanding reached at the May 1998 Summit in no way softens the EU's position that 
the Helms-Burton Act is contrary to international law. The EU never acknowledged the 
legitimacy of these Acts and fully reserves its right to resume the WTO case against the Helms-
Burton Act. 
Full implementation depends on congressional support, which still appears not to be 
forthcoming. The EU and its Member States can only fulfil the European commitments once the 
presidential waiver authority has been fully exercised. 
 
Title  Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and Iran Freedom Support Act 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), signed into law on 5 August 1996, provided for 
mandatory sanctions against foreign companies that made an investment above U.S.$20 million 
contributing directly and significantly to the development of petroleum or natural gas in Iran or 
Libya. In addition, mandatory sanctions were also applicable against companies that violated 
the UN Security Council trade sanctions against Libya. ILSA spells out the following possible 
sanctions  
1. The President may direct the U.S. Export-Import Bank not to approve any guarantee, 
insurance, or credit in connection with any goods or service to the sanctioned company.  
2. The President may order the U.S. government not to issue any specific license or grant any 
permission to export goods or technology to the sanctioned company.  
3. U.S. financial institutions may be barred from making loans or providing credits totalling 
more than U.S.$ 10 million in 12 months to a sanctioned company, unless the loans or credits 
are to be used «in activities to relieve human suffering».  
4. The U.S. government may not buy or contract to buy any goods or services from the 
sanctioned company.  
5. The President may impose other sanctions to restrict imports related to the sanctioned 
company.  
6. The law also provides possible sanctions against a sanctioned financial institution. The 
President may delay the imposition of sanctions for up to 90 days for consultations with the 
government with jurisdiction over the person or company.  
State of 
play 
In November 1996, the EU passed a Blocking Statute which encompassed ILSA and Helms-
Burton, among other U.S. laws. The 11 April 1997 EU-U.S. Understanding on Helms-Burton and 
ILSA specified that the U.S. agreed to work with the EU toward the objective of meeting the 
terms (1) for granting EU Member States with a Section 4 (c) waiver with regard to investments 
in Iran; and (2) for granting EU companies Section 9 (c) waivers with regards to investments in 
Libya.  
On 18 April 1997, the Council took note of the Understanding and agreed to suspend the WTO 
Panel while authorising the Commission to recommence or re-establish the Panel if adverse 
action pursuant to Helms-Burton or ILSA was taken against EU companies or waivers were not 
granted. On 21 April 1998, the WTO Panel lapsed automatically under WTO rules.  
Following the 1997 Understanding, the EU and the U.S. agreed on a package deal at the 18 May 
1998 EU-U.S. Summit in London, which contains three elements (1) an agreement on 
disciplines for investments into illegally expropriated property; (2) a U.S. commitment to self-
restraint with regard to future extraterritorial sanctions legislation, as expressed in the 
Transatlantic Partnership on Political Co-operation; (3) an assurance of future waivers for EU 
companies under both the Helms-Burton Act and the ILSA.  
At the EU-U.S. 1998 Summit, the U.S. did not grant the EU a Section 4 multilateral waiver as 
foreseen by the 1997 Understanding, but opted instead to waive the imposition of sanctions 
against TOTAL for its investment in gas exploration in the South Pars field, and indicated that it 
expected to undertake the same waiver for similar cases in the future. With regard to Libya, the 
U.S. agreed to "engage with the EU in a sustained process for consideration of waivers under 
section 9 (c) of ILSA to companies for the EU".  
ILSA was renewed in 2001. On 23 April 2004 in light of Libya's efforts to dismantle its weapons 
of mass destruction and missile programs and its renunciation of terrorism, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued new interim regulations 
removing most of the restrictions on the export and re-export of goods, technology and 
software to Libya.  
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On 30 September 2006, President Bush signed the "Iran Freedom Support Act," which extends 
and amends the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, codifies certain existing sanctions against 
Iran, and authorizes assistance to support democracy in Iran. The Act basically extends ILSA for 
another five years, until 2011, and drops Libya from the law and its penalties. 
Direct Foreign Investment Limitations 
Title  Exon-Florio Amendment 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
On 24 October 2007 the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) came 
into force, replacing Section 5021 of the 1988 Trade Act, the so-called Exon-Florio Amendment 
to the Defense Production Act. It requires the President to review mergers, acquisitions or take-
overs that could result in foreign control of legal persons engaged in interstate commerce to 
determine their potential effects on U.S. national security if any. This screening is carried out by 
the statutory Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS), which is chaired by the 
Department of Treasury and acting on behalf of the President. It is composed also of various 
other Departments, including Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense and State, as well as the 
Director of National intelligence as a non-voting member. For each case Treasury designates a 
lead agency. 
The length of time taken by the screening process, the uncertainty, and the legal and economic 
costs involved potentially have a negative impact on foreign investment. Moreover, should the 
President decide that any such transactions threaten national security, which is widely 
interpreted - he can take action to suspend or prohibit these transactions. This could include the 
forced divestment of assets. There are no provisions for judicial review or for compensation in 
the case of divestment. Since this legislation was originally introduced, the scope of Exon-Florio 
has been further enlarged.  
While the delays for initial review (30 days) and subsequent investigation (45 days) remain 
unchanged, an investigation must be made if a foreign government-owned entity engages in 
any merger, acquisition or take-over that gives it control of the company, or if control of critical 
infrastructure is involved (except if the Secretary of the Treasury and the head of lead agency 
determine that the transaction will not impair national security).  
Reporting obligations towards Congress are enhanced. They include a report by the President to 
Congress on the results of each CFIUS investigation and an evaluation, among other factors to 
be considered, of the potential effect of the proposed or pending transaction on U.S. 
international technological leadership in areas affecting U.S. national security, blurring the line 
between industrial and national security policy.  
This legislation could conflict with the principles of the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital 
Movements and the National Treatment Instruments. While the EU understands the wish of the 
U.S. to take all necessary steps to safeguard its national security, there is continued concern 
that the scope of application may be carried beyond what is necessary. In this context, the EU 
has drawn attention to the lack of a definition of national security and the uncertainty as to 
which transactions are notifiable. 
The new law is the result of extended public discussion and various motions in Congress 
following intended investment by the Chinese oil company CNOOC and Dubai Ports World. 
In a post 9/11 scenario it tightened existing rules, but avoided worse restrictions such as 
extended timelines or overriding of Presidential decisions by Congress. 
Even with the new law uncertainties remain. Foreign investors may feel obliged to give prior 
notification of their proposed investments. In effect a very significant number of EU firms' 
acquisitions in the U.S. are subject to pre-screening.  
There will still be an 'evergreen' provision. A review after conclusion of a procedure may take 
place if false or misleading material had been submitted, or relevant information been omitted, 
or if there is an intentional breach of a mitigation agreement if there are no other remedies to 
address such breach. 
In recent years, the negotiation of Agreements (to mitigate national security concern has 
become more common. These mitigation agreements can require the establishment of a 
separate subsidiary to handle classified contracts.  
The legal and economic costs resulting from the CFIUS review process can be high, not to 
mention the delays in completing a transaction. 
State of 
play 
Awaiting implementation rules. The EU has repeatedly raised its concerns with relevant U.S. 
interlocutors, with the aim of avoiding additional obstacles to foreign direct investment.  
 
Title  Energy Acts 
Sector  Services - Energy 
Description 
Under the Federal Power Act, any construction, operation or maintenance of facilities for the 
development, transmission and utilisation of power on land and water over which the Federal 
Government has control are to be licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Such  
U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2007 
 
 
62
licences can only be granted to U.S. citizens and to corporations organised under U.S. law. 
For the operation, transfer, receipt, manufacture, production, acquisition and import or export of 
facilities which produce or use nuclear materials, the Atomic Energy Act requires that a licence 
be issued but the licence cannot be granted to a foreign individual or a foreign-controlled 
corporation, even if there is incorporation under U.S. law. 
 
Tax Discrimination 
Title  Earnings Stripping Provisions 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
The so-called "earnings stripping" provisions in I n t e r n a l  R e v e n u e  C o d e  1 6 3 j  l i m i t  t h e  t a x  
deductibility of interest payments made to "related parties" which are not subject to U.S. tax, 
and of interest payments on loans guaranteed by such related parties. In practice, most "related 
parties" affected will be foreign corporations. These provisions are designed to prevent foreign 
companies from avoiding tax by financing a U.S. subsidiary with a disproportionately high 
amount of debt as compared with equity, with the result that profits are paid out of the U.S. in 
the form of deductible interest payments rather than as dividends out of taxed income. 
The objective of the "earnings stripping" provisions is reasonable and in line with internationally 
agreed tax policy. However, the U.S. rules for calculating the ceiling in any year on the amount 
of admissible interest uses a formula, the results of which can be inconsistent with the 
internationally accepted arm's-length principle. If, ultimately, this leads to the disallowance of 
relief for the interest payable, it could have discriminatory consequences, because a tax treaty 
partner would not be obliged to make a corresponding adjustment to taxable profits in the other 
country. The provisions relating to loans guaranteed by related parties could also disallow the 
interest on a number of ordinary commercial arrangements with U.S. banks, and provide a 
disincentive from raising loans with them. 
 
Title  Tax Code Reporting Requirements 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
The information reporting requirements of the U.S. Tax Code as applied to certain foreign-
owned corporations mean that domestic and foreign companies are treated differently. These 
rules apply to foreign branches and to any corporation that has at least one 25% foreign 
shareholder. They require the maintenance, or the creation, of books and records relating to 
transactions with related parties. The documents must be stored at a place specified by the U.S. 
tax authorities, and an annual statement filed containing information about dealings with related 
parties. There are stiff penalties for non-compliance with the various provisions.  
The information reporting requirements of the U.S. Tax Code are onerous. Although their 
purpose, the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion, is reasonable, they are burdensome and 
add to the complexity for foreign-owned corporations of doing business in the U.S. 
 
Title  U.S. Wine tax discrimination  
Sector  Wines & Spirits 
Description 
Under U.S. federal law, wine produced in or imported into the U.S. is subject to a "gallonage 
tax" with different tax bands according to the alcoholic content. However, small U.S. producers 
not producing more than 250.000 gallons a year (= ca. 125.000 bottles / 10.000 crates) are 
eligible for a tax credit of USD 0,90 per gallon on the first 100.000 gallons, and a degressive 
rebate for production between 100.000 and 250.000 gallons. The tax credit is a rebate on the 
federal excise duty on wine; the excise duty is paid by producers upon selling wine or by the 
importer of wine at the moment of taking the wine out of the customs depot. 
Only U.S. producers have access to the federal tax credit and tax rebate. 
In addition to the federal tax, differential fiscal measures and excise duties are also levied on 
wine at State level. These measures provide for tax breaks for small domestic producers or tax 
credits for local producers whilst no similar exemptions / benefits are granted to imported wine. 
State of 
play 
The federal tax credit scheme targeting small domestic producers as well as the States 
differential treatment in favour of domestic products were examined by the GATT panel in the 
U.S. –Malt Beverages dispute of 16 March 1992 where it was found that the scheme violated 
the U.S.'s obligations under Art. III.2 of GATT.  
Although the panel report was adopted, the federal law providing for the scheme was never 
repealed or modified and remains in application. 
The issue has been raised at the occasion of the EC/U.S. wine talks meetings in 2006 and 2007. 
According to the information provided by U.S. authorities the scheme remains operational. U.S. 
also mentioned that there is no rule requiring U.S. origin of the grapes used to produce the wine 
but that this is the practice.  
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Intellectual Property Rights 
Legislation on Copyright and Related Rights 
Title  Section 110(5) of 1976 Copyright Act (Irish Music) 
Sector  Services - Communications & Audiovisual 
Description 
Section 110 of the U.S. Copyright Act provides for limitations on exclusive rights granted to 
copyright holders for their copyrighted work, in the form of exemptions for broadcast by non-
right holders of certain performances and displays, namely, "homestyle exemption" (for 
"dramatic" musical works) and "business exemption" (works other than "dramatic" musical 
works). Concretely, Section 110(5) permits the playing of broadcast music in public places (such 
as bars, shops, restaurants etc.) without the payment of a royalty fee. 
The described practice has caused a loss of income to right-holders, as a large number of 
commercial establishments do not pay any royalty fees. Moreover, the incomplete copyright 
protection in the U.S. has broader economic effects negatively affecting the overall position of 
authors on the U.S. market. 
At the request of the EU and its Member States, at the DSB meeting of 25 May 1999, a Panel 
was established. On 27 July 2000, the DSB adopted the Panel report that found Section 
110(5)(B) of the U.S. Copyright Act to be incompatible with the TRIPs Agreement, in connection 
w i t h  t he  Be r n C o n v e nt i o n  on  t he  P r o t e ct i o n  o f  L i t e r a r y  a n d  A r t i s t i c  W o r k s ,  a s  i t  pr o v i d e s  an 
exceedingly broad derogation from the exclusive right of authors to authorise the public 
communication of their works. In particular, Section 110(5) allows the public retransmission of 
broadcast music in commercial premises (bars, shops, restaurants etc.) without royalties being 
paid. 
In 2001, an arbitration panel determined that the level of nullification or impairment was equal 
to 1.219.900 per year.  
As the U.S. declared not to be in a position to comply promptly with the WTO ruling; the EC 
agreed to discuss a possible mutually acceptable arrangement. The parties eventually reached a 
common understanding the U.S. was to provide financial assistance to EU performing societies 
with a view to developing activities for the promotion of authors' rights, pending compliance 
with the DSB recommendations and rulings. The understanding covered a 3-year period ending 
on 21 December 2004. 
In July 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Trade Promotion Authority Act, which included a 
provision setting up a fund for the payment of settlements of WTO disputes. In April 2003, the 
Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act foresaw an appropriation to make a payment in 
connection with the Section 110(5) dispute. In the light of these legislative developments, the 
U.S. and the EC notified to the WTO a mutually satisfactory temporary arrangement on 23 June. 
In September 2003, the U.S. made the agreed payment. The arrangement expired on 21 
December 2004 and the U.S. has so far failed to offer either a temporary or definitive solution to 
the dispute. 
For the time being there are no legislative initiatives to bring the Copyright Act into compliance 
with the TRIPs Agreement. 
The EC's right to suspend concessions or other obligations has been safeguarded by means of a 
request under Article 22.2 DSU made on 7 January 2002. The requested suspension of TRIPs 
obligations consists in the levying of a special fee to U.S. right holders that apply for action by 
the EU customs authorities to block pirated copyright goods. The EC request was immediately 
submitted to arbitration due to U.S. opposition. The arbitration procedure is currently 
suspended. 
Trademarks Legislations 
Title  Section 211 of Omnibus Appropriations Act (Havana Club) 
Sector  Wines & Spirits 
Description 
Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act prohibits, under certain conditions, the 
registration or renewal of a trademark or a trade name which is identical or similar to a 
trademark or trade name used in connection with a business confiscated at the time of the 
Cuban revolution. It also prevents U.S. Courts from recognising or enforcing any assertion of 
rights to such marks or trade names under the same conditions. 
Section 211 was introduced into the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 at the behest of 
Bacardi, in order to bar its competitor, Havana Club Holding (HCH), from protecting its trade 
mark "Havana Club" in the U.S. "Havana Club" is a premium rum produced in Cuba and 
marketed worldwide by Havana Club Holding through Havana Club International (HCI). Formed 
in 1993, Havana Club Holding is a joint venture between Havana Rum and Liquors of Cuba and 
Pernod Ricard of France. Havana Club Holdings owns registration of the "Havana Club" 
trademark in 183 countries and has the right to acquire the U.S. registration from Cubaexport, 
which had registered the mark in the United States in 1976. 
State of 
play 
After WTO consultations failed, the EU and its Member States requested the establishment of a 
WTO Panel on Section 211. On 26 September 2000, a WTO panel was established to rule on the  
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compatibility of Section 211 with the obligations of the U.S. under the TRIPs Agreement. The 
Panel's report, issued on 6 August 2001, confirmed that Section 211 was in violation of Article 
42 of TRIPs by denying trademark owners access to the courts. Furthermore, it stated expressly 
that Section 211 should not apply when the trademark has been abandoned. However, there 
were two points where the Panel did not agree with the EU's claims. The Panel considered that 
trade names are not covered by TRIPs and that TRIPs does not regulate the question of the 
ownership of intellectual property rights. The Appellate Body report, issued on 2 January 2002, 
substantially reversed the reasoning of the panel and ruled that Section 211 discriminates in 
favour of U.S. nationals and against Cuban nationals vis-à-vis other foreigners. According to this 
report, Section 211 violates two core obligations of the TRIPs Agreement which are the National 
Treatment and Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment obligations. The Appellate Body 
confirmed that, under the TRIPs, WTO Members do have an obligation to protect trade names. 
However, the Appellate Body found that the U.S. statute was in conformity with Article 42 of the 
TRIPs Agreement, thereby reversing the panel findings on that point and maintained the finding 
of the panel that the TRIPs does not govern the issue of the determination of ownership of IP 
rights.  
The DSB adopted the Panel's and the Appellate Body's reports at the regular DSB meeting on 1 
February 2002 , which implied the obligation for the U.S. to bring its legislation in conformity 
with its TRIPs obligations. The reasonable period of time for implementation, extended several 
times, expired on 30 June 2005. In July 2005, the DSB adopted a U.S./EU agreement which 
preserves the right for the EU to request the authorisation to suspend the application to the 
United States of concessions or other WTO obligations at a later stage. 
In August 2006, Section 211 was used to deny renewal of the U.S. trademark registration of 
"Havana Club". That decision has been appealed by the company concerned.  
By the end of 2007, the U.S. has not adopted any implementing measure of the DSB ruling. 
Legislation on Appellations of Origin and Geographic Indications 
Title  Protection of EU wine Geographical Indications  
Sector  Wines & Spirits 
Description 
By virtue to the Wine Agreement on trade in wine between the EU and the USA, the U.S. 
protects Community geographical indications via their labelling rules (TBT legislation) and are 
designated as 'names of origin'.  This agreement is without prejudice to EU rights under the 
TRIPS and does not affect the EU legislative framework for GIs (Geographical Indications). 
The U.S. implements its TRIPS obligation relating to GI via trademark law. This legal instrument 
is not appropriate for geographical indication protection for, among others, the following 
reasons: trademarks may be transferred (not possible for GIs since they can be used by any 
person established in the delimited area producing goods in compliance with the specification), 
trademarks shall be renewed otherwise the owner loses his protection (GI does not need to be 
renewed), the protection of GI is subject to private actions (GI is protected ex-officio by public 
authorities), trademark is owned by a person (there is no ownership for GIs). 
 
Title  Protection of EU wine Geographical Indications (semi-generics) 
Sector  Wines & Spirits 
Description 
On 10 March 2006, the agreement on trade in wine between the United States and the EU 
entered into force. With this agreement, both parties recognise and protect via their labelling 
rules each others 'wine names'. Regarding 17 important EU wine GI's considered as 'semi-
generic terms' in the U.S., the U.S. agreed to seek to change their legal status to restrict their 
use to EU wines only, as far as wine labels issued after a certain date are concerned. This 
restriction does not apply to wine labels issued for wines of U.S. origin before that date.  
On the 9 December 2006 the U.S. Congress adopted new labelling legislation for the EU semi 
generics (i.e. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006- Section 422) aimed to restrict the use of 
these names to EU products for new wine labels. This new text was signed by the U.S. President 
and thus enacted as law on the 20 December 2006. 
The fact that these names are still considered in the U.S. as semi-generics weakens the 
reputation of the Community geographical indications concerned in the U.S. U.S. users of semi-
generics can take advantage of, or  could damage, the reputation of the Community 
geographical indications in question. The collective effort and investment made by producers of 
the EU geographical indications concerned to build the reputation of these names is materially 
impacted by the legal status of semi-generics in the U.S. and disadvantages genuine European 
wines traded in the U.S. versus U.S. products using these terms. 
A joint declaration attached to the existing EU-U.S. wine agreement provides that issues such 
as geographical indications and the future phasing out of the remaining labels using the 17 EU 
names for wines of U.S. origin will be on the agenda. Negotiations for a second phase wine 
agreement were launched in June 2006 and further meetings have been held in 2006 and 2007. 
State of 
play 
Negotiations are ongoing. The next meeting will be held in January 2008.  
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Legislation on Patents (Including Plant Varieties) 
Title  Principle of First-to-Invent 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
The U.S. patent system applies the principle of "first-to-invent", while the rest of the world 
follows the principle of "first-to-file", fixing thereby a clearly defined moment when the priority 
right to a patent is established.  
The first-to-invent principle creates several obstacles for EU and U.S. companies trying to obtain 
a patent right in the U.S., namely because it has a considerable economic impact on the 
potential right holder. The issue has figured on top of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue 
agenda and the latter has recommended the adoption of the first-to-file approach in the U.S. 
State of 
play 
The issue is being discussed within the so called Alexandria process or Group B+. 
Since April 2007, there is a bipartisan, but not governmental, U.S. patent reform bill in the U.S. 
Congress that supports introduction of First–to-File system, but it is uncertain whether this bill 
will be finally adopted. 
 
Title  IPR Infringement Cases (Section 337 of 1930 Tariff Act) 
Sector  Other Industries 
Description 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides remedies for holders of U.S. intellectual property 
rights by keeping the imported goods which are infringing such rights out of the U.S. ("exclusion 
order") or to have them removed from the U.S. market once they have come into the country 
("cease and desist order"). These procedures are carried out by the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (ITC) and are not available against domestic products infringing U.S. patents.  
Under the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, several modifications have been 
introduced to Section 337. However, in its present form, Section 337 does not eliminate the 
major GATT inconsistencies raised by the 1989 GATT Panel. As a result, Section 337 appears to 
continue to be in violation of Article III 4 GATT and of a number of provisions contained in 
TRIPs. 
State of 
play 
Since February 2000, the ITC has started new investigations against a number of European and 
Canadian companies. In the absence of any abusive claim or dilatory claim concepts applicable 
to the Section 337 procedure they appear to have no other purpose than to compel the 
European defendants to settle. The Commission is concerned by these developments and it 
regularly raises the "Section 337" issue in its bilateral contacts with the U.S. Administration. The 
Commission does not discount further action at the WTO level. 
 
Title  Plant Patents 
Sector  Agriculture and Fisheries 
Description 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) should revise the current interpretation of novelty criteria for plant patents (for 
asexually reproduced material) and utility patents in-line with the International Convention for 
the Protection of New Varieties (UPOV).  
For foreign plant breeders it is almost impossible in case of vegetative reproduced plants to get 
a Plant Patent system. Contrary to most other countries, foreign breeders only have a period of 
one year after the marketing of their plants outside the U.S. to get breeders rights protection in 
the U.S. for their varieties. This means that a marketing decision has to be made immediately 
whether or not to protect a certain variety in the U.S. However, international agreements are 
based on a four year period, which is more realistic. Although the Plant Patent Act does not 
represent a case of IPR infringement per se, the restriction of one year does seriously impede 
trade in breeding material for ornamental plants to the U.S. 
 
Title  Hilmer Doctrine 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
European companies are confronted with discrimination due to the application of the Hilmer 
doctrine which does not follow the rule that the prior art which is relevant for assessing the 
novelty and the inventiveness of an invention may be defined as all information which has been 
available to the public anywhere in the world in any form before the priority date of a claimed 
invention. Furthermore, an international application (Patent Cooperation Treaty, PCT) arising 
from European countries is not included in the U.S. prior art until the date of the entry into the 
U.S. national phase even if that application has been published previously. 
This doctrine is clearly detrimental for European companies although it is authorised by Article 
27(5) of PCT. 
State of 
play 
The issue is being discussed within the so called Alexandria process or Group B+.  
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Other (export related) 
Export Prohibition and Other Quantitative Restrictions 
Title  Drug Precursor Chemicals 
Sector  Chemicals 
Description 
In the area of drug precursor chemicals, the "Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005" 
contained in the U.S. Patriot Act authorisation establishes potential import prohibitions for 
certain drug precursor chemicals. The Act was signed by U.S. President Bush on 9 March 2006 
and became Public Law Number 109-177. In particular, Sections 721 and 722 require the 
importer to provide information on distribution including sales along the supply chain and allow 
the Attorney General to prohibit the importation of the concerned precursor chemicals in the 
case of refusal to fully co-operate with the Attorney General. The State Department is 
responsible for implementing these provisions and determines the world's largest exporters and 
importers who will then be subject to certification. EU Member States are likely to be on that 
list. The deadline for this new law will be March 2008. 
 
Title  Encryption Control Policy 
Sector  Electronics 
Description 
Potential problems are posed by the differential treatment of encryption items depending on 
whether they are transferred to government and non-government end users. In addition, the 
generalised introduction of the technical review of encryption products above a certain key 
length in advance of sale creates a difficulty for the European industry for cases of re-export. 
The effect of the Cryptography Note, as introduced in the Wassenaar Arrangement, has been 
reduced by the U.S. authorities through the introduction of two new requirements crypto 
functionality should not be modified or customised and the items cannot be network 
infrastructure products such as high end routers or switches designed for large volume 
communications. The latter items still need to be licensed. 
A combination of the continuing constraints on the export of strong encryption products and on 
the interoperability of systems employing such technology inhibits not only trade in encryption 
products but also, more importantly, the effective growth of e-commerce. Thus, significant 
barriers to international trade in encryption products without key recovery continue to exist, 
despite the fact that EU Member States, like the U.S., are all members of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement.  
There is a trend, reported by some EU Member States, of the U.S. denying the export of certain 
dual-use items from EU Member States which is especially worrying, given the high non-
proliferation commitment of the EU Member States and the substantial initiatives they have 
taken in this area, in particular at the Thessaloniki European Council meeting in June 2003. At 
this European Council meeting, a declaration of principles and an action plan against 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was adopted which contains a number of provisions 
regarding the strengthening of export controls of dual-use related items in an enlarged EU. 
 
Title  Iran Non-Proliferation Act 
Sector  Horizontal  
Description 
On 14 March 2000, the Iran Non-Proliferation Act (INPA) was signed into law. It provides for 
discretionary sanctions against foreign companies transferring to Iran goods, services and 
technology listed under the international export control regimes, as well as any other item 
prohibited for export to Iran under U.S. export control regulations, as potentially contributing to 
the development of weapons of mass destruction.  
INPA constitutes extraterritorial legislation. On the one hand, it allows the U.S. Administration 
to apply its own sanctions to exports which are subject to EU Member State and EU export 
control regimes. On the other hand, it unilaterally expands the scope of export controls on EU 
exports beyond those multilaterally agreed upon. Its adoption is incompatible with the U.S. 
commitment under the Transatlantic Partnership for Political Cooperation (TPPC) to resist the 
passage of extraterritorial sanction legislation.  
State of 
play 
EU concerns were repeatedly expressed in the run-up to the adoption of this Act. Taking these 
into account, President Clinton issued a statement when signing the bill into law, undertaking to 
work with Congress in order to seek to rationalise the reporting requirements on transfers 
deemed legal under the applicable foreign laws and consistent with the multilateral export 
control regimes.  
In 2005 persons were arrested within the EU on grounds of extraterritorial application of 
criminal charges levied by the U.S. against EU exporters who were not involved in export of 
dual use items covered by neither international export control regimes nor EC Regulation on 
export of dual use items and were not related to Weapons of Mass Destruction Programmes. 
The INPA also prohibits the U.S. Administration to acquire space related technology and services 
from Russia. In the framework of the International Space Station (ISS) programme, the U.S.  
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has to acquire Russian Soyuz from 2006 in order to fulfil its space transportation obligations in 
the ISS programme, because the U.S. Space Shuttle will not be available in the extent 
necessary for maintaining the ISS. Europe, as a partner in the ISS programme, depends on the 
U.S. complying with its obligations. An amendment to the INPA authorises the Bush 
Administration to derogate from certain provisions that had become an obstacle to the 
acquisition of Russian space technology and services. 
 